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This dissertation studies the emergence of a Keynesian
political-economic strategy in America during the interwar
period.
It is concerned primarily with one crucial aspect of

this process: the ideological role played by key political,
economic, and managerial elites in the emergence of such
strategy.
It thus traces the political discourse articulated
by the Taylor Society, the institutional home of scientific
management, from its inception as an industrial research

organization to its development as an important policy-making
network during the New Deal.
It focuses on key figures in
the Taylor Society including Morris L. Cooke, Harlow

S.

Person, Henry Dennison, and Mary Van Kleeck, as well as those

who were closely associated with the society, such as Rexford
G.

Tugwell, Louis D. Brandies, George Soule, Frances Perkins,

and Sidney Hillman.
The historical narrative shows how during the 1930s the

Taylor Society became an important component of the political
and economic network that put forward a Keynesian strategy

based on the expansion of mass consumption (and thus social
This
purchasing power) via the intervention of the state
network was critical of the corporatist program, embodied in
.

the National Recovery Administration,

in which that state

would sanction cartel-like arrangements among capitalists to
reduce destructive competition, restrict production, and fix
This system of industrial self-regulation entailed
prices.
minimal state intervention and

a

vi

reduced role for the unions

and the collective bargaining.
The Keynesian strategy
advanced by the Taylor Society and its allies, on the
other
hand, advocated an expanded and strong role for the
state and
unions in the political economy, along with macroeconomic
policies that promoted social purchasing power and expanded
mass consumption.

During the "Second New Deal" the Keynesian elite entered
the corridors of power and many of its members took key

administrative positions in the welfare state. From these
positions they attempted to shape the American political
economy
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CHAPTER

I

THE TAYLOR SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

Introduction
"We are all post-Keynesians now,

Hirschman, paraphrasing and updating

pronouncement.

1

In doing so,

"

states Albert

a

famous

Hirschman calls our attention

to one of the most profoundly important developments in the

history of twentieth-century U.S. capitalism:

the rise and

decline of the political-economic configuration called
Keynesianism.

Strictly speaking, the concept of

Keynesianism refers to the economic theory of demand
management developed by English economist John Maynard
Keynes.

According to Peter A. Hall, this economic theory,

as expressed in Keynes'

The General Theory of Employment.

Interest and Money published in 1936,

"suggested that

government could influence overall levels of growth and
employment in the economy by means of
aggregate demand."

As such,

it

a

strategy based on

provided an alternative to

the existing approaches of laissez-faire or direct state

control of the economy that policy makers faced during the

interwar period.
However, during the postwar period, as Keynes'

ideas

became closely associated with the transformation of the

1

state,

Keynesianism acquired

broader connotation.

a

As

Hall puts it:

Like the concepts of Karl Marx... the ideas of John
Maynard Keynes seem quintessential to a historical
period.
They are closely associated with a major
transformation in the economic role of the state
that is one of the hallmarks of this century.
Although Keynes was by no means responsible for the
expansion of the welfare state that is sometimes
linked to his name, his theories placed increasing
responsibility for economic performance on the
government's shoulders, and his attacks on the
priority which classical economics attached to a
balance budget helped to loosen a fiscal constraint
that stood in the way of more generous social
programs.
In these respects, to study the emerging
influence of Keynesian ideas is to consider many of
the factors behind the development of the state
since the 1920s. 3
Thus,

the notion of

era"

refers more generally to the social and economic

a

"Keynesian state" or of

practices associated with the management of
economy in the postwar period.
It

a

a

"Keynesian

capitalist

4

is in this broader and more general way that

use "Keynesianism" here to refer not to

theoretical system, but to denote

a

a

I

will

formal

political-economic

perspective concerned above all with expanding mass
consumption via the intervention of the state.
particular,

I

In

will apply the concept of "Keynesian" in this

broad sense to those interwar ideas or policies that
despite having been developed parallel to, or separate from
Keynes' writings, expressed basically the same political-

2

economic perspective as the one developed by Keynes.
addition,

In

will use "proto-Keynesian" to describe the

I

strategies that anticipated parts of the Keynesian

perspective and, especially, many of its relevant policy
implications.

My concern,

then,

is not

with the

development of a specific economic doctrine, but rather
with the understanding of

a

political-economic strategy

that came to be known retrospectively as Keynesianism
Finally,
I

5

it should be noted that throughout this work

will draw upon the theoretical framework developed by

Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, Robert Boyer and other

French political economist s--called the "regulation
school. "6

As Bob Jessop points out,

this theoretical

framework is particularly concerned with the changing forms
and mechanisms

— institutions,

networks, procedures and

norms--in which and through which the social reproduction
of capitalism is secured,
way.

7

Specifically,

implicitly)

I

albeit in a temporary and partial

will make use

(either explicitly or

of the two key concepts developed by this

theoretical school: "regime of accumulation" and "mode of
regulation."

The first refers to a particular

configuration of production and consumption:
...which can be reproduced over time despites its
conflictual tendencies/" whereas the second
designates a set of historically determined
institutional forms "which can secure capitalist

3

reproduction [for a given period] despite the
conflictual and antagonistic character of capitalist
social relations. 8
As stated above,

with the emergence of
strategy.

It

a

Keynesian political-economic

contends that this strategy emerged in the

interwar period as
Depression.

this study is concerned primarily

response to the crisis of the Great

a

This crisis came about because the prevailing

mode of regulation,

a

fundamentally competitive and

laissez-faire form, had become antiquated and was harmful
to the emergent regime of intensive accumulation,

following Gramsci, has been called Fordism.
clear,

in retrospect,

devise

a

It

seems

that the way out of the crisis was to

new mode of regulation

political,

9

which,

institutional,

(i.e.

new set of

a

and social arrangements such as

the capital-labor accord, the social wage and others)

,

that

would support the expansion of Fordism and hence the
articulation between mass production and mass consumption.
The new mode of regulation devised was

a

Keynesian mode of

regulat ion--based on the increased economic power of the
state,

collective bargaining and rising consumption .norms
*

Central to this new mode of regulation was the

transformation of the role of the state, that

is,

the use

of the state to stimulate mass consumption and economic

growth through fiscal and monetary policy.

4

10

The rise of the Keynesian mode of regulation,
however,
was not a preordained development in the political
economy
of twentieth-century U.S. capitalism.

Nor was it the

product of some capitalist "conspiracy" to "co-opt"
workers.

It was,

(1933-1950)

rather,

the outcome of almost two decades

of monumental economic,

political,

and

ideological struggles involving conflicts not just between
workers and capitalists, but also between different groups
of economic elites and between contending networks of

policymakers.

11

The rise of the Keynesian mode of

regulation then was the outcome of the projects and
struggles of real people trying to cope with changing

historical circumstances.

As such,

it was the product of a

host of profound conflicts, which were resolved in

a

way

that produced wide disparities between intentions and

consequences.

As Jessop indicates,

(and regimes of accumulation)

planned; they emerge in

a

modes of regulation

are "discovered" rather than

contingent, non-intentional

manner
There is no global subject to plan accumulation
strategies, regulatory mechanisms, or hegemonic
projects and to guarantee their successful
Instead we find only different
implementation.
subjects whose activities are more or less coordinated, whose activities meet more or less
resistance from other forces, and whose strategies
are pursued within a structural context which is
both constraining and facilitating. 1 ^
•

5

•19

It took a major capitalist crisis

(the Great

Depression of the 1930s) and the subsequent wartime

mobilization effort to force the creation of this new mode
of regulation.

Once in place, however, Keynesianism

promptly contributed to the stability of U.S. capitalism by
creating the macro-economic conditions which enabled

Fordism to become

a

fully-fledged regime of accumulation.

This process led to the long postwar boom of consumer

capitalism, which lasted until 1973.
U.S.

During that period,

capitalism experienced unprecedented growth and

prosperity, rising living standards, and relative
stability. 13

A key indicator of the phenomenal growth and

prosperity of the postwar period was the expansion of mass
consumption norms to broader and broader sections of the

working class.

Underlying this expansion of mass

consumption was the deployment of Keynesian policies, which
linked wages to productivity through

a

capital-labor

accord, promoted the growth of the social wage,

expanded the facilities of consumer credit.

and

14

The consolidation of the postwar Fordist-Keynesian

mode of development thus led to

a

profound transformation

of the conditions of life for a large section of the U.S.

working class.

First,

it entailed the development of a

mode of consumption characterized by the individual

consumption of commodities provided by mass production

6

(i.e.

by mass consumption of standardized commodities).

According to Michel Aglietta:
...this involved a reversal both of traditional ways
of life and of the initial experience of the working
class in an epoch of extreme poverty and total
insecurity, which provided no basis for any
stabilization of consumption habits." 15

The development of this mode of consumption, moreover,

enabled growing sectors of the working class to purchase
cars,

housing,

machines,

and consumer durables

(televisions, washing

refrigerators, vacuum cleaners,

toasters, etc.).

raised perhaps

a

This process,

stereos,

as Mike Davis points out,

quarter of the American population--

especially white-ethnic semi-skilled workers and their
families--to consumption standards previously enjoyed by

middle-class or skilled workers, standards marked by home
ownership and credit purchasing.

And in doing so,

"it

allowed the U.S. working class increasingly to reproduce
itself as a collectivity of privatized consumers
Second,

."

1

^

it also entailed a vast spatial

transformation, which is best exemplified by the rapid

growth of suburbanization, the diffusion of an extensive

network of highways, and the emergence of fast-food

restaurants and shopping malls as the central features of
the so-called "American way of life."

7

Indicative of this

transformation is the fact that between 1950 and
1960,
suburbs grew forty times faster than central city
areas,

while automobile registration increased by 22 million.

17

Suburbanization involved the breakup of traditional
solidarities, neighborhood communities, and extended kin
networks; and it ensured that the nuclear family would

become the social institution most congruent with the dual

process of commodizat ion and privatization of

consumption

1 &

This transformation, however, did not take place

exclusively through the private market.
possible,

rather,

War II urban

(or

It was

made

by the federal government's post-World

better yet suburban) policy, which

included highway building under the Federal Interstate and
National Defense Act of 1956 and home ownership (federal
home loans,

and tax relief for mortgages)

FNMA,

and other agencies. !9

HLBB,

under FHA, VA,
by providing

Thus,

supportive conditions for higher levels of private mass
consumption, the Keynesian state played

a

key role in the

development of the "auto-house-electrical-appliance
complex" as the mainspring of economic growth during the

postwar period. 20
The "success" of postwar capitalism led some to

believe that the "consumer society" had definitely resolved

8

the social and economic contradictions of
capitalism.

However, those who emphasized the "success" of postwar

capitalism completely ignored the existence of the social
sectors who were excluded (minorities, women and the

underprivileged)

from the benefits of Fordism.

Furthermore, they also overlooked abundant signs of

discontent with Fordism even at its peak.

As David Harvey

points out, Fordism's inequalities produced serious social

tensions and important social movements on the part of
those excluded from its benefits: "Denied access to

privileged work in mass production, large segments of the
work-force were equally denied access to the much-touted
joys of mass consumption.

discontent.

This was

a

sure formula for

The civil rights movement in the United States

spilled over into revolutionary rage that shook the inner
cities.

The surge of women into low-paying jobs was

accompanied by an equally vigorous feminist movement.

And

the shock of discovery of awesome poverty in the midst of

growing affluence
Other America

)

(as

exposed by Michael Harrington's The

spawned strong countermovements of

discontent with the supposed benefits of Fordism." 21
Toward the midl970s, the Fordist-Keynesian mode of

development plunged into crisis, and with this crisis the
long postwar boom came to an end. 22

The crisis of this

political-economic configuration opened

a

period of

transition characterized by radical changes in the labor
process,

in consumer habits,

of capital,

in the geographical mobility

in the form and content of state intervention,

and in cultural-ideological trends.
argues,

But as David Harvey

"whether or not the new systems of production and

marketing,

characterized by more flexible labor processes

and markets,

of geographical mobility and rapid shifts in

consumption practices, warrant the title of

a

new regime of

accumulation, and whether the revival of entrepreneurialism
and of neo-conservatism,

coupled with the cultural turn to

postmodernism, warrant the title of
regulation,

is by no means clear. "23

a

new mode of
what does seem clear

is that since 1973 the political economy has been in major

transformation.

And in the process, we are witnessing the

unraveling of the Keynesian political-economic order that
emerged in the 1930s and was consolidated in the post-World
War II period.

We are witnessing the end of an era.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of
economic policy.

To paraphrase Robert Boyer,

if the

principal debate in the 1970s was between Keynesianism and
monetarism,

in the 1980s neo-liberalism reigned supreme.

At present,

the debate seems to be reduced to which of the

variants of neo-liberalism (conservative, centrist, or

10

social democratic) will prevail.

In practice,

liberalism has involved the deployment of

a

neo-

program

characterized by emphasis on deregulation^ and
disengagement
of the state from economic activity

(including the

dismantling of state-sponsored social programs and the

privatization of the public sector)
much more than

a

.

As such it has become

mere ideology that exalts the virtue of

the market economy.

it

has become the spearhead of

a

political strategy aimed at displacing "welfare-state
liberalism" with
model.

a

laissez-faire,

free-market economic

Gone are the days when even conservative

governments were willing to increase public spending and
social insurance coverage, when even Richard Nixon boldly

proclaimed,

"We are all Keynesians now."

Today,

state

intervention is denounced everywhere as an intolerable

obstruction to "the freedom of the market," to "growth" and
"prosperity." 24
circle:

As Hirschman suggests,

we have come full

"We are all post-Keynesians now."

The Taylor Society and Interwar Political Econom y
If the Keynesian order is dead,

perhaps it is

pertinent to retrace its beginnings to shed light on the

birth of the "new order."
a

My purpose here is not to write

history of the past in terms of the present, but rather

11

to use the past to further our understanding
of the

present.

I

hope to contribute to this understanding
by

examining the ideological role played by key
political,
technocratic, and managerial elites in the emergence
of the

Keynesian mode of regulation.

In particular,

I

will focus

on the political discourse articulated by the
Taylor

Society,

an industrial research organization and policy-

discussion network, which sought during the interwar period
to chart the future of the American political economy.

Born in 1911 and composed primarily by management-

engineers and businessmen, the Taylor Society was the
institutional home of the scientific management movement
founded by Frederick W. Taylor.

Before World War

the

I,

Taylor Society was concerned exclusively with the technical

problems of factory production and the reorganization of
the labor process.

After the War, however, the Taylor

Society would address the problem of industrial relations
by advocating

a

conception of industrial democracy based on

"workers' consent" and "union-management cooperation"

schemes.

This shift in policy led to

a

rapprochement with

the American Federation of Labor during the 1920s.

In the

interwar period, moreover, the Taylor Society would develop
into an important policy-making network concerned with the

problems of the macroeconomy and the state. ^5

12

This dissertation traces the relationship
between the

Taylor Society and American political economy.

it attempts

to show how during the interwar period the
Taylor Society

became

key forum in which an important group of mass

a

consumption-oriented businessmen, engineers, and social
scientists,

sought to sketch the outlines of

a

fundamentally "Keynesian" mode of regulation.

My

contention is that the Taylorites were part of

a

"professional-managerial" elite, who by the early 1930s
came to espouse a "Keynesian" strategy focused on expanding

mass consumption (and thus social purchasing power) via the

intervention of the state.
strategy,

Such a political-economic

according to its proponents, would lead to full

employment, economic growth, and prosperity. 26
the 1920s,

Formed in

this professional-managerial elite came to the

corridors of power during the Second New Deal, when many of
its members became key administrators of the "welfare

state

"
.

Underlying my contention is the understanding that
although Keynes' ideas had no direct influence on policy in
the United States until perhaps 1938 or 1939,

"Keynesian"

ideas were much part of public discourse before the mid19303.

Consequently, we ought to take this neglected

historical development more seriously than has been the

13

case so far. 27

This study thus acknowledges the importance

of ideas in political economy.

However,

it also recognizes

that simply stating that ideas are important
is not enough.

What matters is to be able to explain why one set
of ideas
has more force than another in

a

given historical moment.

And in order to accomplish this we need to examine not only
the ideas themselves, but also the social political, and

economic conditions that lend force to one set of ideas
over another in

particular historical context. 28

a

This

dissertation attempts to address such questions.
To summarize,

this dissertation uses the Taylor

Society as a vehicle to study the emergence of

a

"Keynesian" strategy during the interwar period.
it

As such,

focus on key figures in the Taylor Society including

Morris Cooke, Harlow

S.

Person,

Henry Dennison, and Mary

van Kleeck, as well as those who were closely associated

with the Society,
Hillman,

Soule.29
1930s,

Rexford
i

such as Felix Frankfurter,
G.

Frances Perkins,

Tugwell,

Sidney
and George

trace the Society and its members into the

moreover, to understand their relationship to the

New Deal itself.

Finally,

I

explore the role played by the

Society and its members in the emergence of the post-World
War II Keynesian order.

14

Contending Political-Economic Strategie s
This study attempts to shed light not only on the

beginnings of the post-war Keynesian order, but perhaps
more important on the transition to
My analysis is based on

a

a

post-Keynesian era.

non-teleological conception of

capitalist development in which human agency plays

a

central role and in which history is understood as an open-

ended process.

This conception rejects the "conspiracy"

model of history in which all historical outcomes

consciously serve the interests of the capitalist class.
My point of departure is the recognition that the

history of capitalism is the product of economic,

political

,

and ideological struggles

,

involving conflicts

not just between workers and capitalists, but also between

different fractions of capital

.

Underlying my analysis is

the understanding that the New Deal was not the creation of
a

class -conscious monolithic capitalist class, that sought

to deliberately "incorporate" the working class into its

"design" for a new industrial state, to save American

capitalism.

Instead,

I

will argue that the emergence of

the New Deal should be understood as the result of the

conjunction of working class struggles "from below" and
"reforms from above."

The fact that in the long-run the

New Deal reforms did indeed contribute to the stability and

expansion of capitalism was not pre-determined by some
"deep logic

.of

capitalist accumulation/" it was determined

15

rather by the resolution of specific political
struggles
between contending social forces in a given historical

conjuncture

Another key assumption that informs this study is the
recognition that there were contending political-economic
strategies within the capitalist class.

In particular,

I

will focus on the differences between the corporatist and
the "Keynesian" strategies.

As Steve Fraser points out,

the corporatist strategy was promoted by

a

more traditional

group of capitalists concentrated in railroads, public
utilities, primary commodities, and raw materials.

This

sector was linked to older investment banking houses which

emerged after the Civil War and had long dominated the
Republican Party.

It was a

business elite plagued by over-

production, older technologies,
great debt.

foreign competition,

and

The corporatist strategy endorsed by this

sector envisioned deploying the state to sanction
of industrial self-regulation,

by the NRA.

Yet,

system

which would create cartel-

like arrangements to stabilize production,

divide the market.

a

fix prices,

Its basic thrust was best exemplified

the NRA represented

a

compromise between

those who were still committed to non-interventionist

alternatives and those who favored some form of state
30

intervention

The "Keynesian" strategy,

advanced by

a

and

on the other hand,

was

network of manufacturing, retailing, and

16

financial interests more directly linked to
mass

consumption than those who were most closely
associated
with corporatism. According to Fraser, this
network of
newer, mass consumption-oriented industries
included urban

mass retailers like Filene's and Macy's;

real estate

developers; investment banks like Lehman Brothers and
Goldman,

Sachs; mass consumption-oriented banks such as

Bank of America and the Bowery Savings Bank; and industries
like clothing, housing construction and supplies,

appliances, and office goods.

31

This capitalist sector-

together with other technocratic, managerial, and political

elites--was concerned above all with expanding mass
consumption via the intervention of the state.
strategy thus envisioned
for the state

a

Their

more autonomous and active role

(and the unions)

in regulating and

stimulating the growth of the economy.

During the interwar

period the Taylor Society--in alliance with other
institutional networks such as the Russell Sage Foundation,
the Twentieth Century Fund and the Pollack Foundation for

Economic Research, which was associated with
underconsumpt ionist economists Wadill Catchings and William
T.

Foster—provided

"Keynesian strategy.

a

forum for the development of this

32
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Interwar Polit ical Economy: An Overvie w
Given the centrality of the interwar period to the

unfolding of this study, it is helpful to provide at least
a

brief overview of the political economy of the period so

as to place the development of the Taylor Society in a

specific historical context.

During the 1920s the American

economy experienced an unprecedented growth in
productivity.

Such growth resulted in an almost 50 per

cent increase in industrial production between 1918 and
1928,

while the workforce actually declined by

6

per cent.
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The nature and extent of this advance was such that some

scholars considered it nothing less than

industrial revolution."

a

"second

According to Ewan Clague in 1926:

There is taking place in the United States today a
new industrial revolution which may far exceed in
economic importance that older industrial revolution
ushered in by the series of mechanical inventions
which occurred in England in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, and which eventually transformed
English industrial, political and social life. Many
people today are aware that great improvements in
machinery, processes, management, and output are
taking place; but except for a few magazine articles
from time to time, very little has been done to
express this advance in productive efficiency in
Some people have hesitated to
comprehensive terms.
accept as typical of industrial production as a
whole the surprising figures of improved output in
particular plants or establishments. And yet, even
when we deal in mass figures, the facts stand out
clearly and unmistakably. We are at the present
time experiencing what is perhaps the most
remarkable advance in productive efficiency in the
34
history of the modern industrial system....
However, this revolutionary transformation of

production was not accompanied by

18

a

concomitant expansion

of social purchasing power.

Mary Van Kleeck, the Director

of the Department of Industrial Studies of
the Russell Sage

Foundation,

acknowledged this problem as early as 1926:

Mass production seems to be a very stable thing, and
yet with all its economic ramifications it is an
extremely sensitive machine.
The gap is wide
between the production of goods and the purchase of
them, and in that gap is the whole process of
distribution of income.
In the delicate financial
process of distributing income the same economic
system which is producing such masses of goods fails
somehow to get enough income into the hands of the
people for whom those goods are produced .... No
longer is the danger so serious that it will not be
possible to produce enough to feed and clothe
people, but we are not yet distributing what we
produce so as to feed and clothe and house everybody
adequately 35
As a result of this situation, Van Kleeck concluded,

"the

customers who are to buy the goods have not enough money in
their pockets to purchase the quantity produced."

This,

in

was a major cause of "the slumps in the business

turn,

cycle" and the concomitant rise in unemployment.

36

During this period the purchasing power of the working
class failed to increase significantly.
it,

As Mike Davis puts

"during the first great consumer-durable boom of the

1920s,

the majority of the semi-skilled industrial working

class remained trapped in poverty-level incomes, unable to

participate in the hoopla of car and house buying." 37
benefited, then,

Who

from "the prosperity" of the twenties?

Charles Holt's research revels "the prosperity of the

twenties was
As such,

a

prosperity of the few but not of the many."

these results are consistent with Irving

19

Bernstein's contention:

"The twenties were,

indeed golden,

but only for a privileged segment of the
American

population

This was a society in imbalance and workers

enjoyed few of its benefits.

"38

This

i mb alance--the

imbalance between workers' capacity to produce and
their
capacity to consume--eventually led to the crisis
of

underconsumption of the thirties. 39
The rise of Taylorism and Fordism contributed to the

outbreak of the interwar economic crisis in the United
States.

40

were

contributing factor to an unprecedented rise in

a

For while the Taylorist and Fordist revolutions

productivity, and to

a

spectacular increase in the rate of

profit, they could not resolve the problem of coordinating

effective demand to rising productivity. 41

They couldn't

resolve this problem, among other reasons, because

Taylorism and Fordism were
problem:
say,

a

"micro" approach to a "macro"

the regulation of the wage relation.

42

That is to

they sought to stabilize the capital-labor relation at

the level of the firm, without the intervention of the
state.

In any case this was a problem that took almost two

decades and

a

monumental conflict to solve.

Moreover,

as

David Montgomery and others have demonstrated, Taylorism
and Fordism provoked workers' resistance and strugglessuch as sabotage, strikes, and trade union struggles--

everywhere they were implemented.

Despite these struggles,

by the mid 1920s American employers had largely defeated

20

workers' opposition to the reorganization of
production via
the stop watch and the assembly line. 43
Ironically,

it was the very success of the employers'

"American Plan" and its strategy of stifling trade
unions
and blocking wage increases, that led in part to
the

collapse of the incipient Fordist regime of mass production
and mass consumption.

Most employers were either unaware

of or unwilling to question the long-term consequences of

their actions, driven as they were by preference for short-

term gains in productivity and profits.
however,

a

There was,

small group of employers who along with some

industrial engineers and social scientists had
perspective.

a

different

This economic and social elite understood the

danger of relying exclusively on coercion to intensify the
work process, and believed that poverty-level wages of the

semi-skilled workers threatened the consumer-durable
"boom".

They also became aware of the contradiction of

trying to organize
economy within

a

a

mass production/mass consumption

fundamentally laissez-faire state.

In

response to the Great Depression, this elite became deeply

involved in the efforts to map

a

new political economy,

political economy based on the expansion of mass

consumption via the intervention of the state.

At the

forefront of this effort were the members of the Taylor

Society

21
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CHAPTER II
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction
In this chapter

I

focus on conceptual and

methodological questions.

In particular,

I

will addresses

some key problems concerning the relationship between

political economy and history.
targets.

The first is to critique the dominant approach to

modern U.S. political economy:
school.

This discussion has two

the corporate liberalism

The second is to present an alternative approach

to that subject:

the regulation approach.

Underlying my discussion is the understanding that
conceptual frameworks provide an entry point into the
analysis of real historical diversity and specificity.
Doreen Massey states, the purpose of

a

As

conceptual framework

is not to provide an abstract and pre-given taxonomy that

will render the "real" world understandable, nor to

superimpose
conform.

a

formal model on "reality" and expect it to

The point of the framework is to provide an

approach to the analysis of the real world, not
substitute for it.

a

1

A theoretical framework, thus, cannot in itself (nor
is it its purpose to)

answer questions about what is

happening at any particular time or in any particular
place.

It can,

however, provide an approach that will
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enable us to reformulate the questions being asked and the

problems being studied,

in the hope that this will

contribute to an alternative understanding of the real
world.

Frameworks matter.

And because they do, one should

not remain neutral before different conceptions put forth

by contending theories.

Accordingly,

in this chapter

I

will take position on two contending approaches to modern
U.S. political economy

Critique of Corpora te Liberalism
During the last several decades there has been

a

growing body of literature concerned with the study of

twentieth-century American political economy.

The purpose

of much of this literature was to reassess the so-called

"progressive" or "liberal " school of interpretation, which
was characterized by its emphasis on the conflict between

"business and government "
the emergence of

a

.

This revisionist process led to

new conceptual framework which proposed

the notion of "corporatism" or "corporate liberalism" as
the organizing principle of research concerning the

political economy of twentieth-century America. 2

Although there are semantic differences among those
who use the terms corporatism and corporate liberalism,

most historians of the "corporate liberalism school" use

these concepts to describe both

29

a

political-economic system

and a certain ideological perspective.

According to Ellis

Hawley

A corporate system is one whose basic units
consist of officially recognized, noncompetitive, role-ordered occupational or
functional groupings.
It is also one with a
coordinating machinery designed to integrate
these units into an interdependent whole and
one where the state properly functions as
coordinator, assistant, and midwife rather
than director or regulator.
In such a system
there are deep interpenetrat ions between
state and society, and enjoying a special
status is an enlightened social elite,
capable of perceiving social needs and
imperatives and assisting social groups to
meet them through enlightened concert of
interests 3
This definition,

as Michael Hogan points out,

draws

upon Philippe Schmitter's notion of an "ideal-type"

corporatism; and it calls our attention "to the emergence
of an administrative state with limited but important

responsibilities, the concurrent appearance of organized
units of private economic power, the collaborative systems
that fused these units into concerts of group action and

self-government, and the administrative networks that link

private governments and public authorities." 4
In the case of the United States,

corporate liberalism

historians use the term "associat ionalism" to refer to the
specific variant of corporatism that has developed in this
country.

5

The inference to be made by the use of this

concept is that in the United States political and economic

initiative comes more often from the private sector than

30

the public sector; that the patterns of
interpenetrat ion

and power-sharing between these two sectors are
more

informal and less institutionalized than in Europe
and

Latin America; that the role and power of the labor

movement is less developed than its European counterpart;
and that pluralist ideology and practices remain more

important than in other corporatist societies.
As an ideology,

6

corporate liberalism denotes

liberal ideas that envisioned

laissez-faire and "welfare

a

a

set of

"middle way" between

s tat ism.

Michael Hogan

11

summarizes this ideological perspective in the following
way
the spokesmen of corporate liberalism favored
positive programs, including those
administered by government, to tame the
business cycle, nurture growth, and protect
elements of the population that did not yet
share in the material benefits of modern
capitalism.
But they also sought to contain
the state by entrusting much of the
responsibility for public policy to
semi autonomous agencies of economic
coordination and control to supposedly
nonpartisan experts from the private sector,
and to corporative systems of economic
planning, voluntary regulation, and social
welfare 7
,

According to this analysis, the corporate liberal
tendency of the interwar years is best exemplified by men
such as Owen D. Young, chairman of the board of the General

Electric Company, Henry

S.

Dennison,

a

Massachusetts paper

products manufacturer, Edward A. Filene of the Filene
department stores, and others like them who participated in

31

the Commerce Department's Business Advisory
and Planning

Council and the Committee for Economic Development.

Also

considered corporatist, are the types of reforms these
corporate leaders promoted, as for example, the
establishment in the 1930s of the National Recovery Act, or
the development in the 1940s of a counter-cyclical
fiscal
policy

8

Although the corporate liberalism school is quite
diverse and not easy to categorize in simple terms, we can
recognize two distinct wings within this school of
historiography:

a

corporatist" wing.

"new left" wing and

a

"techno-

The new left wing emerged in the 1960s

with the research and writings of "neo-Marxist " scholars
like William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko,

Weinstein, and Ronald Radosh.

9

James

According to Thomas

McCormick, these new left historians amended and extended

early organizational theory into

a

explicit system of corporatism.

They did so in two ways.

First,

more fully-developed and

they went beyond business corporations

organizational theory)
analysis.

,

(the focus of

and included labor in their

In particular,

they described attempts "to

substitute class collaboration for class conflict via

a

corporatist ideology that stressed the community of
interests,

aims,

and ideals between capital and labor."

Second, they stressed an increasingly important role for

the state:

"to arbitrate differences and coordinate the
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interests of capital and labor;" to establish
institutions
that would "sanction self-regulation and planning
by the

private sector;" and to legitimate the process of
economic

concentration and rationalization.
The new left wing, moreover,

10

articulated the first

radical critique of the limits of the New Deal.

This

critique was aimed at the interpretation of the liberal
scholars of the 1950s and
Jr.,

1

960s--Arthur M.

Schlesinger,

Frank Freidel, William Leuchtenburg, and James

Burns--who wrote from

a

M.

"liberal democratic consensus"

viewpoint favorable to the New Deal:

Enamored of Franklin D. Roosevelt and
recalling the bitter opposition to welfare
measures and restraints upon business, many
liberal historians have emphasized the New
Deal's discontinuity with the immediate past.
For them there was a Roosevelt Revolution
or at the best least a dramatic achievement
of a beneficent liberalism which had
developed in fits and spurts during the
preceding decades.... For most liberal
historians the New Deal meant the
replenishment of democracy, the rescuing of
the federal government from the clutches of
big business the signi f icant redistribution
of political power.
Breaking with laissezfaire, the new administration, according to
these interpretations, marked the end of the
passive or impartial state and the beginning
of positive government, of the
interventionist state acting to offset
concentrations of private power, and
affirming the rights and responding to the
needs of the underprivileged 11
1

'

,

,

The new left view,

on the other hand,

argued that the

New Deal was essentially conservative and continuous with
the previous decade; and that it failed to institute the
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measures necessary to have made America

democratic and egalitarian:
The liberal reforms of the New Deal did not
transform America; they conserved and
protected American corporate capitalism,
occasionally by absorbing parts of
threatening programs. There was no
significant redistribution of power in
American society, only limited recognition of
other organized groups, seldom of unorganized
people.
Neither the bolder programs advanced
by New Dealers nor the final legislation
greatly extended the beneficence of
government beyond the middle classes or drew
upon the wealth of the few for the needs of
the many.
Designed to maintain the American
system, liberal activity was directed toward
essentially conservative goals.
Experimentalism was most frequently limited
to means; seldom to ends.
Never questioning
private enterprise, it operated within safe
channels, far short of Marxism or even native
American radicalisms that offered structural
critiques and structural solutions. 12

A key problem with the new left perspective, however,
is

its "instrumentalist" conception of the state.

That is,

it views the state as a simple tool or instrument of the

ruling-class.

13

Accordingly, this analysis of how and why

the "American corporate state" developed during the

twentieth-century posits that:

"a

sophisticated group of

large corporate reformers managed to replace

competitive economy and make

a

a

freely

new governing class, through

the use of reform mechanisms to mold the government into

mighty instrument of monopolization and cartelization

.

a

14

More specifically, the new left instrumentalist

conceptualization of the state is also clearly evidenced in
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their understanding of the New Deal as

a

class-conscious

strategy designed to save U.S. corporate
capitalism.^
As Fred Block points out, the basic premise
of the new
left analysis is that the extension of state
power during

the twentieth-century was the product of the
deliberate

actions of class-conscious capitalists.

analysis involved

a

As such,

this

reinterpretat ion of the traditional

understanding of American liberalism.

The traditional view

argued that liberalism was the movement of other sections
of society to restrict the power of big business.

According to this perspective, the expansion of the role of
the state during the twentieth-century was an outcome of

popular struggles that succeeded in making capitalism
system more responsive to all citizens.

a

The new left

interpretation reversed the traditional view, arguing that

liberalism was the movement of enlightened capitalists to
save corporate capitalism.

In this view,

the expansion of

the state's role was designed by corporate capitalists and

their allies to rationalize the economy and society, that
is,

to stabilize and revitalize American capitalism.

16

According to this perspective, the New Deal reforms
and programs were intended to deliberately "incorporate"
the American working class into corporate capitalism:
the role played by the Wagner Act
was the same as that of the NRA and the other
It was the
conservative New Deal programs.
Wagner Act that allowed the Administration to
obtain the final integration of organized
In reality,
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labor into the existing political economy
of
corporate capitalism. 17
The role of labor leaders and unions is
analyzed in much
the same way
As the union movement grew, its leaders
accepted the existing corporate political
economy, in return for a minor share in the
decision-making process and increasing
economic rewards for union members.
Its
leaders developed organized labor into an
institution that functioned to integrate
workers into the existing political economy,
rather than as a lever for change....
To
keep [a highly bureaucratic and statist
corporate capitalist machinery] functioning
smoothly, the corporate national class
required the aid of a state-regulated and
approved movement.
Such a brand of unionism
would help the corporations maintain their
hegemonic control over American society. 18
This,

explains Ronald Radosh,

is why Franklin D.

Roosevelt's administration aided in the development of the
CIO,

which is conceived by the new left wing as "a

government-created instrument" that enabled enlightened
corporate capitalists to overcome the resistance to change
of both laissez-faire capitalists and craft unions that

refused to accept the new corporate liberal state.
In synthesis,

19

the new left's analysis is based on

a

"conspiracy" model of history in which all historical

outcomes consciously serve the interest of the dominant
(i.e.,

capitalist)

class.

Deal as a case where

a

Specifically,

it

sees the New

self-conscious capitalist class was

able to manipulate the state to further their own interest
Such a conception, however, downplays or simply disregards
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the relative autonomy of the state from
the capitalist
class, (2) the role of workers' struggles in
pushing
(1)

forward the major reforms and programs of the
New Deal, and
(3) the opposition of the majority of capitalists
(including corporate capitalists) to the most important
New
Deal reforms (including the Wagner Act) 20
The techno-corporatist wing emerged in the 1970s and
is best exemplified by the works of scholars like Ellis
W.

Hawley,
M.

Robert

Collins. 21

D.

a

Kim McQuaid, Guy Alchon, and Robert

According to Louis Galambos, the works of

these authors are

synthesis,"

Cuff,

a

key component of the "organizational

broader interpretat ional framework which

posits large-scale organizations as the centerpiece of
modern U.S. history.

As such,

this approach stresses not

the political struggles between liberal and conservative
forces,

but the creation of new and elaborate forms of

bureaucratic organizations that became hegemonic in
American society. 22

For this perspective,

as Alan Brinkley

points out, the central forces shaping modern America

society have been:

(1)

the decline of informal, personal

authority and local autonomy,

(2)

the rise of large-scale,

national bureaucratic organizations, and

(3)

the

redefinition of roles and specialization of tasks that
modern organizations demand. 23

Drawing upon the organizational approach the technocorporatist historians have attempted to trace what Robert
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Wiebe called "the search for order," and
in the process,
they have reconceptualized the relationship
between capital
and the state in the twentieth-century America. 24
in
particular, they have challenged the progressive/
liberal

contention that "business and government" have been in
constant conflict and have shown,

instead,

how the "private

sector" and the "public sector" formed patterns of

association and accommodation beneficial to both.

The

central contribution of this research, according to its own

practitioners, was the "discovery of
liberalism".

a

corporate

As Ellis Hawley puts it:

American liberalism has indeed had its
market-oriented and statist varieties, and
these have been mixed in numerous and varied
ways.
But developing alongside these,
competing with them and entering into many of
the mixtures, has been a 'corporate
liberalism' seeking answers in new private
orders and disciplines and claiming that it
could provide a liberal but non-statist
alternative to laissez-faire prescriptions. 25
Moreover, the techno-corporat ist wing has also

questioned the notion that corporate capitalists have been
able to unilaterally dominate and control the state for

their own purposes.
subject

(a

Instead,

they view the state as

self-conscious actor) that functions as

a

a

neutral arbitrator which mediates between capital, labor,
and other organized interests.

In this view,

the state

acts as a "coordinating machinery" designed to integrate

these sectors into an interdependent whole and to promote
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the general welfare by creating
of interests. "26

a

"true concert or harmony

Accordingly, where other historians see

conflict or simply an instrument of class domination,

techno-corporatist historians see

a

partnership between

capital and the state in the form of an "associative
state"

characterized by "functional representation, concerts of
interest, public-private continuums,

and elitist

engineering of harmonious abundance." 27
There are several important and closely interrelated

problems with the techno-corporatist view of the state.
The first is that such a conception of the state

— with

its

underlying emphasis on social harmony, cooperation, and
functional interdependence

— tends

to ignore not just class

and social conflict in general, but more specifically, the

effects of these conflicts on the formulation of state
policies.

Consequently,

state policies appear as the

outcome of "enlightened elites" acting in name of some

unproblemat ic "common good."

Furthermore, by placing the

actions of the state outside the field of social and class
struggle, this view fails to grasp the contradictory nature
of social change in modern America.

Second,

the notion of a "neutral" state mediating

between different "organized interests" assumes an

equivalence of power and influence between capital and
labor.

Such an assumption,

as Leo Panitch points out,

one that derives from traditional liberal theory:
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is

"It is

based on the view that if producers' organizations
voluntarily enter into

a

*

on the basis of equality,

social contract', they must do so
just as liberal economic theory

assumes with regard to individuals in the market.

m

"28

the

"real" world, however, there is a vast inequality in
power

between capital and labor.

Thus,

the assumption of power

equivalence within the techno-corporat ist view of the state
obscures the problem of unequal power relations between
capital and labor.

In this sense,

corporatism is no

different than pluralist theory--they both obscure the

problem of power relations.
Finally, the techno-corporat ist view is particularly

weak when it comes to explaining the increased role and the

changing functions of the state during the twentiethcentury.

If,

as the techno-corporatist historians contend,

the transformations in the role of the state are not

a

product of the changing needs of the capitalist class in

maintaining its political and economic dominance, how does
one account for what Panitch calls "the systematic bias

toward capitalist class domination" by the state? 29
other hand, if one disregards
does)

(as the

On the

techno-corporatist

the effects of class and social struggle on the

formulation of state policies, how does one explain those

policies and reforms (such as the Wagner Act) that were
forced upon the capitalist class?

How does one account for

those occasions when the state will intervene against the
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particular interests of capitalists in order
to protect the
general interest of capital? These are key
problems the
techno-corporatist view fails to address.

As a consequence

it does not provide an adequate account
of the

transformations of the role of the state during the

twentieth-century
The techno-corporatist wing is also relies heavily on

modernization theory.

This is most evident in the way it

describes America's so-called "organizational revolution"
as some inexorable process moving through history.

Brinkley points out, such

a

As Alan

description of modern America

participates of "an unmistakable aura of inevitability,

a

sense that in its broad outlines, at least, what has

happened is what has had to happen."
adopts

a

Consequently,

it

winner's vision of history, in which those who

have opposed the centralizing tendencies of modern society
(i.e.,

the process of "modernization")

are viewed as

essentially irrelevant social forces holding on to an
archaic vision of society, and are consequently consigned
to the margins of historical analysis.

In doing so,

it

gives us a lopsided version of twentieth-century U.S.

political economy, which leaves out of its field of study
the voices of protest and dissent,

and the visions of an

alternative society. 30
Despite their differences, both wings of the

corporatist school share several important conceptual and
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methodological limitations.

First,

both of these

perspectives place excessive emphasis on "consensus,"
emphasis that has made some scholars wonder if the

corporatist synthesis is not

a

return to consensus

historiography "by the back door."3i

a consequence of this

undue reliance on consensus is that the corporatist school

downplays or simply ignores conflict.

himself

a

Ellis Hawley--who is

leading corporatist historian--has suggested that

the most significant contribution made by the corporate

liberalism school, is precisely, that it offers further
evidence that:
the core of modern American history may
consist not of class struggles, businessgovernment conflict, and market versus
statist prescriptions; that it may consist
instead of an organizational pluralism in
which state agencies collaborated with and
became attached to private orders, of
recurring crises brought on by failures of
coordination and resistance to organizational
values, and of persisting commitments to
liberal values and the possibility of
realizing them through corporative structures
employing private enlighteners and

disciplines

32

For the corporate liberalism view, thus

,

the

development of modern U.S. political economy was neither
the product of class struggles, nor the result of any other

form of social conflict.

It was

rather,

the outcome of the

actions of identifiable enlightened elites.
for the corporatist approach,

Accordingly

what happened in the 1930s--

including the New Deal--"seems best conceptualized not as

42

the workings of a class struggle or as the
coming of 'big
government but as the efforts of a pluralistic social
order
with liberal commitments to find private structures
and

elites capable of correcting perceived ills and

malfunctions

"
.
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Moreover, this interpretation disregards the key role
of working class struggles in pushing forward the major

reforms of the New Deal.

In particular,

it ignores that it

took the decade-long struggle of the new industrial unions
of the CIO to force upon the capitalist class union

recognition and collective bargaining.

The history of

these reforms shows that the majority of capitalists were

unwilling to grant such concessions to the working class.
These capitalists were too short-sighted initially to
accept,

let alone to promote,

major reforms such as the

Wagner Act and the Social Security Act.

The fact of the

matter is that they opposed and resisted such changes.

The

major reforms of the New Deal were passed and implemented
over the opposition of the majority of the capitalists.

34

They were won through working class struggles "from below."

These struggles, as Fred Block suggests, pressured state

managers to institute economic and social reforms that

simultaneously provided benefits to many workers,

strengthened the state in relation to the working class,
and increased the state's capacity to intervene in the

capitalist economy.

35
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Secondly, they both also place undue emphasis
on

"continuity," and consequently tend to disregard
"change."
Corporatist historians view the history of twentiethcentury U.S. political economy as

a

"evolving" corporate liberalism.

According to this

single process, as an

perspective, the rise of corporate capitalism at the turn
of the century marked a new stage in the history of

American capitalism.
The New Deal,

This stage presumably has not ended.

in this view,

is seen not as an important

moment of historical change, but as "part of

a

continuing

pattern," which began at least during the 1920s.

This

concern with continuity has led corporatist historians to
stress,

for example,

how Hoover's concept of

"countercyclical stabilization" gave way to Keynesian
strategies of "demand management," and how welfare

capitalism and company unionism led to the welfare state,
and the Wagner Act.

35

Furthermore, the attempt to apply the corporatist

paradigm to the New Deal as
First and Second New Deal)

a

whole

(and thus to both the

leads to a perspective that

downplays the significance of the radical break in policy
that occurred between 1935 and 1938 during the Second New
Deal.

And when this dramatic shift is recognized at all,

as Peter Friedlander points out,

inexplicable intrusion by
anti-trust decentralizers

a
,

it

is

"as a brief and

band of 'statist planners,
laborite activists, and anti-

44

business Keynesians

»

1

.
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According to this view, thus, the

Keynesian policies deployed during the Second New
Deal
amount to nothing more than an interruption in the
patterns
of continuity that characterize U.S. political
economy

since at least the 1920s.
Third,

the interpretation put forth by both of these

perspectives has resulted in the obscuring of strategic
ideological and political differences within the capitalist
class.

By arguing either that corporate liberalism was the

ideology of "big business" or that the New Deal was

a

deliberate class-conscious attempt to maintain corporate
capitalism, the corporatist school fails to acknowledge
that corporate liberals were not

a

cohesive group with

a

consistent strategy of reform, and that even among long-

standing business elites there was never an enduring
consensus on the organizational and political implications
of corporatism.
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Moreover, this view also fails to

acknowledge the existence of other strategies of reform-such as the "proto-Keynesian" strategy of the Taylor

Society--within the capitalist class.

And when it does

recognize these strategies it encompasses them within the
ideology and program of corporate liberalism.
Fourth,

39

in discussing the New Deal both wings of the

corporatist school assume

a

dichotomy between "the economic

sphere" and "the political sphere" of society.

An

important consequence which follows from this assumption is
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that the corporatist school tends to ignore
the

relationship between the process of capitalist
accumulation
(regime of accumulation)

affect that process

and the institutional forms which

(mode of regulation)

in this respect,

.

its analysis of New Deal policies is no different
from that

of most New Deal historians.

As Rhonda Levine points out,

the corporatist school discusses New Deal policies from
the

perspective of the stated intentions of the policymakers
themselves, thereby ignoring the structural context within

which decision making took place.

In doing so,

they take

for granted the boundaries of state intervention and ignore

the limits that economic processes might place on

policymaking

40

Conversely, this separation reduces capitalist

"business" activity simply to "economic activity"

abstracted from its sociopolitical context.

According to

Martin Sklar, this tendency--the tendency to reduce
"business" to "economics" or to "economic history " --has

obstructed the study of capitalists as

a

social class

involved in social movements, and has largely confined the
study of social history to noncapitalist classes and
groups.

In doing so,

it has

narrowed the framework of

research respecting capitalists to studies of interestgroup activity, business history, or the "business mind." 41
As the dominant approach to twentieth-century

political economy the corporate liberalism school has made
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important contributions to our understanding of

contemporary American history.

Nonetheless,

as the

discussion above has shown, the corporatist approach
contains significant conceptual and methodological
limitations.

In particular,

school—whether

the corporate liberalism

in its new left or techno-corporat ist

version--has oversimplified the relationship between labor,
capital and the state.

And consequently,

it

has obscured

the complexities of and suppressed the contradictions

inherent to the process of development of U.S. political

economy in the interwar period.

Thus,

to go beyond our

present understanding of modern American political economy-we need to go beyond corporate liberalism.

A Regulation Approach
An alternative approach to the history of twentieth-

century U.S. political economy is presented by the French

regulation school.
with the work of

a

The regulation approach is associated

group of French political economists

including Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz, Robert Boyer, and
others who have developed the concepts of "regime of

accumulation" and "mode of regulation." 42
The purpose of this conceptualization is to provide

historically specific theory of capitalist development,
theory,

a

a

that is, which goes beyond the abstract concept of

"capitalist mode of production" and takes the historical
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character of capitalism seriously.

Its underlying

assumption is that since the basic features of

capitalism-

-commodity production and the wage relat ion--take
different
forms over time, it becomes necessary to examine
the
historical forms these basic categories of the capitalist
system have taken.

4 3

In order to accomplish this,

however,

it is necessary to offer an intermediate level of
analysis,

more general and abstract than

a

detailed history of

capitalism, but more specific and concrete than the

abstract theory of capitalism-in-general presented by

traditional Marxism.
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Regulation theory is characterized by

a

non-

teleological conception of capitalist development.

It

rejects conceptions which view the history of capitalism as
if it were inexorably determined by some abstract "logic of

capitalist accumulation" or as the expression of "the
general laws of capitalism."

provide

a

it attempts to

Instead,

conception in which both social agency and

contingency play

a

on class relations,

significant role.

As such,

it

focuses

technological change, and political

struggles,

as the concrete and contingent determinants of
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For regulation theory thus the development of

history.

capitalism is not preordained.

Rather,

it

is always

mediated through historically contingent institutional
forms,

regulatory networks, and norms of conduct

the wage relation,

the state,

48

(such as

and forms of competition)

which are themselves always the product of past
and present
struggles 46
The regulation school developed in the 1970s, when
the

economic crisis forced many radical intellectuals to
reassess their assumptions and understandings of how

capitalism works.

It

emerged in part out of the demise of

Althusserian structuralism.

47

Regulation theorists argued

that Althusserianism placed undue emphasis on reproduction

and correspondingly disregarded

contradiction.

In their

view, Althusser's reproduction paradigm (which was based on

his rather static reading of Marx) was inadequate to

conceptualize the model of capitalist reproduction
prevalent in advanced capitalist societies--a model

characterized by the combined dynamic transformation of
production and consumption.

Moreover, the Althusserian

view of reproduction, in which social-economic reproduction
appeared to succeed in
provide

a

a

near spontaneous manner, did not

sound basis for explaining the capitalist crisis

of the 1970s.
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as Bob Jessop states,

In short,

regulation theorists

rejected the Althusserian conceptualization of
"reproduction,

"

which assumes that structures somehow

maintain themselves quasi-automat ically

,

independent of

effective social agency, and without significant
transformations.

In its place,

they developed an

alternative conceptualization based on the concept of

49

regulation.

4 9

Michel Aglietta defines this concept in the

following way:
One should try to avoid using the term
•reproduction' either in the sense of a selfperpetuating invariant or as an outcome of
social contradictions which are a priori
predictable. All that is reproduced is the
problem of socialization: how can social
cohesion exist, despite the discord of social
conflict.
This is the problem which the
concept of regulation attempts to confront.
Contrary to the currently fashionable
interpretation of Marxism, it does so without
resorting to any teleological hypotheses.
The theory of capitalist regulation is that
of the genesis, development, and
disappearance of social forms, in short, of
the transformations which the separations
constituting capitalism undergo. 50
In other words,

without assuming that reproduction

must occur, the regulation approach asks how capitalism is

reproduced given the conflictual and contradictory
character of capitalist social relations.
out,

in explaining how regulation occurs

As Jessop points
(i.e.,

how social

relations take on stabilized forms even though these
relations are contradictory)

,

regulat ionists looked at

specific institutional forms, social norms, and patterns of

strategic conduct which expressed and stabilized conflicts
over a certain period of time.

However, given the inherent

contradictions and antagonisms of capitalism, regulation is
always conceived as partial, temporary, and unstable.
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The two key concepts developed by the regulation

school are regime of accumulation and mode of regulation.

According to Alain Lipietz,

"a regime of accumulation
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describes the fairly long-term stabilization of
the

allocation of social production between consumption
and
accumulation." in other words, a regime of accumulation

essentially

a

reproduction scheme--it comprises

a

is

pattern

of production and consumption which can be reproduced
over

time despite its conflictual tendencies.
of accumulation are possible.
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Several regimes

For example,

a

regime of

accumulation can be either extensive (i.e., accumulation
occurs without any major transformations in the labor
process),

or intensive

(i.e.,

the labor process is

radically transformed and labor productivity can

continually rise)

.

Further,

intensive accumulation can

occur without mass consumption, or with growing mass

consumption
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As David Kotz indicates,

these regimes of accumulation

are seen as successive stages of capitalist development:

with an extensive regime of accumulation characterizing
19th century capitalism,

an intensive regime without mass

consumption predominant in the early 20th century, and an
intensive regime with growing mass consumption developing

during the post-World War period.
accumulation, moreover,
mode of regulation.
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is

Each regime of

associated with

However,

a

particular

as we have already noted,

regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are not

inscribed in the fate of capitalism.

Rather,

improbable outcome ("chance discoveries")
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they are the

of social and

political struggles; that

non-intentional manner.

is,

they emerge in a contingent

55

A mode of regulation refers to an ensemble of
institutional forms, norms and social practices, which
can
secure capitalist reproduction (for a certain period)
despite the conflictual and contradictory character of

capitalist social relations.

These institutional forms and

social practices contain and limit the basic conflicts of

capitalism and thereby contribute to regulate the process
of accumulation.
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As Alain Lipietz puts it:

A regime of accumulation does not float,
disembodied, in the ethereal world of schemas
of reproduction.
For one or another such
schema to be realized and reproduced over a
prolonged period, it is necessary for
institutional forms, procedures and habits
to act as coercive or inciting forces
leading private agents to conform to the
schema.
This set of forms is called a 'mode
of regulation
As we shall see, a regime of
regulation cannot correspond to just any mode
of regulation
Economic crises, which appear
to be a general, manifest mismatch between
supply and demand, may in reality reflect a
variety of underlying relationships 57
|

,

1

.

.

However,

as Lipietz warns

the "function" of

a

,

we should not assume that

mode of regulation is to make

of accumulation work,

a

regime

or that the Welfare State was

invented "in order to make mass production go on smoothly,"
and so on.

Rather,

regimes of accumulation and modes of

regulation get stabilized together because they are able to
ensure the crisis-free reproduction of social relations for
a

certain period of time.

Furthermore,
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it

should be noted

that not every mode of regulation can regulate
every regime
of accumulation and that a specific mode can
present itself
as different combinations of partial forms
of regulation.

For example, the social wage does not have the same

importance in the U.S. that it has in Sweden.
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The regulation school sees the history of capitalism
as a succession of regimes of accumulation and modes of

regulation.

It emphasizes,

moreover, how the

contradictions of capitalism take different forms depending
on the prevailing regime of accumulation and mode of

regulation.

According to this approach, the interwar

period was characterized by an intensive regime without
mass consumption and

a

competitive mode of regulation.

This mode of regulation,

as Kotz states,

"enforced
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a

competitive form of wage determination that made wages
sensitive to the size of the reserve army and precluded any
significant rise in real wages over time, thus preventing
mass consumption." 60

Competitive regulation was relatively adequate for

extensive accumulation—characterized by minor changes in
norms of production and consumption.

But it was not

adequate for intensive accumulation which provoked

unprecedented productivity gains during the 1920s.

By

preventing mass consumption "competitive regulation failed
to induce a growth of final demand compatible with these

productivity gains."

This situation eventually led to the
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crisis of underconsumption of the 1930s.

In short,

this

crisis is seen by the regulation school as one in
which the
emergence of a new regime of accumulation (an intensive
regime with mass consumption) was being held back by

outdated forms of regulation (competitive regulation)

it

.

is also analyzed as the first crisis of intensive

accumulation or the last crisis of competitive regulation.
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The post-World War II period was characterized by the

development of an intensive regime of accumulation based on
mass consumption.

Following Gramsci, the regulation school

called this regime of accumulation "Fordism.

1,62

According

to Robert Boyer:

Under this regime the development of the
means of production sector of the economy
went together with the modernization of the
consumer goods sector, whose expansion was
stimulated by an apparently unprecedented
labor-capital compromise.
The task of
management was to remodel the labor process
according to the canons of scientific
management while the concern of unions was
to ensure that workers benefitted from the
corresponding productivity increases, through
strikes or negotiations. 63
,

Thus,

the regulation school uses Fordism to denote not

specific labor process or production techniques, but

a

a

regime of accumulation based on the articulation between
mass production and mass consumption
Fordism,

as Boyer points out,

.

The concept of

is intended to characterize

the macroeconomic conditions governing accumulation.
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As

such,

it only makes sense at the level of the whole

economy,

not at the micro level of the firm.
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The full-fledged development of Fordism was made

possible by

a

new monopolistic mode of regulation, which

encouraged the growth of mass consumption compatible with

productivity gains caused by intensive accumulation.
mode of regulation involved:
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This

collective bargaining

(1)

agreements which linked wages to productivity;

(2)

an

oligopolistic pattern of price setting which contributed to
stabilize the accumulation regime;

(3)

Keynesian

macroeconomic policy and the welfare state (including
social security, unemployment insurance,

and other forms of

social wages) which helped to articulate production and

consumption; and

(4)

the hegemony of credit and the

expansion of consumer credit facilities.
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The monopolistic mode of regulation emerged out of

a

prolonged period of social and political struggles which
began in the 1930s with the New Deal and culminated with
the experience of World War II.

During the postwar period,

after this mode of regulation became consolidated,

monopoly regulation ensured 25 years of economic growth and

prosperity for U.S. capitalism.

But in the 1970s,

faced

with the exhaustion of Fordism and the crisis of

profitability that followed, and with the challenge of the
social movements excluded from the benefits of Fordism, the

monopolistic mode of regulation plunged into an open
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crisis.

By the 1980s the crisis of monopolit ist
ic

regulation (including its Keynesian macroeconomic
policies, and the welfare state) had led to the rise
of neoliberalism,

supply-side economics and monetarism as the

dominant forms of regulation.
In conclusion,

67

the regulation school is concerned with

stages and phases of capitalist development rather than

with abstract laws of motion and tendencies operating at
the level of capitalism in general.

As such,

it offers a

theoretical framework for analyzing the historical
development of capitalism that goes beyond traditional
Marxist accounts of this subject.
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The regulation

approach, however, has several significant problems.

important among these are:

Most

the ambiguity of some of its

key concepts and the divergent use of these concepts by the

members of the regulation school; the weakness of its
analysis in relation to the state; the tendency of some
studies, particularly the more recent ones, to focus on

questions of structural coherence and economic growth and

disregard class struggle and social agency; and the need to
produce more case studies that will shed light on the

usefulness of regulation theory as an approach to the
historical development of capitalism while enriching the
theory itself.

All of these are areas in which the

regulation approach needs further development.
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Despite its shortcomings the regulation approach
has
influenced a good number of scholars from a wide range

of

fields including economics, political science, geography,
sociology,

labor relations, history and others.

Moreover,

it has stimulated a significant amount of research which

has enhanced our understanding of the political economy of

capitalism.

Yet,

as stated above,

the regulation approach

has a number of limitations which it needs to overcome if
it is to remain a fruitful framework.

recognized, as Boyer indicates,

Once this is

further work within the

regulation school cannot simply repeat past research on
larger scale.

Rather,

a

the conceptual framework must become

more precise and new questions must be asked, and new areas
of research undertaken in order to reduce some of the

uncertainties that still plague regulation theory. 70
One way to achieve this is to use the regulation

approach to produce case studies that will provide original
insights into the development of specific regimes of

accumulation and modes of regulation.

These detailed and

specific historical studies could help give the regulation

approach the analytical precision that overly general

presentations have lacked. 71

Thus,

this dissertation, which

examines the role played by key political, technocract ic,
and managerial elites in the emergence of the post-World
War II

(Keynesian) mode of regulation,

57

can be seen as a

historical study whose aim is to contribute to
the
development of regulation theory.

r
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CHAPTER III

READING TAYLORISM POLITICALLY

Introduction
This chapter discusses the relationship between

Taylorism and the Taylor Society.

The Taylor Society--

originally called "the Society for the Promotion of the
Science of Management " --was founded by the followers of

Frederick Winslow Taylor as an organized expression of the
scientific management movement.

For such reason it seems

only appropriate that any discussion of the Taylor Society

begin with an examination of the nature and historical

significance of scientific management, or Taylorism, in the
strict sense of the term.

As Peter F. Meiksins points out,

both Taylor and Taylorism have been the objects of

considerable scholarly attention in recent years:

"As part

of a broad re-examination of the history of the American

working class, the character of the capitalist labor
process and the evolution of corporate structure, social
scientists from

a

variety of disciplines have, of

necessity, been led to re-examine the nature of Taylorism
as well." 1

Most of the contributors to this discussion,

however, tend to focus exclusively on the relationship

between Taylorism and the labor process.
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In doing so,

these scholars,

for the most part,

have missed the broader

ideological and political implications of Taylorism.

discussion in this chapter takes

a

My

different approach.

Although the chapter examines the emergence of scientific
management and re-examines the debate on Taylorism and the
labor process, my focus is on the ideological and political

implications of Taylorism, not on the success or failure of

scientific management as
the labor process.

a

form of capitalist control of

In particular,

my concern here is with

how the Taylor Society "read" Taylorism and how this
"reading" enabled it to go beyond the labor process and the

factory

Tavlor and Tavlorism
As David Montgomery points out, beginning in the 1880s

and gaining strength during the first two decades of the

twentieth century both capitalists and managers in the
United States were engaged in

a

monumental effort to

reorganize the labor process of their factories.
objective of this campaign was to obtain
and direct control of factory production.

a

The main

more systematic
At the forefront

of this campaign was the movement known as scientific

management.

The basic elements of scientific management,

according to Montgomery, were:
production,
(3)

(2)

(1)

centralized planning of

systematic analysis of the labor process,

detailed instruction and supervision of each worker,
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and

(4)

incentive wage payments.

Montgomery adds,

Each of these points,

"undermined the traditional autonomy of

the craftsmen," and clashed with the growing
power of trade
unions. 2
In Montgomery's words, "[t]he historical
role of
the scientific management movement was to
explain, guide,

and justify the changes in the hierarchy of human
relations
in the workplace that accompanied the
turn-of-the-century

transformation of American industry." 3
Scientific Management or "Taylorism" emerged at the
end of the nineteenth century--a period marked by strikes,

violence and other element of widespread industrial unrest-

as a response to labor unrest and to workers'

production.

control of

It was a managerial strategy that specifically

aimed to abolishing the power which

a

certain group of

workers--the autonomous craft smen--exercised in directing
the process of production.

The "father" and most

4

prominent figure of the scientific management movement was
Frederick W. Taylor,

a

do Philadelphia family.

mechanical engineer from
5

a

well-to-

According to Judith Merkle, what

gave Taylor the title of "Father of Scientific Management":
was not his invention of all the techniques of
Scientific Management.
Taylor's work introduced a
complex of technical, organizational, and
ideological elements which can be traced to specific
currents of thought in his time, and which proved to
have differential decay rates during the years that
followed his death.
The synthesis of ideas that he
It is
put forward was the original development.
this synthesis rather than the ideas alone that has
been acknowledged as the identifiable body of
Taylorism.
This new type of linkage between pre-
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existing ideas account for the unique
social
reaction to Taylorism, not aroused by its
neglected
and forgotten predecessors.
Other innovators had
offered partial answers, but only Taylor's
synthesis
answered simultaneously problems of production
and
organization, at the same time that it responded
with solutions to the industrial disruption
in
American society 6
Hugh Aitken also emphasizes that Taylorism was
creative synthesis of pre-existing ideas.
states,

first became known as

a

a

Taylor, Aitken

member of the post-Civil

War shop management movement which included plant
managers
such as Slater Lewis, A. Hamilton Church, Frederick A.
Halsey,

and Henry

R.

Towne.

This movement was concerned

with problems of productivity at the shop level, and shared
a

particular interest in incentive wage payments as

of increasing productivity.

means

a

What made Taylor different

from his contemporaries and predecessors,
Aitken, was not that he adopted

a

according to

radically new approach:

rather it was that, accepting many of their
assumptions, he carried them to their logical
conclusions and embodied the results in an allegedly
complete system of management that was more
inclusive, more self-contained, and more powerful in
its practical implications than their proposals and
devices.
Taylor's system was also much more
suitable to serve as the nucleus of a dedicated
movement than were the tentative, pragmatic
suggestions of other students of the problem.
This is one reason why Taylorism or, as it was later
called, scientific management still evokes
recognition and emotional response, while only
specialists know the work of men like Hasley and
Slater Lewis 7
.

.

,

Taylor himself,

it should be noted,

scientific management was

a

recognized that

creative synthesis of pre-

existing ideas: "Scientific Management does not necessarily
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involve any great invention, nor the discovery
of new or
startling facts.
It does, however, involve a certain

combination
past,

of elements which have not existed in the

namely,

grouped,

old knowledge so collected,

analyzed,

and classified into laws and rules that it

constitutes

a

science." 8

The development of Taylor's ideas on scientific

management was directly linked to his practical experiences
at the shop floor.

Taylor was, after all,

product of the

a

"shop culture" tradition which, according to Daniel Nelson,
"had supplied the bulk of American mechanics and engineers

during the preceding half century."
in the 1870s most manufacturers,

As Nelson points out,

machinery designers, and

engineers still obtained their training on the job.

Even

though college-trained engineers were on the rise and the

apprenticeship system was in decline,
unusual for
in the shop,

a

"it was still not

potential executive to spend his early career
to learn the business

As a group the men who were

a

"

from the ground up'."

product of the shop culture

were "hard-headed, practical, and pragmatic,

"

they "often

disdained theory and questioned the value of formal
education." 9

Taylor was one of these "practical" men.

And

as such he spent his early career in the shop learning the

"science" of management "from the ground up."
One of Taylor's most important practical experiences

came at the Midvale Steel Company.
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In 1878,

after having

completed an apprenticeship as
maker in
a

a

a

machinist and pattern-

small shop in Philadelphia,

laborer at Midvale.

Taylor took

a

job as

Within six years he had become chief

engineer of that plant."

During this period Taylor laid

the foundations of scientific management.

In particular,

there was as a key episode which Taylor would later

associate with the beginning of scientific management.
a

As

worker at the machine shop of Midvale, Taylor had

participated along with his coworkers in "soldiering" --the
deliberate restriction of output.

Shortly after becoming

assistant foreman, however, Taylor began

a

systematic

effort to break-up soldiering by increasing the pace of

work
As soon as I became gang boss the men who were
working under me and who, of course, I knew were
onto the whole game of soldiering or deliberately
restricting output, came to me at once and said,
"Now Fred, you are not going to be a damn piecework
hog, are you?"
I said,
"If you fellows mean you are
afraid I am going to try to get a larger output from
these lathes," I said, "Yes; I do propose to get
more work out."
I
said, "You must remember I have
been square with you fellows up to now and worked
with you
I have not broken a single rate
I
have
been on your side of the fence
But now I have
accepted a job under the management of this company
and I am on the other side of the fence, and I will
tell you frankly that I am going to try to get a
bigger output from these lathes " They answered,
"then, you are going to be a damned hog." 11
.

.

.

.

Taylor's effort led to
of that plant in which,

a

bitter conflict with the workers
as he puts it,

"I was

doing

everything in my power to increase the output of the shop,
while the men were absolutely determined that the output
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should not be increased."

The conflict at Midvale,

according to Taylor's own testimony,
three years ....

"lasted for nearly

12

The experience at Midvale convinced Taylor
that

soldiering had become
capital accumulation.

soldiering.

a

major obstacle to the process of
Taylor identified two types of

The first was natural soldiering--which was

due to "the natural instinct and tendency of men to
take it

easy."

The second was systematic soldiering--which

involved

a

deliberate and conscious effort by the workers.

Of the two forms of soldiering,

13

Taylor was fundamentally

concerned with the second:
The natural laziness of men is serious, but by far
the greatest evil from which both workmen and
employers are suffering is the systematic soldiering
which is almost universal under all of the ordinary
schemes of management and which results from a
careful study on the part of the workmen of what
will promote their best interests....

The greater part of the systematic soldiering ... is
done by the men with the deliberate object of
keeping their employers ignorant of how fast work
can be done.
So universal is soldiering for this
purpose that hardly a competent workman can be found
in a large establishment, whether he works by the
day or on piece work, contract work, or under any of
the ordinary systems, who does not devote a
considerable part of his time to studying just how
slow he can work and still convince his employer
that he is going at a good pace. 14

According to Taylor, what enabled workers to engage so
effectively in systematic soldiering--and hence resist

management's attempts to intensify the pace of work--was
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that they possessed

a

superior mastery and knowledge of the

labor process than management:
This mass of rule-of-thumb or traditional
may be said to be the principal asset or knowledge
possession
of every tradesmen.
Now, in the best of the
ordinary types of management, the managers recognize
frankly the fact that the 500 or 1000 workmen,
included in the twenty or thirty trades, who are
under them, possess this mass of traditional
knowledge, a large part of which is not in the
possession of the management. The management, of
course, includes foremen and superintendents, who
themselves have been in most cases first-class
workers at their trades. And yet these foremen and
superintendents know, better than anyone else, that
their own knowledge and personal skill falls far
short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all
the workmen under them. 15
This "mass of traditional knowledge," Taylor concluded,

amounted to nothing less than workers' control of
production.

Knowledge is power.

And in this case, power

was in the hands of the skilled workers who controlled the

labor process through their craft secrets and traditions.

Management, on the other hand, was totally dependent on the
workers'
it,

"initiative" in the work process.

As Taylor put

"the underlying philosophy of all of the old systems of

management in common use makes it imperative that each
workman shall be left with the final responsibility for
doing his job practically as he thinks best, with

comparatively little help and advice from the management." 16
As long as workers controlled the labor process, their

practices would hinder management's attempts to increase
both productivity and the intensity of the pace of work.
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17

The solution to this situation,

Taylor argued, was to put

the control of the labor process in the
hands of

management,

"where it belongs."

Since workers' power in

the workshop was based on their superior knowledge
of the

labor process, Taylor sought to expropriate the
skilled

workers' traditional knowledge of the work process.
the guiding principle of scientific management,

Thus,

in Taylor's

own words, was "the deliberate gathering in on the part
of

those on management's side of all the great mass of

traditional knowledge, which in the past has been in the
heads of the workmen,

and in the physical skill and knack

of the workman, which he has acquired through years of

experience." 18

By expropriating workers'

"principal

possession" Taylor hoped to reverse the relationship

between knowledge and power in favor of capital.

Having

gathered into their possession workers' traditional
knowledge, management could then proceed to the systematic

reorganization of the labor process in such

a

way as to

ensure that they would dictate what was done and how it was
done,

while workers

"

[did]

what they are told to do

promptly and without asking questions or making
suggestions

.

19

Taylorism, then,

as Mike Davis indicates,

about efficiency; it was about power. 20

was not

Its primary goal

was not merely to make workers more "efficient;" it was to

achieve complete control of the labor process.
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As Aitken

argues,

all of Taylor's contributions to shop
management-

including not only time and motion studies and the
planned
scheduling and routing of work in progress, but also
the

use of uniform belting and high-speed cutting tools-were

designed "to achieve control of the job and its performance
and,

in particular,

enforce

a

to enable management to prescribe and

standard work pace." 21

In short,

Taylorism sought

to "liberate" the labor process from the forces that held
it hostage:

workers' control of production.

differently,

it attempted to open a new space for the

Put

accumulation. of capital and for the development of

standardized mass production by creating
worker: the semi-skilled operative.

a

new type of

As Antonio Gramsci

pointed out in the thirties referring to Taylorism,

American phenomenon ... is

...

"the

the biggest collective effort to

date to create with unprecedented speed and consciousness
of purpose unmatched in history

man

"
.

a

new type of worker and

22

Re-examining Tavlorism
The success or failure of Taylor's efforts has been

the subject of considerable scholary debate in recent
years.

Most of the scholars who have contributed to this

discussion on the historical significance of Taylorism have
focused primarily on the relationship between scientific

management and the capitalist labor process.
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The most

influential of these contributions is Harry
Braverman
Monopoly and Labor Cap ital, which argues that
Taylorism was
the capitalist strategy to ensure capitalist
control over
'

the labor process in the late nineteenth-century
factory

and that its widespread use during the twentieth-century
has been crucial to the degradation of work.

23

According to

Braverman, the capitalist labor process is characterized
by

tendencies towards the de-skilling and degradation of work
and by

a

continuous capitalist effort to seize control over

production from relatively "skilled" and "autonomous"
workers.

The essence of capitalist control of production

is the separation of mental and manual labor,

separation of conception and execution.

that is the

Through this

process capital reduces workers to "general purpose
machines" or "abstract labor" and removes the "subjective
factor of the labor process... to

a

place among its

inanimate objective factors." 24
What Braverman is describing here is the process Marx

called the transition from the formal to the real

subordination of labor to capital.

The formal

subordination of labor arises with the private legal and
economic ownership of the means of production, the private

appropriation of social production, and the commodif ication
of labor power.

Labor was formally subordinated to capital

in both the putting-out system and the early factory.

The

key here is that although workers had been gathered under
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"the watchful eye of the capitalist" or
his foreman,

remained in control of the labor process.

they

The real

subordination of labor, on the other hand, takes
place
within the labor process itself and requires a
fundamental

reorganization of the work process.

Labor becomes really

subordinate to capital when the capitalist can control
what
the worker does while engaged in the labor process.
The

transition from formal to real subordination is measured by
the progress of de-skilling,

standardization of tasks.

routinization, and

The end result of this process

is the creation of "abstract labor." 25

For Braverman,

the self-conscious expression of this

process is found in the principles of scientific

management

Modern management came into being on the basis of
these principles.
It arose as theoretical construct
and as systematic practice moreover, in the very
period during which the transformation of labor from
processes based on skill to processes based upon
science was attaining its most rapid tempo
Its
role was to render conscious and systematic, the
formerly unconscious tendency of capitalist
production
It was to ensure that as craft
declined, the worker would sink to the level of
general undifferentiated labor power, adaptable to a
large range of simple tasks while as science grew,
it would be concentrated in the hands of
management 26
,

.

.

,

Taylorism, thus,

is not merely a set of organizational

principles: it represents "nothing less than the explicit

rationalization of the capitalist mode of production."
expresses the logic of capitalist accumulation which
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It

inexorably drives management towards complete
control of
the labor process.
In other words, from Braverman's
perspective, capital has no other choice but to
extend the
process of real subordination of labor as far as its
power
will permit.
Taylorism represents the essential expression
of this process; it is the strategy that will ensure

capital's objectives.

27

A central problem with Braverman, as Michael Burawoy
points out,

is that he develops a unilateral analysis that

only takes into consideration the "objective"

(economic)

aspects of the labor process, and ignores the "subjective"

dimensions of work.

In doing so,

Braverman fails to expand

our understanding of production beyond its purely economic

moment by explicitly including the political and

ideological moments of work.

As Burawoy puts it:

Not only can one not ignore the 'subjective'
dimension, but the very distinction between
'objective' and subjective' is arbitrary.
Any work
context involves an economic dimension (production
of things)
a political dimension (production of
social relations)
and an ideological dimension
(production of an experience of those relations)
These three dimensions are inseparable... 28
~

,

,

The process of production,

then,

must be seen as an

inseparable combination of its economic, political and
ideological aspects.

And this is precisely what Braverman

fails to recognize.

Braverman's analysis, Burawoy argues, leads him to
reduce workers' resistance to Taylorism to "an essentially
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derivative role, an impotent expression of
their helpless
subordination to capital." in doing so, he fails
to see

that class struggle "is not merely derivative
but is also

determinative of capitalism's development
Braverman's conceptualization entails

a

.

"29

In short/

treatment of the

working class as an object of capital, an object
rendered
ineffectual by the development of capitalism.

In Burawoy

1

s

words

Braverman's analysis is exclusively from the side of
the object.
This is no oversight; Braverman
repeatedly stresses the mechanisms through which
subjectivity is destroyed or rendered ineffectual
and through which individuals lose their
individuality.
In this he follows a powerful
tradition within Marxism, most clearly represented
by George Lukacs in History and Cla.s.s ConsrinnsnP^
Like Lukacs, Braverman presents capitalism as a
process of becoming, of realizing its inner essence,
of moving according to its imminent tendencies, of
encompassing the totality, of subordinating all to
itself, and of destroying all resistance.
Unlike
Lukacs, however, Braverman does not call upon the
miraculous appearance of a messianic subject--the
revolutionary proletariat--which, through the agency
of the party, would conquer history and turn
capitalism on its head.... 30
For Braverman, then, capitalism is an "expressive totality"

which moves as an irresistible force towards the

subordination of society to capital.
destroys,

resistance

absorbs,

In the process,

it

or makes ineffective any source of

31

According to Burawoy, there is no doubt that Taylorism
gathered together knowledge about tasks and decided "the
best way" to perform them.

For him,
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however,

it is by no

means clear that this constituted
over the labor process

a

(after all,

monopoly of knowledge
he states,

Taylor

obtained his knowledge of the labor process as

worker);

a

nor is it clear that these new rulings could
be enforced.

Missing from Braverman's assessment of Taylorism
are the
workers' responses to this process.
"It is one thing

for

management to appropriate knowledge; it is another thing to

monopolize it," Burawoy points out.

Under Taylorism,

Burawoy argues, instead of

a

separation of conception and

execution, what we find is

a

separation of workers'

conception and management's conception, of workers'
knowledge and management's knowledge.

The attempts to put

Taylorism in practice led workers to recreate the unity of
conception and execution, but in opposition to management's
designs.

Workers used their creativity to outwit the

agents of scientific management before, during and after
the "appropriation of knowledge."

Consequently,

in any

shop there are "official" or "management approved" ways of

performing tasks and there is the workers

'

way,

which is

devised and revised in response to any management
offensive.

Not only has management failed to appropriate

from the workers their "trade secrets",

it is not

necessarily to their advantage to do so.
management," Burawoy indicates,
In Burawoy

'

s

view,

"Shop

"usually knows this." 32

Taylorism was

a

failure as

practical mechanism of capitalist control:
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a

Unlike changes in the division of labour
and the
scientific-technical revolution, Taylorism, defined
by the specification of task performance,
cannot be
identified with the separation of conception
and
execution.
what then is its relationship to
capitalist control? It has been resisted by
trade
unions the world over and has promoted struggles
organizing labour and capital into hostile campus.by
On a day-to-day basis workers attempt to sabotage'
Taylorism, while at a broader level unions join in
struggles to defend output clauses in rules.
Thus, scientific management may have undermined
capitalist control over the obscuring of surplus and
of the relations of exploitation between capital
and
labour.
With respect to the securing of surplus
there can be no definitive answer.
Insofar as
Taylorism fostered antagonism between capital and
labour, the coordination of interests became less
feasible and the reliance on coercive measures more
necessary 33
'

'

For Burawoy the significance of Taylorism lies precisely in
its failure to enhance capitalist control over the labor

process.

This failure,

in his view,

created the conditions

for the emergence of a new type of labor process

characterized by "the scientific-technical revolution." 34
Richard Edwards and Daniel Nelson also question the
practical impact of scientific management.
Edwards,
a

According to

the significance of Taylorism was that it offered

solution "to the crisis of control in the firm."

contends,

But,

he

"if we look at Taylorism as a management practice

rather than as an idea, the promise was never fulfilled."
One reason for this was that "the system was complicated,

and employers often grew impatient long before the final

elements were ready to be installed."

More importantly

Edwards argues, Taylorism failed because most large firms
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did not even give it

a try:

"The extent and incidence of

scientific management has always been something
of
mystery, but the available information suggests

a

that

Taylorism was confined to smaller nonunionized
enterprises.
In any event,

the new industrial giants~U.S. Steel,

International Harvester, and the others--showed little
interest in it." 35

In the final analysis,

however,

Taylorism "failed to solve the crisis of control in the
firm because workers fought it to a standstill."

This was

especially true, Edwards points out, after the Watertown
Arsenal strike, which galvanized organized labor's

opposition to Taylorism and "ended the possibilities for

a

scientific management solution to the firm's crisis of
control

.

36

Daniel Nelson, moreover, questions the impact of

Taylorism on the "labor problem":
Despite Taylor's apparent preoccupation with the
worker, scientific management had little direct
effect on the character of factory work or the lot
of the worker.
Taylor's labor "reforms" were
introduced in toto in only a handful of firms. And
even in piecemeal form they had far less impact than
his technical and organizational innovations.
Taylor's claims and reputation notwithstanding, a
different and often antagonistic group of labor
reformers revolutionized the worker's role in the
twentieth-century factory. 37

Rather than

a

"partial solution of the labor problem,

Nelson contends, Taylorism was
of factory coordination.

a

response to the problems

It was a

refinement and extension

of the earlier ideas known as systematic management.
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38

In

Nelson's view, the long-standing association
of Taylorism
with "a partial solution of the labor problem"
stemmed from
Taylor's efforts to link "his reform of the factory
system,

subject of modest appeal, with the elimination of
the
labor problem." Taylor's enduring fame, Nelson

a

states,

"is

in large measure a testament to his success in
that

endeavor

.

39

Although Nelson offers compelling evidence that
scientific management was not as widespread as Taylor and
others would have us believe, his analysis underestimates
the impact of Taylorism on the worker and on the

reorganization of the labor process.

Taylorism was not applied in toto

The fact that

in most industrial

establishments should not lead us to understand that key
aspects of Taylorism, such as the stop watch and incentive
wage payment schemes, had no impact at all.

Furthermore,

in arguing that Taylorism was a response to a problem of

"factory coordination," Nelson assumes that scientific
management' was merely

a

"technical

problem" instead of an

inherently political problem rooted in the control of the
labor process.

Thus,

where there is

a

problem of "politics

of production" Nelson only sees "technical matters."

Finally,

by claiming that "another group of labor

reformers [welfare capitalists]

revolutionized the

workers' role", Nelson completely disregards the role
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played by the Taylorites and the Taylor
Society in the area
of industrial relations during the
interwar period.
In conclusion,

the debate on Taylorism reopened by

Braverman has focused, almost exclusively, on
the labor
process.
Despite their differences, most scholars

who have

participated in this debate have conceived Taylorism
merely
as a form of labor control.
The central concern in this
discussion has been the question of how successful and

widespread was Taylorism in practice.
question, these authors,

By focusing on this

for the most part,

have failed to

examine the broader ideological and political implications
of Taylorism.

Moreover, because of their narrow concern

with the practical applications of Taylorism, they have
also failed to appreciate the relationship between theory
and practice in the case of Taylorism.

As Charles Maier

points out:
Theories of management are to the practice of
business as theories of architecture are to
buildings.
Few buildings follow the canons of
design announced by leading architects, even if they
incorporate individual elements.
Still,
architectural manifestoes are crucial for orienting
the profession to what might be their solution if
clients, money, and site constraints allowed.
So,
too, few industrial plants incorporate the doctrines
of management experts as coherent ensembles.
Few
factories were organized as Taylorite institutions,
even, in the United States.
Nonetheless, Taylorism
or scientific management dominated the discourse of
industrial relations through the 1920s.... 40
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Tavlorism and the T aylor Society
The significance of Taylorism, then,

study is concerned)

far as this

(as

lies not in its actual factory

applications, but rather in its political and
ideological
appeal during the interwar period.
It is the social and

political implications of Taylorism and not its
not narrow
technical features which merit our attention. 41
This perspective allows us to explore the
relationship

between Taylorism and the Taylor Society.
Taylor Society "read" Taylorism?

How did the

How did this "reading"

enable it to go beyond the labor process and the factory?
For the Taylor Society,

first of all,

Taylorism was an

ideology that promised an end to class conflict and social
division.

According to this view, Taylorism would

eradicate class conflict by providing simultaneously higher
wages to workers and higher profits to owners.
benefits,

in turn,

would be the product of

increase in productivity made possible by

a
a

These

general
more

"efficient" workplace and by the cooperation between labor
and capital.

This view was best articulated by Taylor in

his testimony before the House of Representatives in 1912,

where he stated that scientific management was not merely

piece work, time studies,

incentive wages,

"group of efficiency devices."

or any other

The essence of scientific

management, as Taylor put it, was "a complete mental
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revolution" which involved

a

reconciliation between labor

and capital:
The great revolution that takes place in
the
attitude of the two parties under scientific mental
management is that both take their eyes off the
division of the surplus as the all-important
matter
and together turn their attention toward
increasing'
the size of the surplus until this surplus
becomes
so large that it is unnecessary to quarrel
over how
it shall be divided.
They come to see that when
they stop pulling against each other, and instead
both turn and push shoulder to shoulder in the same
direction, the size of the surplus created by their
joint efforts is truly astounding.
They both
realize that when they substitute friendly
cooperation and mutual helpfulness for antagonism
and strife they are able to make this surplus so
enormously greater than what it was in the past that
there is ample room for a large increase in wages
for the workman and an equally great increase in
profits for the manufacturer. 42

During the 1920s the Taylor Society, or more properly the

progressive wing of the Taylor Society, took Taylor's
conception of scientific management as "a mental
revolution"

a

step further.

According to Robert Bruere,

a

leading member of the Taylor Society, the success of

Taylor's methods in the workshop led him to limit his

vision of "the great revolution in mental attitude" to
industrial production.

Taylor's methods were so successful

in creating a large surplus in individual plants and his

doctrine of high wages and low labor costs was so effective
in improving industrial relations in these plants,

tended to see in high wages, high profits, and

a

"that he

fair price

to the consumer the complete solution to all of the

problems of industrial relations."
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Taylor's vision of the

problem of industrial relations, thus,
did not go beyond
the factory.
As Bruere states, it "came to be
enclosed by
the walls of the workshop." Consequently,
Taylor lost
sight of the larger social significance
of his own

doctrine

43

For Bruere,

"the mental revolution" envisioned by

Taylor must go beyond the factory; it must embrace

distribution, consumption and all other areas of social
life:

The revolution in mental attitude which Taylor
advocated cannot be socially effective until the
entire community is secure not only in its ability
to create a surplus, but also in the equitable
distribution of the surplus when created. For the
conquest of surplus is not the end but the beginning
of civilization.
It is the function of industry as
society's main instrument in the struggle for
existence to create surplus; it is the function of
government and our cultural institutions to provide
for such a distribution of the surplus as will raise
the general standard of living and improve the
quality of the race.
The mental revolution must be
carried beyond the individual plant, beyond the
total industrial organization, until it embraces the
mind of the entire community.... 44

Although Taylor was concerned primarily with the creation
of a larger surplus

(and not with its social distribution)

his very approach to creating surplus--based on common

understanding and cooperation--entailed

a

new approach to

the problem of distribution and a new view of labor's

status in relation to capital, Bruere concludes.

Bruere enunciates here,

in my view,

social-democratic perspective.
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45

What

is the outline of a

,

In this context,

it is important to note that as
early

1920 Morris Cooke was advocating a program
along the same
lines as the one outlined by Bruere.
In April of that year

Cooke wrote

a

letter to Sidney Hillman, of the Amalgamated

Clothing Workers of America,
labor movement adopt

in which he proposed that the

program based on increasing

a

production through the development of the scientific
management of industry.

By contributing to this program.

Cooke argued, the labor movement could share

portion of the surplus produced.

a

larger

As Cooke put it:

Most of us have come to believe that in
itself any increase in the production of
essential commodities is a desirable social
end.
All groups and classes of society
should actively participate in the
cultivation of the arts and sciences leading
thereto.
If under the present organization
of industry we could assume that labor was
receiving at least a 'fair share' of the
proceeds of any increase in production of
course there would be no guestion as to
labor's participation in building up a more
efficient industry simply because labor has
more to gain than any other element in the
community through the betterment in status. 46

Cooke's proposal basically involved
labor would receive

a

a

trade-off in which

larger share of the surplus through

higher wages in exchange for adopting

a

program based on

expanding production and accepting the "technical"
expertise of scientific managers in the workshop.

As such,

this program of labor-management collaboration for

increased production anticipated important elements of the

post-World War

II

capital-labor accord.
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By 1926 Cooke expressed satisfaction
with the progress
achieved by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers'
program of

union-management cooperation to expand production:
believe that Sidney Hillman and the Amalgamated
Workers have been another large element in
winning
over labor to product ion ... The Amalgamated
has
only almost completely organized its industry not
but it
has secured markedly higher wages, unemployment
insurance and the right to sit in on the discussions
of practically every problem that affects the
business.
Then I think they have made the
demonstration that labor has a very real
contribution to make to policy. 47
I

However,

Cooke warned,

if this progress was to be

maintained workers had to organize and their organizations
had to collaborate with scientific management.
put it to Harlow
Society,

S.

Person,

As Cooke

managing director of the Taylor

in letter written in January 1929:

The big thing that is going on in the United States
is the increase in output due to various causes, but
principally to the imagination and better management
on part of the workers.
If we are going to keep
this we need organization on the part of the workers
and those organizations need a better picture of
what is happening and new techniques by which to
protect themselves and at the same time let

themselves out.

48

The role of progressive managers like Cooke and others in

the Taylor Society was to provide the "better picture" and
the "new techniques,

"

while the role of workers was to

cooperate with management in the expansion of production.
The outcome from such collaboration would be the

distribution of the surplus in the form of higher wages for
workers
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For the Taylor Society, thus, Taylorism
also involved
a strategy for economic growth.
The cornerstone of this
program was the recognition of productivity as
the source
of wealth and prosperity.
As Taylor put it:
The general material gain which those of the
present
generation have over past generations has come from
the fact that the average man in this generation,
with a given expenditure of effort, is producing two
times, three times, even four times as much of those
things that are of use to man as it was possible for
the average man in the past to produce.
This
increase in productivity is, of course, due to many
causes, besides the increase in personal dexterity
of the man....
But from whatever cause this
increase in productivity has come, it is to the
greater productivity of each individual that the
whole country owes its greater prosperity. 49
_

These changes in productivity, Taylor concluded, directly

affected the living conditions of the working people;

provided them

a

it

higher standard of living and transformed

"the luxuries of one generation" into "the necessities of

the next

.

50

The general adoption of scientific management,

Taylor

contended, would double the productivity of the average
worker.

This raise in productivity,

in turn,

would lead to

an expansion of both "the necessities and luxuries of

life;" it would enhance "the possibility of shortening the

hours of labor;" and it would increase the "opportunities
for education,

culture,

and recreation."

Moreover, the

"great increase in wages" linked to the doubling of

productivity would "largely eliminate the wage question as
a

source of dispute."

Finally, by lowering the cost of
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production this increase in productivity would
enable the
companies who adopt scientific management to
compete
better
this will so enlarge their markets that their
men
will have almost constant work even in dull times
and they will earn large profits at all times.
This
means increase in prosperity and diminution in
poverty, not only for their men but for the whole
community immediately around them. 51
Thus,

as Judith Merkle points out,

Taylor clearly related

the increase in productivity and wages to an expansion
of
the market for manufactured goods.

prefigured the notion of

a

In doing so,

Taylor

mass consumption economy.

What

he envisioned was to raise productivity to a point where

previously deprived sectors of the working class can be
incorporated into "the high consumption of mass-produced
goods."

Put differently, the idea of a mass

production/mass consumption economy was already present in
Taylor's understanding of productivity as the basis of

economic growth.

52

The implications of Taylor's economic thought would
not go unnoticed by the Taylor Society.

Writing in 1929 as

past president of the Taylor Society, Morris Cooke

characterized Taylor as an important innovator who made

a

fundamental break with the past:
The America of the late [19th century], the period
when Taylor first came on the industrial scene, was
gripped in a vicious circle of low wages, low
production, low purchasing power and a consequent
Strikes and other evidences of
lack of prosperity.
widespread industrial unrest marked the
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period.
[Taylor] projected into this drab
milieu
his program of high wages for the
individual as the
reward for high production by that individual;
pragmatist that he was, he taught the individualand
and
society how exceptional production could
be secured
With vivid applications. .he won acceptance
thesis that the warfare between employer and for his'
employee, between the manager and those he
directs... is for the most part wanton waste.
commonly accepted doctrines of high reward for The
high
performance, and so of actually lowering costs
through paying higher wages, he was the first to
propose.
And thus there was initiated on a firm
technical foundation the typically American policy
of the maintenance of purchasing power. 53
.

Cooke,

thus,

credits Taylor with being the first proponent

of the "commonly accepted" doctrine of high wages
and low

costs,

and of providing "a firm technical foundation" for

the policy of maintaining the purchasing power of the

workers.

In doing so,

he clearly links Taylor's doctrines

to Henry Ford's "high wage policy" and to the

underconsumptionist currents
interwar period.

(including Keynes)

of the

More importantly, Cooke's assessment

leaves no doubt as to the significance of Taylorism

(particularly during the Great Depression)

as a strategy

for economic growth and prosperity.

For the Taylor Society,

both

a

finally,

Taylorism provided

"philosophy and technique" for social economic

planning.

As is well known,

a

key component of scientific

management was the establishment of

a

centralized planning

department which was responsible for directing the overall
flow of production throughout the workplace.

Chris Nyland,

According to

in Taylor's early work's the Planning
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Department had been known as the Rate-Fixing
Department.
The change in name, Nyland argues, was
not just a matter of
semantics.
It signified the "maturation in
Taylor's

conception of what was required within the production
process that was to give his work so much significance." 54
Yet,

despite its importance for Taylorism, the idea of

planning production was not introduced by Taylor.
fact,

as a leading Taylorite recognized,

The

was that "managers

had always to some degree planned production and Taylor
got
many elements of his planning and control mechanisms from
other shops." 55

What,

then,

was the contribution of Taylor

to the notion of planning production?
S.

According to Harlow

Person, managing director of the Taylor Society during

the 1920s,

Taylor's contribution was that:

he integrated mechanisms into an interlocking whole,
and the degree to which planning and precise control
were developed by him was so great in quantity as to
create a new qualitative situation.
Planning
generally had not been effective because it was
based on so many chance factors. Now with the aid
of standardization, calculations could be made with
a fair degree of certainty.
This made possible the
planning-room procedures of routing, scheduling and
complete and economical utilization of facilities.
It was this precise control through planning and
preparation which secured the results of increased
productivity by eliminating idle times and
misapplied efforts, which are the result of many
different causes under uncontrolled conditions 56

Taylor,

thus,

created

a

"new qualitative situation" with

respect to planning, one which secured increased

productivity by eliminating "waste" in the production
process
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Rexford

G.

Tugwell, who was close to the Taylor

Society during the 1920s, recognized the
centrality of
planning in Taylorism.
In a paper titled, "The Principle
of Planning and The Institution of
Laissez Faire, " which
was presented to the American Economic
Association in 1932,
Tugwell stated:
If we have been watching, describing, analyzing
industry as we should, we must have known that the
greatest economic event of the nineteenth century

occurred when Frederick W. Taylor first held a stop
watch on the movements of a group of shovelers in
the plant of Midvale Steel Company.
And we must
have understood, when Shop Man^Pmp n was published
in 1903 that, perhaps a generation later, the world
could be overwhelmed with goods. 57
t-

For Tugwell, the importance of Taylorism was that it

provided

set of planning techniques that would enable

a

capitalism to experience unprecedented expansion of mass
production.

"If we had eyes to see the implications of

Taylor's work we should have known that the vast expansion
of production which must follow would clog all the channels

of trade,

swamp the mechanisms of an artificially limited

commerce,

and end in

Tugwell argued.

a

period of violent reconstruction,

"

American economists, however, had failed

to see the implications of Taylor's work and were thus

unprepared to effectively confront the Great Depression.
Because of their blindness to Taylorism, Tugwell contended,

economists had not yet discovered the sources of "the

astonishing capacity for production which seemed suddenly
to show itself everywhere in the twenties;" they had no
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idea of how production could be
"regularized and made

available to consumers;" and worst of all, they
had no
notion of what their policies "ought to be in
days of

disaster.

58

If the significance of Taylor's planning
technigues

was that it enabled the expansion of mass
production,

its

problem,

suggested Tugwell, was that it was confined to the
workplace.
As such, it could overcome the limitations
imposed by "the institutions of laissez faire" to the

process of production:
...Industry after industry may follow the half-dozen
now fairly rationalized; each may use in its own
plants the new technology of work-elimination; each
may solve its own problems of control and
coordination.
But it will end again in just such a
disaster as we are struggling through now unless we
take the final step of linking each to each. Unless
we learn the structure and rhythm of laissez faire
are inconsistent and anachronistic concomitants of
such technology as soon will infuse the industrial
process, confusion and disorder will prevail
whenever the willful pursuit of business privileges,
as we still know them, chokes the smooth
interchanging flow logically belonging to the system
of industry, but never yet achieved by human
management 59
The solution to this problem,

in Tugwell'

s

view,

was to

extend Taylor's notion of planning production beyond the
factory to the national economy.

What was needed was to

develop the notion of "national planning" --understood in
technical sense as

a

"normal extension and development of

the kind of planning which is

contemporary business."

a

familiar feature of

For Tugwell,
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finally,

the

a

implications of the development of

a

"national plan" for

the American economy were so profound that:

"The setting

up of even an emasculated and ineffective
central co-

ordinating body in Washington will form
recognition may gradually gather.

a

focus about which

It will be an

action as

significant as the first observation of Taylor; and it can
lead eventually to the crowning of that genius' work." 60
The leadership of the Taylor Society also understood

the need for national planning.

In a

discussion of the

Taylor Society, held in the winter of 1930, Harlow

S.

Person stated, that "[the] operations of industrial society
are not yielding substantial good to the greatest number of

the industrial citizens

...

because these operations are

not ... organized with that end in view."

Specifically, this

occurred because of the "inconsistency between the basic

principle of business enterprise

— individual

self-interest

and intuition--and the basic principle of the production

technology which that enterprise, without full appreciation
of its influence,

integration."

has come to use--cooperat ive

The dominance of the former over the latter,

Person adds, has left the regulation and coordination of
industrial activity to "the chance composite influence of
vast number of enterprises motivated by individual gain in

competitive activities,

limited in their perception of

relationships and the organic consequences of their
activities,

and on the whole dependent upon intuition for
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a

their decisions as to purpose and method."

This situation

was the fundamental cause of industrial
dislocations,

unemployment and halted economic stagnation.

61

Moreover, Person recognized that the attempts of

scientific management to stabilize individual enterprises
internally had been "frequently nullified by the impact of
forces of the industrial environment outside the control of

management."

The way out of this situation was to extend

the Taylorist planning principles to "industrial society"
as a whole:

"If these were applied to the organization and

control of industrial society, conceived as an organic
whole, many and perhaps most of the forces which now cause

periodic dislocations and distress in industrial life would
be eliminated."

planning involved

Thus,
a

for Person,

the notion of national

"greater limitation to individual

freedom in business activities than is at present assumed
to desirable," and that

Taylorist principles developed in

individual enterprises be extended "to industry conceived
as one vast enterprise in which all members of industrial

society are workers and share-holders in common." 62

By the

mid-1930s, Person, Cooke and the other leading figures of
the Taylor Society acknowledged that the only force capable
of ensuring the goals of national planning was the Federal

Government.

Consequently, they endorsed the New Deal and

through it the establishment of an interventionist state
that would seek to stabilize and regulate of capitalism.
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63

In conclusion,

much more than just

for the Taylor Society,
a

Taylorism was

"system of labor control."

it was

simultaneously "a mental revolution"--an ideology of
class
conciliation and social peace; an economic strategy for
economic growth and prosperity; and

a

"philosophy and

technique" for social economic planning.

64

By focusing on

the political and ideological implications of Taylorism,

instead of on its more narrow technical features, the
Taylor Society was able to transcend the factory and the
labor process.

It was able to

articulate

a

political

discourse that addressed the problem of the macroeconomy
and the state.

In short,

the Taylor Society went from

Taylorism to social-Keynesianism
went,

that is,

(or social-democracy)

from factory to society.
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CHAPTER IV

FROM FACTORY TO SOCIETY

Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the Taylor

Society.

Although there is an extensive literature on

Taylor and Taylorism, there is no work which deals

exclusively with the history of the Taylor Society.

Nor

for that matter is there any published study that explores

the influence of the Taylor Society on the emergence of the

political economy of mass consumption.
not to provide

a

1

My purpose here is

detailed historical account of the Taylor

Society, but rather to use that Society as

a

vehicle to

study the emergence of mass consumption capitalism.

My

interest is to show how "a small band of Taylorites," who
at first were concerned exclusively with the problems of

factory production, eventually developed into an important

policy-making network concerned with the problems of the
macroeconomy and the state.

Origins of the Tavlor Society
The Taylor Society was formally organized in 1911.

was a professional association composed primarily of

management consultants, engineers, and businessmen
interested in the "science of management." 2
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According to

It

founding member Frank

Gilbreth,

B.

the purpose of the

Taylor Society was to:
gather, codify and preserve all data on the subject
of scientific management, to act as a clearinghouse
for ideas, to secure the cooperation of all men
capable of undertaking the work of scientific
management ... in order that there would be available
at all times for the members, a cohesive working
force, familiar with the principles, and in sympathy
with the ideas of scientific management. 3

Membership in the Taylor Society concentrated in
Philadelphia, New York, and Massachusetts.

The principal

activities of the Society were membership meet ings local
(

and national)

,

educational work and research concerning

scientific management,

consultation and information

a

service for members, discussions of the most important
issues facing the "business community",

(beginning in 1915)

and the publication

of a bimonthly bulletin.

4

The Taylor Society emerged out of the American Society
of Mechanical Engineers

constituted
1886,

a

(ASME)

,

where "Taylor's followers

ready-made reform faction." 5

with Henry

R.

Towne

'

s

paper,

Beginning in

"The Engineer as

Economist," and following during the next two decades, with

contributions such as Taylor's "A Piece Rate System"
and "Shop Management"

(1903),

the ASME had provided

(1895)
a

key

forum for the discussion of management as an engineering

problem.

6

reverted to

By 1905,
a

however, the ASME seems to have

more narrow and traditional understanding of

the role of the engineer as

a
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technician--that

is,

as

someone merely concerned with problems of
machine design
and operation. As Harlow S. Person puts
it, "the concern
of that society with an increasing number
of technical

subjects did not permit expansion of its program to
give
that attention to management which importance of
the

subject required." 7

Eventually, this would be an important

reason why the Taylorites decided to create their own

organization
A related problem was the emergence within the ASME of
a

new generation of engineers linked as employees to large

corporate organizations.
points out,

These engineers, as Edwin Layton

identified their destiny with the large

corporations which employed them.

By 1904,

these

"commercialized engineers" came to dominate the ASME and
under their regime this society became subordinated to

corporate power.

within ASME.

This situation created a growing division

On one side,

were the corporate employees who

were exponents of "commercialized engineering".

On the

other side, were the representatives of the machine-tool

industries and light-manufacturing industries who defended
the notion "that mechanical engineers should be independent

and self-employed practitioners."

were part of the latter group.

Taylor and his followers

8

As the most active group within the ASME,

the

Taylorites took the leading role in the struggle to restore

independence and professionalism to engineers.
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In the

course of this struggle, they clearly identified

"commercialism" as the threat to their goals.

A leading

9

figure in this struggle was Morris Cooke who
"grasped the
key fact that the hard core of resistance to
scientific

management came from the public utilities and railroads
acting together as

a

sort of monopoly interest within the

engineering profession.

By shifting emphasis from the

virtues of scientific management to the vices of the
utilities,

[Cooke]

was able to broaden the base of his

appeal and link the efficiency crusade to the national

Progressive movement." 10

Moreover,

according to Layton,

Cooke "identified three groups that served as carriers of

utilities influence [within the engineering profession]
employees and officers of utilities; engineers affiliated

with their suppliers, such as the manufacturers of
electrical equipment and steam boilers; and consultants
whose practices depended upon the utilities." 11
so,

as Peter Friedlander argues,

In doing

Cooke demonstrated that he

understood very clearly the structural nature of the
opposition to scientific management within the ASME.

12

The election of Taylor to the presidency of the ASME
in 1906,

deepened the rift in that organization.

Taylor's

reforms, particularly his attempt to apply scientific

management to the society itself, provoked

"a

storm of

protest" from the conservative faction of the ASME. 13
was Cooke, however, who led the struggle to reform the
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It

ASME.

Cooke hoped to transform the ASME into

forum for

a

scientific management and progressive social reform.

For

this it was necessary to rid that society of corporate

influence and to instill in the engineering profession
sense of dedication to public service.

effort Cooke wrote

a

paper in 1908,

a

As part of this

"The Engineer and the

People," in which he argued that public service was the key
to the engineer's status.

The low professional status of

engineers was due to the fact that they did not serve the
people directly.

Engineers might attempt to overcome this

situation by collectively serving the public.

As a

practical step in that direction Cooke proposed the
creation of

a

committee in the ASME through which engineers

could provide public service and enhance their sense of
social responsibility

14

According to Layton, underlying Cooke's outlook was

a

radical departure from more traditional views of

engineering and professionalism:
What made Cooke s proposal revolutionary was his
assumption that loyalty to the public and loyalty to
employers were antagonistic, even incompatible
This theme was not stressed in Cooke's 1908 paper;
Cooke saw
it became apparent only later.
He
engineering and business as radically different
resented "the assumption that business- -big or
His animosity was directed
little is engineering.
particularly toward the large, monopolistic
corporations, which he felt were exploiting the
people and polluting American politics. Engineers
who allied themselves with such organizations were
acting against the public interest. 15
1

.

—
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For Cooke,

in conclusion,

the domination of engineering by

"large,

monopolistic corporations" was responsible for the
low professional status of engineers.
This presented "a
terrible menace to society".

The solution to this problem

was to be found in regaining autonomy for the
profession

and in the dedication to public service.
As Daniel Nelson indicates,

16

the efforts of Taylor,

Cooke and the other Taylorites to reform the ASME led, by
1911,

to an informal alliance between traditional engineers

(whose background was similar to that of the Taylorites)

and corporate engineers.

A clear indication of this

alliance was that, during this period, engineers like John

Calder and L.P. Alford, two of the society's most

articulate members, openly criticized Taylor and scientific
management.

Both of these men were part of the system

management movement, but considered engineers to be

technicians and the ASME an organization for the discussion
of technical rather than management problems.

Consequently, they opposed the Taylorites' attempts to

broaden the scope of the society and of engineers' social
responsibility.

17

Another important indication of this

alliance was the resistance to publishing papers on

scientific management,

including,

significantly what would

become Taylor's most important work, The Principles of

Scientific Management

.

18

This was followed in 1912, by the

report of a committee of the ASME which basically rejected
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the scientific claim of Taylorism.

In short,

"the ASME

came close to repudiating scientific management
between
1910 and 1912.-19

The Taylor Society was created as

a

response to this situation.
The Taylor Society was born during the "Eastern Rate

Case."

In the spring of 1910,

announced

a

a

group of railroads

general wage increase for their employees.

railroads followed this announcement with
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
freight rates.

a

The

petition to the

for an increase in

The rationale for this,

according to the

railroads, was that wage increases constituted financial
losses,

thus,

the need for an increase in price.

In

response to this action, the Eastern Shippers Association

called upon Louis

D.

Brandeis to present their case against

the price increase before the ICC.

The hearings held by

the ICC--which became known as the Eastern Rate

lasted from August to December 1910.

Case-

The case was decided

in February 1911 and it was won by the shippers'

association.

The case marked

a

scientific management movement.

turning point for the
It

propelled the movement

into the national spotlight and popularized the concept of

"scientific management" throughout the United States.

As

Milton Nadworny indicates, the Eastern Rate Case put the
scientific management movement "on the map" and gave it

proper name.

It also

provided an opportunity for the

formation of the Taylor Society.
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20

a

The strategy used by Brandeis was to
attack the

railroads as "inefficient".
in a more efficient way,

If the railroads were operated

he argued,

they could pay higher

wages without increasing their rates.

The problem with the

railroads was that they had failed to adopt scientific

management
We say that this situation, this practical
declaration of hopelessness which comes from the
railroads, this incompetence to deal with the great
problem of labor and the great problem of costs, is
due to failure to regard that which the most
progressive manufacturers in competitive lines of
business have been led to adopt, namely the science
of management 21
If the railroads adopted scientific management,

Brandeis

contended, the results would be "higher wages to the

workman,

less costs,

and therefore, better profits to the

manufacturer, and reduced prices,

in many instances to the

consumer--and this reduction in price to the consumer,
coincident with the general increase in prices about which
we have heard so much,

living." 22

and the increase in the cost of

Brandeis' most sensational claim, however, was

that the adoption of scientific management would save the

railroads one million dollars

a

day.

This claim sparked an

"efficiency craze" around the country and transformed

scientific management into

a

national phenomenon. 23

To elaborate his strategy and document his claims,

Brandeis turned to Taylor and his followers.
an important development occurred.
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Henry

L.

At this point
Gantt,

one of

Taylor's closest associates and

a

member of the ASME

'

governing council, attempted to get the society
to endorse
Brandeis' case against the railroads.
The ASME,
however,

rejected Gantt's petition. 24
anyway and assisted Brandeis.
met with Gantt,
T.

Kent,

The Taylorites went ahead
In October 1910,

Brandeis

Frank Gilbreth, Henry V. Sheel, and Robert

editor of Industri al Enalnpprinn

.

in New York to

discuss the strategy for the ICC hearings.

It was at this

meeting that the name "scientific management" was
officially adopted for the Taylorite movement.
states,

"it was not the first time the term was used,

it was the

title

"
.

As Nadworny

but

first time it was accepted as an official

25

As part of their efforts to assist Brandeis, Gilberth

and Kent went to Canada to gather information on the

management methods introduced into some shops of the
Canadian Pacific Railroads by Gantt.

It was

during this

trip that Gilbreth conceived the idea of creating

society

a

which would "perpetuate Fred Taylor's work" and "conserve
the ground that will be won" by scientific management after
the Eastern Rate Case.

idea with Cooke,
a

and

a

Gilbreth and Kent discussed the
few days later,

on November

9,

1910,

group of five men met at the New York Athletic Club and

laid the foundation for what would become the Taylor
Society.

The five men present at that first meeting were

Morris Cooke; Frank Gilbreth/ Robert Kent; Wilfred Lewis,
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President of the Tabor Manufacturing Company

Taylorite plant); and Conrad

N.

Lauer,

(a

model

also from Tabor.

it

would take another year, however, before the Taylor
Society
was formally organized. 26
In October 1911,

month before the Taylor Society was

a

formally organized, Harlow

Morris Cooke, organized

a

S.

Person,

with the aid of

"Conference on Scientific

Management" sponsored by the Amos Tuck School of Business
and Finance at Dartmouth College.
the Dean of that school.

At the time,

Person was

The purpose of the conference was

to bring together a group of New England businessmen with

management engineers and manufacturers who were experts on
scientific management.
hoped,

This encounter,

the organizers

would enable the New England businessmen to gain

a

better understanding of the principles of scientific

management and of the benefits of applying these principles
to their businesses.

27

The conference was attended by the

most important figures in the field of scientific

management including:
Gantt,

Frederick Taylor, Carl Barth, Henry

Harrington Emerson, Sanford L

.

Thompson, King

Hathaway, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, Robert B. Wolf, and
James M. Dodge.

Among others, the businessmen associated

with scientific management included:
Lincoln Filene, Ralph

E.

Flanders,

Henry Kendall, A.

and John G. Aldrich.

The conference market the first major meeting devoted to

the subject of scientific management.
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28

The fact that it

was organized by Person and Cooke is not
insignificant.
For this conference prefigured what the Taylor
Society

would become--a forum for the discussion of management
problems.

In a sense,

although the Taylor Society was not

yet formally constituted,

the Dartmouth Conference was the

society's first public activity.
The Taylor Society,

or the Society for the Promotion

of the Science of Management,

as it was called originally,

was formally organized in November 1911.

Robert

T.

Kent,

29

According to

the organization's secretary:

"The Society

was formed partly because ...the American Society of

Mechanical Engineers

...

would not give to the Taylor

principles the publicity that we thought they deserved."
The creation of a formal organization was also the product
of the need to consolidate the gains made by scientific

management as

a

result of the Eastern Rate Case.

As its

first president the society elected James Mapes Dodge,

past president of the ASME.
indicates,

This was done,

"to avoid offending" the ASME.

30

a

as Kent

That is to say,

it was done so that the Taylor Society would not appear as
a

divisive element within the ASME.

all,

The society,

after

had been originally conceived as one which would act

in harmony with the ASME.

31

The election of Dodge was also

an attempt to win over Taylor's support for the new

organization
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According to Nadworny, Taylor was initially
opposed to
the creation of a society to promote his work.
He was
concerned that

a

effective as

group within the ASME

a

separate organization would not be as
.

For him the problem

was that the new organization would be composed of
people

already converted to scientific management, while within
the ASME there was still a large group that needed to
be

convinced about the benefits of Taylorism.

Thus,

the

formation of the Taylor Society could do more harm than

good to the cause of scientific management.

32

Despite

Taylor's opposition, the new society continued to function
and develop.

Moreover, the formation of the Taylor Society

gave new life to scientific management within the ASME, and
by 1919,

as Edwin Layton states,

to control the society."

"the Taylorites ... seemed

This influence was evident in the

role played by the Taylorites in the formation of the

Federated American Engineering Society,

a

progressive

federation of four major engineering groups, and in the

creation of

a

in 1920 33

The Taylorites'

.

special management division within the ASME

was short-lived.

control over the ASME, however,

By the mid-1920s Cooke and the Taylorites

had been defeated by the conservative forces within the
ASME.

34

Having failed to transform the ASME into

a

forum

for scientific management and progressive social reform,

the Taylorites turned their energies to expanding the work
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of the Taylor Society as an independent
policy-discussing

and industrial research network.

35

Development of Poliri^
In its early years,

before World War

I,

the Taylor

Society focused its attention on the purely technical
aspects of the labor process.

Its domain was the factory

not society, production not consumption.

As Harlow S.

Person explains:
Before the War American industry was on a sellers'
market and the emphasis in the work of the society
was on production technique, and the principles as
expressed therein, for on a sellers' market
production to meet what appears to be insatiable
demand is the major problem of industry.
It was
during this period and in the production field that
the basic technique of scientific management was
worked out and the fundamental principles
formulated 36

During this period discussions at the society meetings were

restricted to topics such as "the determination of work and
operating standards, the order of introducing Taylor's
methods into

a

plant," and "the handling of materials

between machine operations." 37

In this respect,

the

society's outlook was basically in tune with Taylor's early
concerns
However, with the election of Harlow Person
not an engineer, but an economist)

(who was

as President in 1913,

the Taylor Society began to broaden its scope.

In

particular, the Society began to address the so-called
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"problem of industrial relations," which Person defined
as
"the problem of management." 38

As part of this effort,

in

1915 the Taylor Society provided a forum for industrial

consultants Robert

G.

Valentine and Robert

B.

Wolf to

develop their "revisionist" ideas on the relationship

between scientific management and organized labor.

Valentine was

proponent of "workers' consent in

a

management," whereas Wolf advocated the idea of
"nonf inancial incentives" to motivate workers in production
and defended a positive role for unions.

departed in

a

Both of them

radical way from Taylor's understanding on

the role of unions.

39

Although the majority of the members

of the Taylor Society did not necessarily share these views
at this time,

the society still provided an open forum for

40

In the years ahead the Taylor Society would

such ideas.

give vent to the issues of "workers' consent," "workers'

participation," and "union-management co-operation."

Such

was the development of the Taylor Society in this area,

that by 1923 Person proclaimed "the outstanding

contribution which scientific management is now making, is
to the solution of the problem of industrial relations." 41

World War

I

marked

the Taylor Society.

a

turning point in the history of

It was

during the war--when all of the

officers and over 50 per cent of the membership of the
Taylor Society went to work for the U.S. government on

behalf of the war effort

— that
122

the Taylorites discovered

the macro-economy and specifically the state.

42

The war

effort made it necessary for U.S. industries to
maximize

production while at the same time it generated

a

labor

shortage which strengthened the trade union movement.
led the state to turn to the Taylorites

management "experts")
war production.

This

(and other

for the planning and development of

During the war, as Daniel Nelson states,

many managers and businessmen served on the War Industries
Board,

the Council of National Defense,

Conservation Division of the WIB,
the elimination of waste,

and the

"all of which stressed

the simplification of styles and,

the standarization of parts." 43

The members of the Taylor

Society were part of this contingent and their experience

organizing war production enabled them to broaden their
social perspective and enter what Person called the "period
of the larger conception of scientific management." 44
On December

8,

1917,

the Taylor Society met to discuss

the problems of organization and production for war.

that meeting, Henry Kendall,

a

At

Massachusetts textile

manufacturer, argued that U.S. victory in the war was

contingent
upon the maximum production of the country,
production of what is wanted, in the quantities
wanted, and at the time wanted, and this maximum can
be obtained by a completely organized war machine,
and this can be brought about in time only by a
definite plan and centralized authority in bringing
it to pass. 45
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For Kendall, this utmost coordination and
centralization of
Government activities was a necessity, if the U.S.
was

going to defeat the "all embracing, high-efficient

organization represented by the German Government." 46
Ernest Martin Hopkins, president of Dartmouth College,

concurred with Kendall, stating "that there is nothing to
do except to make a complete democratic move,

to commandeer

everything and everybody and every resource in this country
for the common purpose."

authority,

"

he added,

"If this is centralization of

it seems to me that that is what we

ought to do." 47

Morris Cooke, however, warned against the excesses of

centralization of authority and argued in favor of

a

more

decentralized and democratic form of control:
In planning any organization, industrial, political
or any other, it seems that we should always try to
come back to the rule of democracy ... wherever we

decentralize we get the spring and the surge and the
inspiration that comes with people acting from
motives of their own without dictation from the top,
or least with the minimum of dictation from the
top.

For Cooke,

48

in short,

"democratic lines."

Taylorites shared

a

the war should be conducted along more

Despite their differences, the
common understanding of the

significance of the war for American society.

This

understanding was best expressed by the president of
Dartmouth College, who was
Society,

a

close associate of the Taylor

as he summarized the discussion on the war effort:
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All of this goes back to a very large fact in
connection with our national welfare, namely, that
we have been a nation of individualists and have
been extremely slow to understand that prosperity
and welfare were coming to us in the last analysis
by disassociating ourselves from the theories of
individualism that have prevailed, and accepting an
entirely new view in regard to cooperation, which
eventually must be the basis of effective
democracy 49
It was this

understanding which enabled the Taylor Society

to draw on the cooperative and collective war effort

Murray N. Rothbard calls "war collectivism") as

a

(what

model to

confront the Great Depression and build the New Deal.

50

During the war the majority of the leaders of the
Taylor Society worked with the Ordnance Department, the

Emergency Fleet Corporation, the United States Shipping
Board,

and other planning and production agencies.

51

Within

these agencies, the Taylorites played an instrumental role
in terms of labor-management relations.

significance,
"

[during]

Of particular

as Morris Cooke pointed out,

the War

a

was that

group of those associated with the

Taylor Society helped to draft [an industrial code] which
was issued as General Order #13 by the Ordnance Department
and under another designation by the Quartermaster

Department." 52

This Code, which according to Nadworny,

"was

probably mainly Cooke's handiwork;" recommended that
government contractors accept collective bargaining, the 8hour day, minimum wages, equal pay for women, health and

safety provisions
and children),

(aimed fundamentally at protecting women

and union-management cooperation schemes.
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53

Before the war it seems improbable that most

Taylorites would have endorsed these measures.

However,

the experience of organizing war production with the

collaboration of the unions under government sponsored
collective bargaining arrangements,

led the members of the

Taylor Society to reassess their previously held position
in relation to union recognition and collective bargaining.

This new understanding on the role of unions would be key
to the rapprochement between the AFL and the Taylor Society

during the 1920s.

54

As Edward Eyre Hunt indicates,

the war

had broadened the function of the management engineer

tremendously and had put "[not] mechanical but human
problems

... in

the foreground." 55

This tendency would be

taken even farther during the post-World War

I

period.

The end of the war brought new possibilities and

challenges for the Taylor Society.

At a national meeting

which took place in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on October
4,

the post-War World

1919,

I

3-

situation was summarized in

the following way:
The aftermath of the war brings with it a severe
test of resourcefulness and efficiency in the
The wholesale
conduct of business activities.
destruction of the products of labor, the vast
amount of deferred maintenance that has to be made
up on much of the undestroyed maintenance that has
to be made up on much of the undestroyed property,
the smaller numbers of ablebodied laborers
available, the demand for shorter hours and for an
increased measure of the comforts and luxuries for
the masses, --all require increased intelligence in
56
the processes of production and of distribution.
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Moreover,

as John E.

Otterson,

from Winchester Repeating

Arms Co., and acting president of the Taylor Society
argued,

the war had expanded the opportunities "for the

application of the philosophy and the science of management
as taught by Mr.

Taylor,

and were he here today,

he would be able to point out to us

application of his teachings." 57

a

I

am sure

wider field of

In light of these new

challenges and sensing an opportunity to expand the

application of scientific management "to
the Taylor Society established

a

a

wider field,"

central office in New York

and created the position of managing director, to run the

affairs of the society on
1919,

Harlow

S.

day-to-day basis.

a

On April

Person was chosen managing director of the

Taylor Society, a position he held until the dissolution of
the society in 1936.

58

The postwar period also brought a transformation in

the membership and composition of the Taylor Society.

In

its early years the membership of the Taylor Society was

composed

primarily of engineers and employers.

society was

a

The

small and close-knit group composed of

From

"Taylor men" and representatives of "Taylor plants."

"a small band of Taylorites" which attracted some twenty or

twenty-five persons to its meetings during the first two
years of its existence, the society grew to
over 800 during the 1920s.

only grew in size,

59

a

membership of

The society's membership not

it also changed in composition.
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By

1922,

as Person states,

membership to the Taylor Society

did not require "that one be
'Taylor plant'."

'Taylor man' or represent a

a

it meant only that

interested in management as

a

a

science,

person was

desired to promote

investigation in that field, and was "open-minded and

appreciative of great contributions to the development of
better management." 60

As a consequence of this change,

Taylor Society began to attract

the

social scientists such as

Mary Van Kleeck and Irving Fisher,

journalists such as

George Soule and Robert Bruere, and urban mass retailers
such as E. A. Filene and A. Lincoln Filene. The

transformation in the society's membership and composition
coincided with the broadening of its social and economic
perspective, and with the extension of scientific

management to new areas.
A key area to which the Taylor Society attempted
to extend the application of scientific management was

sales and marketing.

This was done during the 1920s,

in

the context of contracting markets.

According to Person,

the war had plunged the economy into

a

"buyer's market":

...the war... was a tremendous shock to the
On the one hand it caused a
industrial system.
still greater development of productive capacity,
financed out of future earnings through the
mechanism of bonds and taxation, and caused a
coincident decline in consumers' demand... a decline
which is likely to continue for some time because of
the continuing heavy taxes and the maladjustments
In short, the shock seems to
caused by the war.
have hastened evolutionary tendencies, which would
have developed more gradually and with only minor
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depressions, and to have thrown us suddenly upon
buyers' market which will last for some time and a
may
be the beginning of a dominant buyers' market. 61
What this meant,

in Person's view,

was "intense competition

on the part of management to find the individual
consumers

and to sell them."

And in that competition selling price

and cost of production would be critical factors.

62

Thus,

the need to focus on marketing and selling.
As Henry Dennison,

Society,

a

prominent member of the Taylor

pointed out, since 1920 the problem of marketing

and especially the creation of demand for the product and
the development of new products had become the pre-eminent

concern of business executives.

At the forefront of those

concerned with the problems of marketing and selling,
according to Dennison, was the Taylor Society.
October,

1920,

"articles suggesting

a

As early as

more scientific

viewpoint on marketing" appeared in the Bulletin of that
society.

63

These articles and the discussions that took

place at the Taylor Society on selling and marketing

recognized that "the application of science" to the
solution of sales problems was "a relatively recent

development in American business."

Yet,

the attitude that

prevailed was that "[the] problems of marketing, like
factory problems, must be isolated, abstracted and analyzed
after the scientific method."

The assumption was that,

American business and management had used "science" to

129

if

resolve its factory problems, they could also use
it to
resolve the problems of marketing and selling.

64

Henry Kendall summarized the Taylor Society

perspective on selling in the following way:
There are three essentials to selling:
knowing your
product, knowing the market and knowing the trade
channels.
The problem of the sales executive backed
by the chief executive today is, on the basis of
these three essentials, to create new markets.
To
guide and sustain the sales executive, the chief
executive should know as much about merchandising as
the latter, and should now focus his attention upon
the latter's problem. 65
Moreover,

Kendall added, the key to the problem of

marketing is to:
(2)

(1)

find

a

new market for the product,

modify the product to meet the requirements of an

existing market, or

(3)

develop

a

new product to meet the

requirements of an existing market.

Here again,

it is the

task of the sales managers, with the assistance of the
"chief executive,

"

to coordinate the process of market

research and "sales engineering." 66

This process entailed

not just the study of the product and of the market in

general, but more specifically,

merchandising,

"

"the evolution of

"the use of statistics and the development

of the sales budget,

"

joint research in the field of

selling and marketing with other institutions, and

"scientific advertising."

As a result of this new emphasis

on selling the sales managers had come to occupy the

position held by the production managers in the period
before the war.

67
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The approach of the Taylor Society to the
problem of

selling and marketing was part of their approach
to

broader problem:

a

the problem of economic stabilization at

the macroeconomic level. During the

1920s the Taylor

Society was an important component of the campaign led
by

Herbert Hoover to create

a

macroeconomic management system.

The idea behind this campaign was to achieve macroeconomic

stability through microeconomic strategies.

As Guy Alchon

indicates, this campaign sought to influence the

microeconomic decisions of individual managers in such
way as to enhance the stability of the economy as

a

a

whole.

The underlying assumption of this approach was "that if

enough managers stabilized their operations along the lines
recommended, then the sum of individual decisions, much
like the invisible hand of the classical market, would add
up to increased productivity, moderation of distributive

conflict,

and,

thus,

the collective good." 68

According to

this approach, then, the stability of the economy as

a

whole was achieved through the action of individual

managers at the level of the firm, the role of the state
and other private agencies was to provide guidance to these

managers so that they could stabilize or "regularize" their
firms

69

As part of this effort, the Taylor Society played a

leading role in the study developed by the "Committee on
the Elimination of Waste" in 1921.
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The study of waste in

industry was an initiative undertaken by Hoover
as

president of the Federated American Engineering
Societies
(FAES

)

;

its purpose was to investigate the causes of

"inefficiency" and low production in industry.

The Waste

Committee was dominated by the Taylor Society--a
substantial majority of its eigthteen members were

Taylorites

— and

its report was recognized as a statement

representative of scientific management. 70
Person,

According to

"that committee was composed largely of Taylor

engineers,

its point of view was entirely Taylor,

and the

standards by which it judged waste were the standards,
simon-pure, of scientific management." 71

In fact,

as

Nadworny points out, several key reports published in Waste
In Industry

were summaries of studies conducted by members

of the Taylor Society:

Sanford Thompson's reports on the

building and boot and shoe industries; Morris Cooke's on
men's readymade clothing; John Williams' on the printing
industry; and Fred

J.

Miller's on metal trades.

72

The report of the Waste Committee created heated

controversy within the engineering profession and was
soundly rejected within employer circles.

Its most

controversial aspect was

its assessment of who was

responsible for waste

e.,

(i.

inefficiency)

in industry.

The report concluded that over 50% of industrial waste was

the responsibility of management, while it held labor

responsible for less than 25%. 73
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Underlying this conclusion

was the understanding that management could
eliminate

the\

sources of waste and inefficiency in industry, if it

followed the Committee's recommendations for stabilizing
plant operations.

One of the most important

recommendations put forth by the Committee was the need for

management-labor cooperation to increase production.

The

Committee also stressed the need to prevent unemployment,
which was not only an important source of waste, but also
of industrial unrest.
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Here again,

the responsibility for

dealing with this problem was placed on the shoulders of
management.

Not surprisingly,

the reaction of organized

labor to the report of the Waste Committee was positive.
In Person's words,

the Committee's report "was

hailed by

organized labor as one of the most important documents in
their interest ever published-- for it publicly placed the
chief responsibility for waste on management."
so,

In doing

it contributed to the process of reconciliation between

scientific management and the unions.
As Evan Metcalf points out,

75

although much of the Waste

Report was concerned with problems of shop management and

production control, the Committee's recommendations went
beyond the traditional methods associated with scientific
management and encompassed measures concerning business
planning,
sales.

such as the coordination between production and

In particular,

it

stressed the need for mechanisms

of formal sales forecasting and systematic budgeting, both
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of which were necessary if firms were to respond

effectively to fluctuations of the market and to the

problem of "irregular employment."
argues,

For Hoover, Metcalf

the Committee's report represented a landmark in

the transition of scientific management from its pre-War

World

I

concern with "the minutiae of shop and office

routine" to "broad questions of policy-making." 76
This transition was also evident in the role played by
the Taylorites in the FAES
a

second major research project,

1

study of the twelve-hour day in the steel industry.

study,

This

which was undertaken by the FAES at Hoover's

initiative,

was also dominated by engineers associated to

the Taylor Society

(5

of the

8

members of the Committee

appointed to supervise the project were Taylorites)
as was the case in the Waste Study,

viewed favorably the change to

a

its conclusions

And

.

(which

eight-hour day) were

highly controversial within the engineering profession.
Specifically, the study's recommendations were rejected by
the steel industry—which opposed shortening the work day--

and by its allies within the engineering societies.
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A central aspect of Hoover's campaign to stabilize the

American economy was the movement to prevent unemployment,
or as it was called during the 1920s,

"regularize employment." 78

the movement to

In terms of policy-making,

the

principal vehicle of this movement was "President Harding's

Conference on Unemployment." This conference, which was
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convened by Harding in September 1921 at Hoover's
suggestion, was one of Hoover's first and most
important

projects as Secretary of Commerce.

The Unemployment

Conference had two fundamental purposes.

The first,

immediate purpose, was to mobilize the business sector
and
local communities behind an emergency relief and re-

employment program.

The second aim,

was to develop a long-

range program of unemployment prevention.
and his allies

(including the Taylorites)

79

,

But for Hoover

the Unemployment

Conference was above all "the vehicle through which

microeconomic regularizat ion and

a

greater data competence

might become instruments of macroeconomic stabilization." 80

According to Alchon, the Unemployment Conference and
such research offshoots as the Business Cycle Committee

supplied evidence that regularizat ion,

"understood as

managerial production and sales strategies that could
reduce fluctuations in employment and business activity,

had become

a

key aspect of Hoover's campaign for

macroeconomic stabilization.

81

Hoover's focus on

regularizat ion was shared by the members of the Taylor
.

Society,

waste

who viewed unemployment as

a

form of industrial

that could be prevented by the application of

scientific management at the level of the firm.
states,

"the

As Person

[Taylor Society] has maintained that the point

of attack on practically every phase of the industrial

problem is in the individual plant, and that better
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conditions in general are to be achieved by wiser

administration and more scientific managements of
individual enterprises." 82

Consistent with this

perspective, the Taylor Society encouraged individual

managers to take measures to regularize employment within
their own firms.
the development of

In doing so,
a

they sought to contribute to

macroeconomic stabilization strategy

based on the scientific management of individual plants.
In September 1921,

Hoover,

acting as Chairman of the

Unemployment Conference formed an Economic Advisory
Committee, to set the agenda and prepare the program for
that conference.

This committee,

as Alchon notes,

was

dominated by representatives of the American Association
for Labor Legislation,

Research,

the National Bureau of Economic

and the Taylor Society.

83

Among the Taylorites

who composed the Economic Advisory Committee, the most

important figure was Henry Dennison.

manufacturer from Massachusetts,

A paper products

Dennison was

the efforts to regularize employment

a

pioneer in

(his company establish

United States)

the first company unemployment fund in the

and was considered one of the most progressive and

influential business leaders in the country.

84

Active in

the movement to prevent unemployment since the pre-World

War

I

period, Dennison became

a

close associate of Hoover's

Commerce Department throughout the 1920s.

Elected

president of the Taylor Society in 1920, Dennison became
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the leader of a group of progressive
employers—including

Richard A. Feiss, Henry Kendall, Howard Coonley, Edward
Filene, A. Lincoln,

A.

and Morris Leeds--who were at the

forefront of the campaign to regularize employment.
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For Dennison, and other members of the Economic

Advisory Committee such as Wesley Mitchell, the question of
controlling the business cycle was
Unemployment Conference.

Indeed,

a

central one for the

the Committee's

preconference report stressed the need to focus attention
on the study of the business cycle and on ways to enhance

the control over it.

Dennison

!

s

To this end Hoover,

who shared

and Mitchell's view on the importance of

controlling the business cycle,

formed

a

subcommittee of

the Unemployment Conference to study this question.
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According to Metcalf, the report of the Business Cycles
Committee, which was published in May 1923, provided

a

broader framework for the development of regularizat ion
policies.

Specifically, the report recognized that many

aspects of the business cycle were not well understood by

businessmen or managers, and that some of these aspects
were beyond their control

.

Moreover, he states, the report

contained three major areas of policy recommendations:
monetary policy,
and

(3)

(2)

long-range planning of public works,

regularization of employment and investment by

private business

(1)

87
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For Mary Van Kleeck,

Cycles Committee,

a

key member of the Business

"the theme of that report was that

unemployment must be traced back to the businessman.

Not

that he is to blame, but he must take the lead in
analyzing
the whole network of conditions and applying such knowledge
as scientists can bring to bear." 88

Van Kleeck,

a

social

worker and Director of the Department of Industrial Studies
of the Russell Sage Foundation, was since the pre-World War
I

period

a

leading advocate of regularize employment.

During the war she became closely associated with Morris
Cooke,

with whom she collaborated on issues regarding

women's work.

became

a

89

Subsequently,

in the early 1920s,

she

member and an officer of the Taylor Society.

Being a social worker, however, meant that her perspective
on social problems was different from that of the majority
of engineers and employers that composed the Taylor

Society
Social workers are vitally concerned in the
attainment of a more adequate standard of living.
In their work among families and individuals whose
living conditions are below par, they encounter
unemployment, low wages, and evidence of unwholesome
conditions in industry. But they do not always see
that the remedy for these conditions may be in the
workshop.
In the Taylor Society, social workers
have an opportunity to meet members of the
engineering group who are tackling problems in the
plant with just as much anxiety as have the social
workers to reduce long hours, increase wages, and to
regularize employment. Perhaps the engineers also
need this contact to enable them to see the full
significance of management engineering in its
effects upon the social life of the community. 90
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Moreover, Van Kleeck stated,

the fact that the Taylor

Society recognized the importance of the social
scientist
"and had admitted those of us who whose work has
been

entirely in the human aspects of industry,

"

was a clear

signal that the society was moving in the right direction.
It was an

acknowledgement,

in her view,

"that no one could

be a true Taylorite who does not have the human interest

either to begin with or as result" of their industrial
studies.
thus,

91

Van Kleeck'

s

interest in the Taylor Society,

was "not directed toward challenging the technical

engineer to give attention to problems of human relations."
She was concerned rather with having "those people who see

the present disastrous results of industrial organization
in the community realize how the art of management in the

shop can fundamentally change those social conditions in
the community."

For Van Kleeck,

the Taylor Society was

a

vehicle through which management could be interpreted to
those "who are seeking to construct

a

better society."

And

membership in the society provided "an opportunity to share
in that interpretation." 92

Van Kleeck,

in short,

viewed the

Taylor Society as an important element in the campaign to

achieve social stability through microeconomic strategies.
As a social scientist, Van Kleeck was also very much

concerned with the need to develop scientific management as
a

tool for social research in industry:
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Are there not signs that scientific management
must
learn to apply its own science to the more
subtle
and difficult problems of human relationships which
we are coming to see as the science of management?
How much do we know, for instance, on the moot
question of financial or non-financial incentives
and the whole problem of developing and conserving
the creative power of the workers in highly
developed forms of industry. Or again, how shall we
learn to measure the relation between production and
consumption? .. .What methods shall be set up to
answer [these questions]? The field of discovery is
as yet vague, but its vital importance is
increasingly shown. We need to forge the tools, to
find the methods, for making the discoveries. 93
For Van Kleeck, all of the areas under the supervision of
the industrial manager required information that could only
be provided by the methods of the social sciences.

Here

lies the importance of social research in industry; it is

means of discovering the "facts'* that will enable the

manager to scientifically administer the industrial plant:
"

[Can]

the industrial manager know all he needs to know

about materials if he excludes form the range of his

knowledge the habits and attitudes of the men who make
them...?

Must he not also know the habits, the attitudes

and the circumstances of purchasers?

Can the market be

understood without using the methods of the social
sciences?"

Above all, Van Kleeck concluded, the power of

social research lay in its capacity to harmonize social

conflict and make cooperation possible.

Van Kleeck

's

94

concerns about the importance of

developing tools for social research in industry were
shared by the leading members of the Taylor Society.

140

In

a

particular, Harlow Person, who also was

a

social scientist,

argued likewise that the Taylor Society should insist
upon
the "widest possible discussion of all phases of
scientific

management."

It

should,

he added,

contemplate its

discussions from the point of view of the manager, the
worker,

and the social scientist each of whom could

contribute to the analysis of an aspect of social reality
that the others had not experienced.

The importance of

this type of approach to social research was that it

provided
industry.

a

broader understanding of the problems in
It also

provided

a

better basis for cooperation

between these different groups.

By combining and

harmonizing these three different perspectives the Taylor
Society could contribute to the development of

a

truly

scientific approach to social research, and scientific

management could "finally [reveal] itself as raising
fundamental questions of industrial philosophy." 95

Thus,

both Van Kleeck and Person were convinced of the
"objective" and "impartial" nature of the "scientific"

approach to social research they proposed; and of its
importance as
stabilization.

a tool to

In this,

further

a

strategy of economic

they shared with Hoover what

Alchon calls "a basic faith in the social virtues of

technocratic analysis and prescription." 96

This faith

explains the centrality of economic and social surveys in
Hoover's effort to stabilize the American economy.
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In conclusion,

through their participation in the

waste and the twelve-hour day studies, and in
the different

committees of the Unemployment Conference, the members
of
the Taylor Society played a leading role in Hoover's
campaign to create

a

macroeconomic management system.

Conversely, participation in this campaign played

a

key

role in the transition of the Taylor Society from factory
to society.

As Hoover put it,

it

enabled the Taylorites to

move beyond their concerns with the details of factory

production to the broad issues of policy-making.
enabled them,

finally,

It

to develop what they considered to

be "a truly scientific" approach to social research in

industry and to apply scientific management to "fundamental

questions of industrial philosophy."
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CHAPTER
TOWARD

A

POLITICAL

ECONOMY

V
OF

MASS

CONSUMPTION

Introduction
During the New Deal the question of recasting the

political economy came to the forefront of American society.
As the Great Depression undermined the institutional

arrangements that had supported the development of capitalism
until then, contending political-economic strategies sought
to gain influence in the policy-making process.

chapter

In this

focus on the political struggle between two of

I

these strategies: corporatism and Keynesianism
begin, however,

.

I

will

by discussing the political rupture between

Hoover and the Taylorites, and the emergence within the
Taylor Society during the late 1920s of

perspective.

I

a

proto-Keynesian

will also trace the Taylor Society into the

1930s to understand its relationship to the New Deal.

Finally,

I

will examine the role played by the Society and

those closely associated with it in the development of

a

Keynesian political-economic order

Proto-Keynesianism
During the 1920s the Taylor Society and its associates

played an important role in the development of Hoover's
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campaign to create
campaign, as

I

a

macroeconomic management system.

This

have shown, was based on a
mioroeconomio

approach to macroeconomic stability.

It involved,

according

to Guy Alchon, the creation
of a planning apparatus
conceived
as "a middle way" between
"statist collectivism" and

"laissez-faire."

In this

"middle way", the role of the state

was limited to providing
information and guidance to

individual businessmen concerning their
microeconomic
decisions,

in the hope that this guidance
would influence

their decisions and contribute to the
stabilization of their
firms.

As such,

this strategy relied heavily on the

expertise and authority of management engineers
and social
scientists.

1

Thus,

the prominent role played by the

Taylorites
For the Taylor Society, Hoover's campaign represented
an

opportunity to expand the application of scientific
management to new areas and

a

recognition of the importance

of Taylorism as a tool for resolving social problems.

2

Their

alliance with Hoover was based on the recognition by both

parties of the need to apply "the engineering method" to
social problems.

Despite the close collaboration between

the Taylorites and Hoover, their alliance began to unravel

toward the end of the 1920s.

Franklin

D.

By 1932,

with the election of

Roosevelt and the launching of the New Deal, the
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differences between these two
groups had become

irreconcilable and their political
collaboration came to an
end
The severing of the Taylorite-Hoover
alliance was the
result of several factors.
First among them was that during
the late twenties leading
members of the Taylor Society

became increasingly critical of
Hoover's program and

consequently begun to develop political
relationships with
individuals who espoused
strategy.

By 1927,

a

different political-economic

for example,

Mary Van Kleeck-who as

member of the Business Cycle Committee had
defended

a

stronger role for the federal state in the
prevention of

unemployment— began to
strategy.

distance herself from Hoover and his

Van Kleeck was particularly concerned with the

problem of growing unemployment within the context of
general
prosperity.

For her,

this situation was indicative of

structural problems in the economy, and also
failure of Hoover's macroeconomic strategy.

signal of the

a

3

As Van Kleeck grew increasingly skeptical,

along with Frances Perkins

— one

she became

of the most prominent critics

of President Hoover's unemployment policies.

Specifically,

both Perkins and Van Kleeck were sharply critical of the

optimistic figures on unemployment put forward by the Hoover

administration--f igures that did not correspond to the ones
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generated by
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and private firm§i4

^
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&f

"statements from the White House,"
Van Kleeck wrote in 1930,
"give evidence of a disappointing
opportunism in politiotl
leadership, rather than [the]
sober grappling with realities
which is characteristic of
engineering. »§
in 1928,

as part of her efforts in favor
of a more

comprehensive collection of unemployment
statistics, Van
Kleeck advised Senator Robert F.
Wagner on his bill to exei
[Mil
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

This bill increased the

appropriation authorized for the Bureau by
$100, 000 "so that
it might

extend its report to include statistics on
part-time

as well as total unemployment,
based on data obtained not

only from

large number of manufacturing industries and

a

railroads but also from the mining, construction,
agricultural, transportation, and retail and wholesale
trade

industries

g

.

For Van Kleeck and other like-minded

individuals, this bill represented the culmination of a long
(and until then unsuccessful)

attempt to develop a more

adequate process of collecting unemployment statistics,

what

Van Kleeck and the others could not accomplish under Hoover's
nut
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furthermore, by the late 1920s Van Kle

openly critical of Hoover

f

s

conception of the relationship
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between the state and the
economy.

At a meeting of the

Taylor Society in December
1928, she strongly criticized
American businessmen for their
attitude toward the state:
Why is the American business
man so gun-shy of the
state?... How much do we do in a
free kind of
V thinkin
*
bout
the
relationship of the
^
stat^f
h
t0 ^dustry?...
is it not about time we began
to
€
P roblems of industry as not stopping
w^h\h
with
the factory door, and least of
all, not stoppL
with the door of the particular
manufactured is ft
not about time we ... consider what
is the particular
function of the state which can best
serve the entire
plan of the community? 7
"

^

Van Kleeck's comments, however,
at the business class.

were not directed exclusively

They were intended also as an

explicit criticism of the political leadership
of the

country— including the "engineering political leaders"

(an

obvious reference to Hoover)— for promoting this
attitude

among the businessmen.

In an indictment of Hoover's

understanding of the relationship between the state and the
economy,

Van Kleeck said:

of course, we are continually, in the mood of
saying, as do our great political leaders— even
engineering political leaders
'Beware of state
socialism,
and 'Beware of politics in business,
and
'Let us maintain the individual initiative of the
American businessman;
if we are going to be
controlled by formulae like that, and are going to be
so gun-shy of any legislative proposal, we shall get
just the kind of limited, negative legislation that
If,

—

'

'

'

industry is continually complaining of.

8

Van Kleeck's critique was shared by Taylor Society

members,

such as industrial consultant Ordway Tead, who
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:

welcomed "every scientific
management study which [helped]
define and characterize the
severe limitation under which
the
competitive process inherently works
[and helped] to destroy
the hold on business men's
minds of such now compelling
slogans as 'less government in
business,' and 'competition is
the life of trade. "'9

Although this was still

minority

a

perspective, it foreshadowed the ideological
direction that
the Taylor Society would take
during
the 1930s.

Also significant, in this context, was
the distancing of
Morris Cooke from Hoover.
By 1928 Cooke, who had earlier

called Hoover "the engineering method
personified," was
openly critical of the presidential candidate.

In October of

that year, Cooke wrote to Felix Frankfurter
explaining why he

became disenchanted with Hoover and would not support
him for
President

On at least four different and very important matters
he [Hoover] has gone back on views previously held and
taken up with the views held by those who control the
newspapers and other big interests.
He isn't as smart
as I hoped he would prove. 10

Kenneth

E.

Trombley, Cooke's official biographer,

the reasons behind Cooke's break with Hoover:
[thought]

confirms

"Cooke

that generally Hoover did an excellent job as

Secretary of Commerce.

represented his state on

During this period [Cooke]
a

committee
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set up by Hoover to study
electrical questions,

which had

afforded him an opportunity
to observe the Secretary at
first
hand.
They soon broke, however, for
Hoover consistently
backed the private power
interests ."
In 1931,

following his break with Hoover,
Cooke was

appointed by Governor Franklin

D.

Roosevelt to serve as a

trustee on the New York State Power
Authority ,12
capacity,

In this

he established a close political
relationship not

only with Roosevelt, but also with
Frances Perkins and other
key figures in Roosevelt's state
administration.
This

experience enabled Cooke to establish

a

new political

alliance and to become an integral part of
that would play

political milieu

a

a

crucial role during the 1930s.

to Jean Christie,

Cooke "looked forward early to

According

[Roosevelt's] nomination and election to the Presidency,
and
in 1932,

clinging to his useful standing as

supported him as an 'independent.'" 13

a

Republican,

Along with Cooke,

a

group of prominent businessmen linked to the Taylor Society

including Henry Dennison, Henry Kendall,
Morris Leeds

— endorsed

E.

A.

Filene,

and

Roosevelt and subsequently became

strong supporters of the New Deal.

This endorsement

confirmed the final political rupture between the Taylor
Society and Hoover.

14
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A closely related factor
in the demise of the
TayloriteHoover alliance was the
emergence within the Taylor Society
of a proto-Keynesian
political-outlook.

Between 1927 and

discussions in the Taylor Society
focused on the
problem of "the maintenance of
economic balance."
1929,

Increasingly, however, the debate
on this question began to
transcend the boundaries of the
consensus built around the

Hooverian approach to macroeconomic
stability.

At a

conference dinner held in 1927 and
attended by the directors
and guests of the Taylor Society,
Henry Bruere, vicepresident of the Bowery Savings Bank, asked:

"Is it true,

since we have so much prosperity, that
the secret of

prosperity is mass production and rising purchasing
power?
Have we at last discovered the magic circle?
true,

what are we doing about it?"

reflected

a

Bruere

'

s

If that is

questions

growing concern within the Taylor Society about

the ability of Hoover's program to maintain economic balance

and sustain prosperity.

It

reflected also an emerging proto-

Keynesian perspective which was developing within the society
during the late 1920s. 15
Such a perspective went beyond Hoover's strategy for

macroeconomic stability.

It

involved a developmental or

growth-oriented strategy based on high wages and rising
consumption norms.

As Wilfred Lewis,
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president of Tabor

.

Manufacturing Company, expressed
in

a

paper titled "Master

Planks in the American Industrial
Program," presented to the
Taylor Society in December
1927:

35 b C ° me increasingly plain
that high wages are
^nH
f
fundamental
to American prosperity.
Some

economists
have suggested that high wages
are the strongest
incentive to lower costs of production
and
distribution.
But at the same time that the high
payroll brings pressure to bear on the
management to
increase production and decrease costs,
it is also
increasing the purchasing power of the
consumers and
sustaining or increasing the market for
goods... 16
This strategy clearly linked high
wages to increasing

productivity and the expansion of mass consumption.
paper, moreover,

In his

Lewis presented four major planks for

industrial development:

(1)

to raise living standards by

increasing real income through improvements in production
and
the cheapening of products;

(2)

to increase the high level of

wages still more and to link these high wages to increases
in

productivity;

(3)

to improve the production and distribution

of goods through co-operation between management and workers;

and

(4)

to stabilize employment--by keeping "men and machine

fully occupied." 17

These four planks summarized the aims of

the Taylor Society during the late twenties.

They

constituted not only the outline of an industrial development
program, but also, more importantly, they pointed toward the

emergence of

a

full-fledged "Keynesian" macroeconomic

strategy
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.

The proponents of this
strategy had a clear

understanding of the effects it
would have on the
macroeconomy.

Specifically, they argued, their
policies

would promote economic growth
and prosperity for the country.
As Henry H. Williams, of the
R. T. French Company in

Philadelphia and

a

Taylor Society member put it:

urchasin 9 Power of the workers of this
country
increase twenty five per cent it would
not
be
aitticult to predict what would happen in
many
industries.
The demand for automobiles would
undoubtedly increase in an enormous way.
The buildinq
of new living quarters for a vast section
of our
immediately undertaken and the
industries affected by such construction would
prosper.
All sorts of electrical appliances and
conveniences would have their sales augmented ... 1
t

«L ^
should

?

William's analysis was significant in at least two
ways.
First,

he articulated his explanation in terms of the

"multiplier

effect" this strategy would have on the

performance of the overall economy.

In doing so,

he was

expressing his analysis in terms later made famous by Keynes
himself.

Put differently,

what Williams expressed here was a

central aspect of what would subsequently be known as

Keynesianism.

Second, his analysis focused precisely on the

effect of this strategy on the three commodities, house, and

electro-domestic appliances--that would become the mainspring
of "Fordist" economic growth during the post-World War II

period
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in William's view,

two obstacles stood in the
way of the

development of this strategy
based on high wages and mass
consumption.
The first, was the fact that
the majority of
the managers and capitalists
strongly opposed the policy of
high wages.
They are, he stated, too
concerned with making a
short-term profit: "It matters not
that almost all industrial
enterprises will ultimately benefit
by

[this policy]

.

The

question is what will be our earnings
next month or next
quarter?"
For these managers and capitalists,
wages were no
more than costs for capital; lower
wages meant lower costs.
For Williams, however, wages were

not just a cost but also

an outlet for mass production.
High wages,

he argued,

were a

way of increasing the workers' purchasing
power and expanding

mass consumption.

This,

in turn,

economic growth and prosperity.

would ensure continuous
Low wages might benefit

capitalists in the short-run by increasing profit margins,
but in the long-run they had the negative effect of

restricting consumer demand and halting prosperity. 19
The second obstacle was the weakness of organized labor.

According to Williams, despite its efforts, organized labor
had failed to achieve its aim of increasing real wages in
step with increases in productivity:

While productivity and the income of the United States
have greatly increased in the last few years, real
wages have increased little, if any.
In new and
advancing industries where rapid progress in
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nL^fbeV^
fairlv well
„AiV organized.
faxrly

-P^e-nent

fa

many y ears labor is
«
Labor is strong where it can
accomplish the least. 20

in

'

Although Williams recognized
the social and economic
implications of organized labor's
weakness and suggested the
need for a better form of
organization, he did not discuss
how it might be accomplished.
However, other proto-

Keynesians within the Taylor Society,
such as Morris Cooke,
did address this crucial issue.
In his

1928 presidential address to the Taylor
Society,

Cooke called for management to visualize
labor unions as

"a

deep social need" and to assist in
their development:
The interest of society, including those of
the
workers, suggest some measure of collective
bargaining in industry to the end that the
weaker side may be represented in negotiations
as to hours, wages, status and working
conditions.
Collective bargaining implies the
organization of workers on a basis extensive
enough say nat ion-wide--as to make this
bargaining power ef f ect ive
If labor
organizations are in fact desirable social
agencies and essential to the orderly conduct
of industry, they logically come within the
field of management.
It therefore becomes part
of our task to discover all necessary outlets
for the energy and spirit of the grouped
workers and to aid in the cultivation on the
part of management and labor of those newer
disciplines which will effect the maximum cooperative effort. 21

—

.

.

.

Trade unions, Cooke contended, were necessary as a form of
"balance of power" between capital and labor.
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They should be

seen as a way to ensure
workers of "a fair bargaining

Position so that they can
safeguard themselves, and society
on occasion, in the proper
distribution of the rewards of
productive enterprise and, of
increasing importance against
the ineffectiveness and
inefficiency of those who control

through their property rights."

The key problem of industry,

Cooke concluded, was to discover
how to give unionized

workers "a functional place in the
industrial process. "22
That is, how to incorporate unions
effectively into the

process of production.

"What we want," Cooke stated,

"is to

set up an integrating process which
will tend to unite us in
a

common purpose. "23
In 1931 the Taylor Society,

"industrial code" that sought to

led by Cooke,

drafted an

address the problem of

"human relations and working conditions in industry".

The

code stated that "unprejudiced study of the most
effective
forms of organization of labor for functioning in relation
to

management as

a

science is an obligation resting upon

progressive managers,

in the interest of good management as

well as in recognition of the importance of satisfactory

human relations in industry." 24

Furthermore,

the Taylor

Society industrial code defended the right of workers to
collective bargaining:
Labor's right to recognition as a party to
collective agreements is now, in this country,
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so widely recognized as
to be generally beyond
Y
debate
theory

m

and beyond contest in
right may be exercised through
various
Jf.forms of organization
however perform the function which can,
of representing
YeeS ° nly if C ° ntro1 of th
^ workers'
oraan?L\°
organization
rests fully and really with
the
workers.
With whatever form of workers'
organization an employer must deal...
Any
condition of the work contract binding
the
workman not to join an independent
(standard)
labor union is to be deprecated
2
5
...

S

T hat

Notwithstanding what this document stated,
the position of
the Taylor Society on labor
organizations was not shared by
most employers and managers in the
United States.
More
specifically, most capitalists and
management strongly

opposed collective bargaining and labor
unions, and

it was

this opposition in combination with the
weakness of organized

labor which posed

a

serious threat to the proto-Keynesian

"path to prosperity."

Unlike Hoover's program, the aim of the proto-Keynesian

strategy was not to stabilize production, but to expand
This view was clearly articulated by H

.

B.

Brougham,

it.

an

economist linked to the Pollack Foundation for Economic
Research, who presented a paper to the Taylor Society in

December 1927. 26

Brougham criticized Hoover's policies

concerning the stabilization of production.

These policies,

as expressed by Hoover's Committee on the Elimination of

Waste in Industry, were the following:

(1)

"productive

capacity should be conservatively based upon
of normal demand;" and

(2)

a

careful study

"production schedules should be
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based on a carefully
foliated sales policy,

deterged

from

an intensive study of
markets, thus stabilizing

product ion.- .27

In Brougham's view,

these policies should be

turned "inside out" and
replaced by new ones focusing
on the
expansion of production, not
on its stabilization.
As

proposed by him, the proto-Keynesian
policies concerning
production would read as follows:
(1)
"normal demand should
be based on a careful study
of productive capacity, and
should be steadily increased as
capacity to produce

increases;" and

(2)

"the aim is not to stabilize production,

but to expand production,

and to remove any purely monetary

hindrance to that expansion by providing
that markets be
supported by an always adequate purchasing
power."

according to Brougham,

In short,

"production would not be stabilized,

but mobilized with a view constantly
to raising the standard
of living. "28
As Wallace Clark,

a

management engineer and Taylorite

pointed out, one of the most important problems facing
American industry during the interwar period was "to
determine whether to reduce productive capacity until it
matches effective demand for goods or to increase the

purchasing power of consumers to keep pace with
capacity that is constantly growing."29

a

productive

a key difference

between Hoover's program and the proto-Keynesian strategy
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"

espoused by Brougham and
others closely associated with
the
Taylor Society was their
response to this problem.
Whereas
Hoovers favored the first option, that is, reducing
productive capacity until it
matched effective demand; the

proto-Keynesian perspective aimed
at increasing purchasing
power and expanding production.
"To the engineering mind,
argued Clark summarizing the
proto-Keynesian view, "the
solution of this problem inevitably
lies in the increasing of
purchasing power, for it is inconceivable
that the expansion
of American industry can be
arrested. "30

However, Brougham warned,

a

serious problem related to

the expansion of American industry
was the tendency to

increase productive capacity while
simultaneously displacing
more and more wage earners.

Given this situation,

should the

expansion of production be left to "the play of
competitive
forces" or should it be planned in the interest
of the

nation?

Moreover, how were workers to maintain,

increase their purchasing power,

let alone

if they were left unemployed

and cut off from the source of their purchasing power?
First, Brougham answered, prosperity must be planned.

More

specifically, effective demand must "be adapted, controlled,
and graduated" in correspondence with the constant expansion
of production.

Not to do so would be to "surrender to the

blind forces that have hitherto ended our brief intervals of
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prosperity.' Ol

The answer tQ

^

secQnd probiem

^

development of a program of
public works on an extended
soale, which could provide
displaced workers with alternative
employment and thus with a renewed
source of purchasing
power 32
Such a program of public works
would not only provide
displaced workers with employment,
it would also generate new
jobs and spur new economic activity.
Moreover, Brougham
argued, its adoption in the summer
of 1920, when there were
increasing signs of economic troubles,
would have averted the

1920-1921 depression during which American
industry suffered
20 billion dollars in loses.

As he put it:

The

[influx of public expenditures ]... would have
circulated like a transfusion of new blood through all
the veins and arteries of industry.
New purchasing
power could then flush out the congested areas of
surplus goods, and with renewal of demand yet more
credits would have flowed spontaneously into
productive works.
Instead of the dead loss of twenty
billions in idle and depreciated plant and products,
with unemployment and business stagnation, new public
works would be set up and in use to balance the added
bonded indebtedness, and prosperity would be prolonged
with fresh business expansion. 33

The implications of Brougham's analysis were self-evident.
If the country was to avoid a repetition of the 1920-1921

economic crisis, prosperity must be planned

— meaning

that

purchasing power must rise in accordance with increases in
productive capacity, and that public works must be expanded
to provide the growing numbers of displaced workers a new
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source of purchasing power.

Anything short of this program

would be an invitation for
another crisis.

The Great

Depression dramatically confirmed
Brougham's.
By the end of 1927, then,

a distinct

proto-Keynesian

perspective had emerged within the
Taylor Society.
perspective involved

a

Such a

growth-oriented strategy based on high

wages and rising consumption
norms.

Its aim was not

"to

stabilize production, but to expand
production", and to
support that expansion by sustaining
or expanding the markets
for goods via "an always adequate
purchasing power."

This

perspective not only went beyond Hoover's
program for

macroeconomic stability,

it also

prefigured some of the

central aspects of the post-World War

developmental model.

II

Keynesian/Fordist

Missing from this perspective, however,

was a more precise and elaborate understanding
of the role of

the state and of the unions in the development
of a mass

consumption political economy.

Such an understanding would

only develop during the early 1930s.
The onset of the Great Depression finally brought the

Taylorite-Hoover alliance to an end.

Two circumstances

prompted the dissolution of that alliance.

The first was the

obvious failure of Hoover's macroeconomic management system
to prevent the depression itself.

The second was what Evan

Metcalf calls "President Hoover's persistent reliance during
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the Great Depression on
business initiative as an
alternative
to government action to
support investment and employment,
despite evidence of its failure. "34
ln June l932> , TaylQr
Society document calling for
a conference to discuss
"the
challenge of the economic
situation" publicly criticized the

policies adopted by Hoover's
administration to face the
depression

The situation after two and one-half
years of
depression is one of "stabilized"
"
Certain measures which have been depression
adopted have
deflation--possibly for the time being stopped retarded
it.
But there have not been adopted
measures designed to
stimulate business activity, either directly
as
through public works disbursement of
purchasing
power
or indirectly as through manipulated
general price
increases.
It is doubtful whether the only
measure within Congress which has a chance proposed
of
LtneWagner relief and public works bill] is adoption
sufficient to serve as a stimulus. Apparently
public
policy has been governed by the belief that
the
outcome should be left to automatic adjustments
with
their waste of productive capacity and acute
suffering 35
.

This conference was one in

place on July

7

and August

a

series--the others took

18— organized

Society to discuss the depression.

conferences was to elaborate

a

by the Taylor

The purpose of these

programmatic response to the

depression and to influence public policy.

In November,

as

part of these discussions, the Taylor Society created a

special committee composed of 15 members of the conference

group to prepare
situation.

a

"plan of action" to confront the economic

In a memo to Sanford E.
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Thompson, Harlow

S.

Person explained that:
"The purpose of this committee
is to
consider and revise a program
of positive aotion for

presentation to the New Administration
and to Congress ... All
of us are aware that the
struggle has begun between the
forces of liberal action and
the forces of conservative
action to secure dominance in
the next Congress.

Any

influence we may hope to exert
should be made promptly. "36

According to Thompson and Person,
president and managing
director of the Taylor Society
respectively, the Hoover
administration was not only taking
inadequate steps to
confront the depression,

it was also

which could provide some relief,

undermining the measures

such as the bill introduced

by Robert Wagner to extend relief through

program.

a

public works

The response of Hoover to Wagner's bill,
the Taylor

Society leaders argued, amounted "to an
emasculation of the
bill

(1)

by reducing the funds available and

by

(2)

substituting Treasury financing for bonds issues, thereby

eliminating the most hopeful features of the bill— a moderate
reflation." 37

As a consequence of this action,

Thompson and

Person concluded:

It now seems apparent that a public works

program will
not serve as an immediate, direct and bold stimulus to
resumption of business activity.
The purchasing power
which it is hoped public works would distribute among
wage earners cannot register its effect for many
months, and is then likely to be to slight for the
situation which will have developed by that time. 3 ^
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In short,

Hoover's policies had failed.

As William G.

Schluter, professor at the
Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce and a close associate
of the Taylor Society,
pointed
out
in a document circulated
among the participants of the
"Economic Conference" sponsored
by the society, the basic

problem of the depression was the
lack of consumer demand and
this problem was not being directly
attacked by Hoover's
policies

The current depression is primarily
a consumer's
crisis.
It can only be remedied by easing
mdebtness of consumers and increasing theirthe
current
incomes.
This consumer's
crisis has been so destructive and has gone
so far
that it will not be immediately solved,
nor corrected
for sometime if reliance is placed only
on possible
increase in production activity under private
initiative. .. [A] decisive stimulation for [the
recovery and increase in consumer's income] must
come
from other sources ... The United States Government
is
the only super-agent with the sufficient credit
to
provide this stimulation and break the continuous
vicious cycle of declining prices, production and
incomes 3
.

It was the

persistent emphasis on private init iat ive--along

with the failure of Hoover's program to prevent the

depression in the first place—which led Cooke and other
prominent members of the Taylor Society to endorse Roosevelt
in 1932 and to support the New Deal.
In July 1932,

discussed
a

3

a

the leadership of the Taylor Society

draft of an open letter to Hoover, which proposed

point relief program.

called for:

(1)

a

The program,

as drafted by Person,

deliberate inflation of the currency— to
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raise general prices and
provoke a resumption of business
activity, (2) the extension
of a broad and comprehensive
program of public works to
distribute social purchasing
power, and (3) the establishment
of a national economic

council-to make studies and recommendations
for the economic
development of the nation. 40

In the conclusion Qf the

to Hoover, Person stated:

This is a specific program which
we recommend you
It
requires leadership, an obligation
which the
organization of our government imposes on
If VO u
assume bold leadership along these lines you.
the Congress
and the citizens of the United States
will follow
Both the Congress and the citizens have
followed
willingly and helpfully when definite
constructive
promising lines of action have been indicated.
They
stand ready to follow along bolder lines...
We can be
masters of our economic destiny. All that is
needed
is imagination, boldness and a definite
plan... 41
Hoover, however,

failed to provide the leadership, or the

program necessary to get the country out of the depression.
As a result,

the Taylor Society backed Roosevelt in the hope

that he would provide the "imagination," the "boldness" and
the "definite plan" that the economic situation required.

Roosevelt's plan, as it turned out, was the New Deal.
Taylor Society not only supported this plan, but, as
show below, helped to develop it.

The
I

will

Underlying the Taylor

Society's support was the understanding that the New Deal

provided the mechanisms through which society could become
"master of its own economic destiny."
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During the early 1930s two
political-economic

strategies-corporatism and Keynesianism-contended
to
become the dominant approach guiding
the New Deal policies.
Morris Cooke, Harlow S. Person, and
other leading members
of the Taylor Society were part
of the political networkwhich included figures such as Felix
Frankfurter, Robert F.
Wagner, Frances Perkins, Robert LaFollete,
Jr., Sidney
Hillman, and George Soule— that put forward
a Keynesian
strategy based on the expansion of mass
consumption via the
intervention of the state.
This Keynesian elite
was

critical of the corporatist program, promoted
by

businessmen such as Gerard Swope and Henry

I.

Harriman,

and

embodied in the National Recovery Administration,
which
sought to limit production,
role of state.

fix prices and minimize the

The Keynesians advocated,

instead,

an

expanded role for the state in regulating the economy;
policies that would increase social purchasing power and
mass consumption; and the enactment of the more radical
social reforms of the so-called Second New Deal,
the Wagner and Social Security Acts.

such as

42

It should be noted that both of these strategies were

advanced not just by different political networks, but also
by different blocs of capitalists.
out,

As Steve Fraser points

the corporatist strategy was promoted by
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a

more

traditional business elite
linked to the railroads,
public
utilities and producer goods.
Harriman and Swope, for
example were both linked to
public utilities.
The
Keynesian strategy, on the other
hand, was advocated by a
network of manufacturing, retailing
and financial

interests

closely linked to mass consumption
of durables and light
durables.
Mass urban merchandisers such as
Filene's and
Macy's and mass consumption-oriented
banks like the Bowery
Savings Bank were prominent
supporters of Keynesian
strategies.

The corporatist bloc was plagued by

overproduction, older technologies,

foreign competition and

indebtness, while the Keynesian bloc was
concentrated in
newer and expanding mass consumption-oriented
industries.
Finally, the corporatist bloc favored
cartel-like

arrangements to restrict production, while the
Keynesian
bloc was concerned above all with expanding
mass

consumption through the intervention of the state.

43

Led by Cooke and Person, the Taylor Society played an

important role not only in the development of the Keynesian
strategy, but also in the political struggle against

corporatism.

The struggle between Keynesianism and

corporatism, which took shape early in the 1930s, centered
on several issues that had strategic significance for the

development of American capitalism.

Key among these was

the question of the nature of the Great Depression.

corporatists, the depression was caused largely by an
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For

overextension of productive
capacity, which resulted from
"blind competition." This
perspective was expressed by
Henry I. Harriman, vice-chairman
of the New England Power
Company and prominent member
of the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, in a paper
presented to the American
Economic Association in 1932:

Poss?bi?iM^
S
h
S
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b6CaUSe ° itS desire for P rofi t.
r
°
9 reater P rof it induce speculation
f

f

UC 10n

^ ^ut

Th6Se in tUrn bri
a
corresponding lowering of
6
finall y the disruption of business and
f'
unemployment, with resultant underconsumption.
The
accumulated surplus of the previous period
of
expansion is exhausted; as a result,
production is
resumed and there is a return to prosperity
and
employment; and thus the upward and downward
swings
are continued.
While we cannot expect with our
present knowledge and experience to prevent
recurring depressions, let us hope that the depths
of the valley of future depressions may be
reduced
by avoiding preceding periods of overexpansion
and
undue speculative activity. 44

suroiuf
H
surplus of goods,

'

'

a

'

n^

Harriman

's

assessment provided not only an explanation of

the causes of the depression,

it

suggested also the

elements that defined corporatist economic recovery
policies: the restriction of production and the self-

regulation of industry.
For Keynesians,
a

on the other hand,

the depression was

crisis of underconsumption, not of overproduction.

As

Leonard Kuvin, an economist from the Index Number
Institute, pointed out at a meeting of the Taylor Society
in December 1929:

The real obstacle to the employment of all available
man power in this country is the lack of proper

179

mechanisms to engage the productive capacity
now
idle and the absence of adequate means
to stimulate
demand from our own consuming population.
Far from
r
0
Cing in thS S0Cial sense ^rican
industry
^nH
and the American people suffer from a
chronic
condition of industrial underproduction.
Their
powers of consumption are limited in a large
measure
oy their lack of incomes.
The bulk of the nation's
income is lodged in the hands of a minority
of
potential consumers. 45

K^

The problem,

'

in Kuvin's words,

was that the bulk of the

U.S. population received "a disproportionately
small share

of the nation's income;" and consequently,

"the greatest

possible market for American manufactured goods [was]
stifled by

a

lack of purchasing power."

Further

aggravating this situation, Kuvin stated, was that

"

[f]unds

that should be paid to labor to nourish consumer demand
[were]

put back into unused equipment." 46

In short,

the

problem was the lack of social purchasing power, not the
overexpansion of productive capacity.
therefore,

The solution,

lay not in restricting production,

increasing purchasing power.

This,

in turn,

but in

entailed

a

dramatic redistribution of the nation's income.
Ralph

E.

Flanders,

chairman of the American

Engineering Council's committee on the balance of economic
forces and

a

friend of the Taylor Society, concurred with

Kuvin's analysis.
not due to

a

In Flanders'

view,

the depression was

situation of general overproduction:

that general overproduction has not yet
It is conceivably
existed in this country.
possible; but if one rides on a railroad train, say
through scattered sections of this country, or if
one walks about the streets of a great city, he sees
I

.

.

.

f eel
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f PSOPle Wh
° are livin <? far below the
Poss!h??'?
possibilities of material
enjoyment.
Realizing that
13 " 0t the sum total
°f
nappiness, yet it is quite evident
happiness^^H?^
that
a
vast
amount of material well being
is possible which we
attained so that, looking at the
thinq
in th^°H
the broadest way, I think it
is safe to say that
general overproduction has never
been reached^
tnis country 47

&

'

Flanders conceded that there were
cases of "special
overproduction, ' such as the cases of
wheat and cotton in
agriculture and the soft-coal industry,
but these were
particular instances and not indicators
of a condition of
general overproduction. 48

Drawing on Keynes and Hobson, Flanders
argued that the
depression was a crisis caused by:
the fact that purchasing power does not
equal the
productive capacity, due mainly to the fact that the
results of industry, manufacture, transportation,
and
so forth, on the whole have gone too largely
into
the hands of those who invest rather than spend,
and
too little into the hands of those who ordinarily
would spend rather than invest." 49
Put differently,

the problem was that "too large a

proportion of income from business" was in the hands of
"those getting the higher salaries and dividends," and "too

little" went "into the hands of the workers on lower

salaries."

This produced

a

crisis of underconsumption.

The way out of this situation was to increase the

purchasing power (and thus income) of workers so that they
could increase their capacity to consume. One way to

achieve this was through "capital investment in the form of
new manufacturing buildings, new machinery, bridges,
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"

.

highways, dwellings houses,
office buildings," and
"anything that goes under the
general category of capital
goods 50
.

A crucial factor that led to
the onset of the
depression-according to George Soule, editor

of the N^w

Es^lic

and close associate of the Taylor
Society-was the
failure of industry to carry out
the policy of high wages.
As Soule explained, this theory
was based on the
understanding that:

Industry fosters very rapid technical
oy the use of which more production canimprovements
be turned
out with less effort.
This means the lowering of
labor costs per unit of product.
Now that result
can be an increase in wages or a lowering
of prices
or an increase in profits.
[I] f, when productivity
advances you give the workers the benefit, largely
through the increase of money, wages, or reduction
of prices, then the workers will be in a position
to
buy back a large part of the increased product that
is produced as a result of the technical advance,
and that is good for industry.
But if you do not
give the wage worker the benefit you may find
difficulty in disposing of your product because
those who share in profits are not so likely to buy
the products of our great mass production
industries, which are set up on the basis of
manufacturing goods used by the general
population 51
.

.

The failure of American employers to adopt this doctrine,

Soule argued,

contributed to the depression in two ways,

one direct and the other indirect.

It kept wages

low,

thus

limiting the consumption capacity of the workers and

preventing them from absorbing

a

much larger percentage of

the consumer goods being produced by the mass production

industries.

Moreover,

it

contributed indirect ly--via the
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:

increased earnings of industry
that were not shared with
l abor __ to rapidly
rising profits wh ch overstimulated
.

^

speculation in the securities market

.

52

Finally,

Soule warned, American industry
would be
incapable of adopting a high wage
policy as long
as it

remained organized on

a

individualistic and competitive

basis
The automobile manufacturer, for
instance, may know
tnat it is to his advantage that the
whole
population should be able to buy automobiles.
He
nas the power to increase only, however,
the wages
of the workers in his own factory, and
he can not
find a market for his whole product among
his own
workers. .The policy has to be applied by
all of the
employers at once or by a very large section of
them
to be effective.
On the other hand, the competitive
nature of our market creates a continued pressure
in
favor of lower production costs and sends the wage
rate down... Those are things that everybody can
see
at work if he uses his common sense; consequently,
mere good will on the part of the big employers can
not keep wages advancing. 53
.

In short,

Soule did not believe that the action of

individual employers would succeed in bringing about

policy of high wages.
policy,

thus,

a

To ensure the adoption of this

industry would have to be reorganized under

new principles and the state would have to play

more

a

active role regulating the economy.
In April 1932 the Taylor Society presented for

discussion among business and management circles

a

programmatic document entitled: "Action Toward Business
Recovery."

The document, which was drafted by the

president and the managing director of the society with the
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advice of

number of businessmen and
economists, adopted
an underconsumptionist
perspective in line with the
analyses developed by Kuvin,
Flanders and
a

Soule.

recognized that

it

primary cause of the depression was
the
failure of purchasing power to
keep pace with the increase
in production.
Specifically, it stated
a

that:

During the period from 1925 to 1929
there was an
increasing supply of capital for investment.
This
S
r
fr ° m profits in business; from
promotion
o? new
of
nPw enterprises; and from investment
of surplus
by the public in general.
This capital for awhile
was absorbed by manufacturing developments,
the automobile; by construction activities; such as
and by
foreign investments.
All of these, except the last
transferred^ money to the people who were buying
goods .. .Buying power was also temporarily
accelerated by installment buying and credit
arrangements.
But as the needs for capital became
less it was used more and more for uneconomic
purposes or became actually stagnant.
This money
which should have been directed to purchasing power
of goods was made unavailable.
Demand for
manufactured goods as well as construction became
less and^ less
Failures of banks and business
institutions took place, unemployment and distress
among workers, reduction of wages among those
remaining employed, and a general impairment of the
standard of living. 54

^f

.

The document, moreover,

criticized reductions in

expenditures for public improvements as counter-productive,
and called for drastic governmental action "designed

deliberately to direct money and credit into channels
whereby they will become both

a

stimulant and a means to

consumer purchasing." 55
By 1932,

then,

two schools of thought concerned with

the nature of the depression had emerged.
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One focused on

the problem of overproduction,
and the other on
underconsumption and the lack of
purchasing power. Each of
these interpretations, moreover,
entailed a very different
understanding of the policies
necessary to get the economy
back on its feet. Nowhere was
this more evident than in
the issue of national economic
planning.
Although both
corporatists and Keynesians favored national
planning, they
attributed very different meaning to that
concept.

Corporatists, such as Gerard Swope of General
Electric and
Henry Harriman of the Chamber of Commerce,
advocated
a

planning scheme based on separate, autonomous
industries
under minimal government control, and coordinated

by trade

associations.

56

The principle underlying this plan,

according to Swope, was that:
Trade associations in America are the natural
organizations to study the economic elements of each
particular industry. Each trade association should
hold itself responsible for the coordination of
production and consumption to stabilize its
industry, with the consequent benefits to the
employees and to society.
The trade associations,
working out their problems in the stabilization of
industry, would then be the foundation stones upon
which to erect the superstructure of [a] national
economic council ... 57
^

The primary purpose of such

a

planning scheme,

according to its proponents, was "to balance production and
consumption."

As Harriman stated,

"[o]nly through a proper

co-ordination of production and consumption can
orderly,

a

sane,

and progressive economic life be developed."

However, what corporatists meant by "balancing production
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.

and consumption" was not
adjusting consumption to
production, but just the opposite.
In Harriman's words:

^^

6

g eral W0Uld Pr6fer
ou?put to the consumin capacity t0 ^uge their
of the country and
g
dilidl IL
divide
the volume of such production
among the
e
tS ° f indust
on a equitabll basis,
rather than to continue the present
harsh and
unremunerative competitive system, but
this thev
cannot attempt today becauseof the
ever-present
risk of incurring penalties under
antitrust laws
16 35 th6y may haVe been for
cond^Mon^^
conditions of an earlier day, are not in economic
with the present-day needs of industry. 58 consonance
.

1

^

tLn

Put differently,

the objective of the corporatist planning

scheme was to restrict production.
objective,

furthermore,

To accomplish this

corporatists called for the

modification of antitrust laws to allow businessmen
"to
enter contracts for the purpose of equalizing
production
consumption."

production

to

That is to say, to allow the limitation of

59

The differences between the corporatist strategy

proposed by Swope and Harriman and the one advocated by
Keynesians came into sharp focus during the Hearings on the

Establishment of

a

Nati onal Economic Counci

l.

These

hearings—which were convened by the Senate Subcommittee

on

Manufactures and were chaired by Senator Robert LaFollette-took place between October and December 1931.

According to Steve Fraser, the hearings were planned
by a small group that included,

among others LaFollette,

George Soule of the New Republic

,

Sidney Hillman of the

Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and Harlow
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S.

Person of the

Taylor Society.

The objective of this group
was to

neutralize the influence of the
corporatist planning scheme
and to provide a forum for
the Keynesian approach.
To this
effect: »[t]he group discussed
who was to testify and what
questions were to be asked. They
designed the sequence of
testimony so as to first display the
ideological and
programmatic exhaustion of the business
community,

to follow with 'expert'

and then

analysis by friendly economists and

industrial engineers so as to provide the
'scientific'
basis for the [Subcommittee's] ultimate
political

recommendations."

establishment of

These recommendations focused upon the
a

government sponsored national economic

council composed of representatives of industry,
agriculture, transportation,

Harlow

S

.

Person,

and labor.

finance,
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managing director of the Taylor

Society, presented a key testimony at these hearings.

Person criticized trade associations on the grounds "that
they had little or no influence on the stabilization of

industry generally"; defended the establishment of

a

national economic council or government planning agency
"with the power to require all industrial enterprises" to

provide the information pertinent to the task of economic

planning and to make recommendations for legislative action
to the Congress; and called for the regulation of the rate

and amount of investment of new capital in industry.

187

61

Furthermore,

in an exchange with

LaFollette-which

exemplified the way the hearings
were set up to undermine
the corporatist planning
scheme-Person rejected the notion
of restricting production as

a

central objective of

economic planning:
The Chai rman

As you conceive the problem [of
a
bSlieVe that the P^cipal goal to
Y
be SS^?n;/°
oe
obtained is the control or reduction of
.

^

production?
Doctor Pprsop
no.
while I do not accept the broad
statement that human wants are limitless and
insatiable for the simple reason that a day
has only
^4 hours, I do accept as a basis for present policy
the statement that human wants are not
adequately
satisfied, and that the trouble is not
overproduction in terms of human wants, but lack of
balance of production in terms of specific wants.
The Chai rman
I gathered from a reading of
the
report of the chamber of commerce committee on
continuity of business that it reflects an attack on
this problem on the part of business men which is
largely directed to the problem of curtailing or
quotaing of production.
It is manifest in their
emphasis on the importance of changes in the Sherman
antitrust law which are directed largely to the
legalization, so to speak, of contracts for the
curtailment of production.
While that suggestion
may or may not have merit I am not passing on that
now--I was anxious to get your reaction to the
problem because it seems to that we would make a
great mistake if we placed our emphasis, if we
concentrated on the objective of attempting to
reduce production in a systematic way rather than
attempting to consider at the same time ways and
means of increasing consumptive power and of
supplying the demands of the consumptive power as it
is increased.
Doctor Person
I agree with the Senator.
I think
it would be quite wrong to make curtailment an
objective.
I will concede that in accomplishing,
let us say, the objective of satisfaction of human
wants as they develop in a balanced manner there
might be for a period relative curtailment in
But as
certain commodities and extension in others.
to the total of production, I think if we can
achieve some manner of increasing consumptive power,

.

—

.
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"

dlmlrT

PUt Lt rather

demand power, effective

<

°"oduction tflt!
SS^rSSri^tn^r
increase in productivity
qenerallv
w ?k

it

Within this increase adjustments
might
in certain lines."

fl,
require
decreases

To Keynesians,

then,

the objective of economic

Planning was not to restrict
production, but rather to
increase purchasing power, expand
mass consumption and
utilize the maximum possibilities
of the productive
capacity of the nation. As economist

Lewis Lorwin put it:

...economic planning ... means the coordination
of economic activities in such a
manner as to
use our resources in a collective way
in
relation to a continuously rising standard
of
living.
Unless demand is prompted and
systematically developed, so as not to remain
stagnant, but to become more extensive in
scope as well as higher in quality, we have
got somehow to restrict output; but if we are
able to maintain an increasingly productive
equipment we must develop our demand, too.
Economic planning consists in balancing, not
a stationary production with a stationary
demand, but in balancing a progressively
developing technique with a progressively
rising standard of living... 63
Put differently, Keynesians did not share the vision
of a static balance between production and consumption

which underlay the corporatist economic program.

They did

not believe that the task of the day was to maintain

a

"mature" economic machine.

a

They advocated,

instead,

growth-oriented program centered on the expansion of mass
consumption and "a progressively rising standard of
living

.

The implications of such

a

program were developed by

Mary Van Kleeck in her testimony at the LaFollette
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hearings, which focused on

critique of "the Swope Plan"
for industrial self-regulation 64
Van Kleeck acknowledged
that Swope had made a
positive contribution by proposing
a
Planning scheme that called for
employees' participation
and Federal supervision of
industry.
However, she argued,
the Swope Plan failed to go
far enough in either direction.
First, under this plan employees'
participation was limited
to the administration of
pension, disability and
a

.

unemployment funds.

Workers' participation,

therefore, was

not extended to the more important
and decisive area of

planning production.

Moreover, workers were to be

represented by "employees' committees" or "company
unions,"
which in the past "had rendered some service
in producing
better relationships between employees and management,"
but

had "never had any real control over the fundamentals
of

wages and over management policies." 65
In Van Kleeck

'

s

view,

representation constituted

such a conception of labor

major flaw in any planning

a

scheme because it failed to recognize that in the area of

industrial relations "where the interests of the management
and of labor are not identical, where there is

question

a

as to what is going into surplus for profits and what is

going into the wage envelope
as the only group which,

Thus,

...

the trade unions

as a group,

can represent labor." 66

the importance of the trade unions.

however,

[remained]

Swope

1

s

plan,

excluded the trade union in favor of an employees'
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.

representation scheme that did not
give workers any degree
of real participation in
the process of production.
the Sw ° pe plan bein ^iven
9
universal application ° in the United
universafLn?^^
States if
6

f

employees' representatives elected
by their fellow
employees and paid by the trade
associations
composed of the companies which employ
these' men,
ep resentation of ^bor's side in
this
!
QuestLn
H
rade
Uni ° nS in this c °untry will have
no Sir.*'
place in any such scheme.
It seems to me that,
eral thesis is adopted, that purchasing
g
w
power
is the important question in the
plans
Production today, then it is surely obvious for
there is a tremendously important function that
for the
labor unions to fulfill in national
economic
planning.
Their point of view must be represented
They must have a chance to function in
relation to
management 67

^

In short,
(as did all

Swope

'

s

planning scheme failed to recognize

corporatist schemes) the importance of

collective bargaining and labor unions in the development
of a political economy of mass consumption.

Such was not

the case of Van Kleeck and other exponents of the Keynesian

strategy who testified at the LaFollete hearings-

including Sidney Hillman--who advocated

a

strong role for

the labor movement in the policy-making process and who

understood the role of collective bargaining and unions in

maintaining wages high and increasing the workers'

purchasing power.

68

The second major weakness of Swope
to Van Kleeck,

'

s

plan,

according

lay in the vagueness of the powers it

assigned to the Federal government in relation to the
supervision of industry.

According to Van Kleeck:
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On the side of investigation
and statistics which
is the subject of primary
interest in this
n
6 fSderal ^emment
seems to be
J' a
rovin
PP
the
form
of reports to
g
It
It ^°
stockholders.
That is a gain, of course,
experience of the Federal Trade Commission?but the
en joined
in its investigation of the
causes of high prices
for commodities at the instance
of a trade
10n
C ° al indus try, is sufficient
to
?ho^h^
show
the necessity of freeing the
Federal
agency for
thorough investigations in the public
interim
a
m ° re th n annual re
rts
to
P°
stockholders.
Eo^lT! vague is the
t
Equally
plan's provision for definite
regulation by the Federal government.

S

^

^

Here again, Van Kleeck raised

a

fundamental point of

difference between the corporatist strategy
and the
Keynesian strategy: the role of the state in

the economy.

The difference between both strategies was
that, while

corporatists advocated

a

planning scheme based on the self-

regulation of industry and with minimal government

intervention therefore clinging to

a

conception of an

"associative state"; Keynesians favored an interventionist
state with strong regulatory functions with respect to

capitalist enterprises and the macroeconomy in general.
Thus,

the call by Keynesians during the LaFollette hearings

for the establishment of

conceived as

a

a

National Economic Council

state planning agency,

and not as

a

private

business council as proposed by Harriman and other
corporatists.

As Frances Perkins put it:

"when someone

speaks of economic planning nowadays one is supposed to be

referring to economic planning by the government." 69
Underlying the Keynesian conception of the role of the
state was the assumption that left to its own devices
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business was incapable of
stabilizing the economy.
was so, they argued, for two
reasons.
First,

This

the

capitalists self-interest and
fixation with short-term
gains undermined any serious
effort of cooperation in
search of long-term solutions for
the problems of the
economy. As Henry P. Kendall, a
leading textile
manufacturer and past president of the
Taylor Society
stated, when asked during the LaFollete
hearings
if he

thought that industries acting independently
or as members
of trade associations could succeed in
stabilizing industry
as a whole:

do not think so, for the reason that they
can not get 100 per cent support.
There are
always some selfish, greedy manufacturer who
says, 'Yes; that is fine for industry, and I
hope they will do it, but I am going to
continue to run long hours and increase
production for all its worth and make money
out of it; but I hope the others will
curtail.'
The trade associations have never
been able to control that situation... 70
I

The inference from Kendall's testimony is quite clear:

given the unwilliness of industry to cooperate and plan

constructively on
do,

a

voluntary basis it must be compelled to

as Person indicated,

Second,

"by the power of the state." 71

the economic crisis was

a

situation beyond the

control of any single industry or any group of industries

acting autonomously.

depression was "not

As Sidney Hillman noted,
a

the

problem of any one industry.

real problem confronting us affects all industries,
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The

and it

is not within the power
of any industry to right itself. "72
Thus, even if industry found
the will to act collectively,
it could not stabilize the
economy because the problem was

out of their control.

This was due in part to the

complexities of modern American capitalism
which, in
Frances Perkin's view, were "so intricate
that

no one

industry can conceivably make its economic
plan alone and
have it sound. "73 It was also due
tQ
the fact that

fche

solution to the problems of the depression was
linked to

areas-such

as fiscal,

monetary and other policies--which

were under the control of government not
industry.
this reason, argued Ralph Flanders,

it was

For

dangerous to

assume that business alone could restore prosperity:
believe it is really dangerous for industry
to take the position, even tacitly, that if
you give it the power it can control the
severities of the business situation.
I do
not think that is possible ... because the
primary elements of the thing seem to me to
be in the control of the Government and in
the field of Government rather than in the
field of industry... I think [Swope] is wrong
to put himself in the position of saying that
'If we are granted certain powers we will be
able to produce certain results,
because
industry alone can not produce results. 74
I

'

Moreover, as Hillman stated, the onset of the

depression was in itself evidence that business had failed
to provide the leadership necessary to stabilize the

economy.

Thus,

the need for the government to step in and

assume the responsibility for leadership.

Hillman

1

s

view,

The

state,

in

was the only institution with the power to

194

enforce

recovery program (based on
increasing purchasing
power to match productive capacity)
that could
a

lead the

country out of the depression.

m

Hillman's words:

It

is impossible for industries
to do it
They won't do it; they have not
done it,
will not do it.
The only power that can
effect is government action.
There have
promises as to what industry will do.

alone
and they
put it into
been
We know that
nothing constructive from the larger
point of view
was done when they were in a position
to do it. 7 ^

Put simply, Keynesians placed their faith
in state

intervention and not in the self-regulation of
industry.

The Rise and Fall of Socia l

Keynpsi^i^

The LaFollette hearings on national planning

established clearly that by 1931 two distinct approaches
to
the American political economy had crystallized: a
corporatist strategy based on the sel f -regulation of
industry and the restriction of production, and

a

Keynesian

strategy based on the expansion of mass consumption via the

intervention of the state.

As Mary Van Kleeck put it in

her testimony before the hearings:
In the light of the reports presented in this

Congress, the big problem faced by the United
States is whether American industry alone or
through the Government can adopt social
economic planning, or whether it is limited
to business planning which would control

production ... 76
The crystallization of these two approaches had profound

significance because they pointed toward radically
different political-economic programs.
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Assessing the

s

.

strategic implications of the
adoption of either one of
these approaches in 1932,
Harlow S. Person argued, "the
choice of one or the other of
these divergent policies is
perhaps more momentous than any
choice which the United
States has yet been compelled to
make." 77 The i mp i

ications

of adopting one policy or the
other were perhaps not as

momentous as Person contended, but they
were certainly
important--as the history of the New Deal would
demonstrate
The adoption of the corporatist strategy in
early 1933
led to the enactment of the National Industrial
Recovery

Act

(NIRA)

(NRA)

.

,

which established the National Recovery Act

Although

it

lasted only two years and "vanished

with hardly an institutional trace," the NRA was the

centerpiece of New Deal policy from 1933 to 1934.
process by which the NRA came into existence is

78

a

complicated topic beyond the scope of this study.
is to say,

And this victory

— although

the Act was the product of

a

compromises—was reflected

in the

NRA.

Suffice

that in the struggle with Keynesians to

influence New Deal policy, corporatism
battle.

The

won the initial

not complete because

series of contradictory

establishment of the

79

The NRA was basically

a

revamped version of Swope

'

associational plan-in which the state would sanction the

cartelization of capitalist enterprises in order to reduce
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destructive competition, limit
production and fix prices.
From the beginning, however
the NRA was in
trouble.

80

First,

it was torn by the political
infighting of different

policy-oriented groups.

This was best exemplified by
the

battle against rigid price controls
led by Leon Henderson,
a Keynesian economist who
was in charge of the Research and
Planning Division of the NRA, and
Leverett Lyon,
of the

Brookings Institutional

many but please few.

second,

it

managed to antagonize

As Otis Graham puts it:

Large business in general appreciated the
chance to end 'cut-throat competition' by
fixing prices or production targets, but
hated dealing with a federal bureaucracy
which was not only sometimes slow and obtuse
but occasionally suggested unwelcomed gains
for labor and consumer.
Small businessmen
found themselves outmanuvered for shares of
the market in the NRA code making-process.
Labor expected higher wages, but found prices
rising faster ... 82
As for the Keynesians and other liberal-minded New

Dealers,

they considered the NRA "an ill-conceived

experiment" from the beginning.

83

The dissatisfaction of

Keynesians with the NRA and the economic policies

underlying it was expressed by Mary Van Kleeck in

a

letter

to Morris Cooke in which she explained her unwilliness to

accept

a

position on the Consumer's Advisory Committee of

the NRA:
find myself forced to stand outside and criticize.
I have to work out in my mind the right direction
for my present activities—whether to attempt to cooperate when I am out of accord with the main
economic thought apparently underlying much of the
I
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program in Washington and still
more out of line
with what the big business
interests are doinq to
lnt enti0 S
f
thS administrators (or^rather
°
to the°rh
,
?
Whiteh

advisers)"^

M

—

^

and his disinterest^

Thirdly, the NRA was paralyzed
not only by an
inefficient bureaucratic machinery,
but also by its

contradictory objectives. As Ellis Hawley
argues, the
recovery act was "a contradiction in
terms."

hand,

On the one

its proponents wanted to enter
into agreements that

would violate the Sherman Act, but on
the other they
admitted that these agreements would constitute
monopolistic practices.

The solution to this dilemma,

Hawley indicates, was to incorporate into the
recovery act
two contradictory clauses, "a clause exempting the
proposed
codes from the antitrust laws and another providing that
no

code should be so applied as 'to permit monopolies or

monopolistic practices, or eliminate, oppress, or
discriminate against small enterprises.'" 85

Caught between

these contradictory goals the NRA could not steer
course.

In short,

as Otis Graham points out,

of the NRA was both muddled
Thus,

a

clear

"the design

and faulty." 86

it should come as no surprise that by May 1935--

when it was declared unconstitutional and terminated by the

Supreme Court--the NRA failed to accomplish anything

significant as
that is,

a

program of economic recovery.

for Section

7

(a)

Except,

which provided "the

right to collective bargaining to workers under the NRA
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codes," and "reinvigorated the
torpid labor movement. "87
Conceived as a concession to labor
leaders, Section 7 (a)
was openly defied by capitalists
large and small who
counterattacked the measure by fostering
company unions.
This challenge led Sidney Hillman
to call in 1934 for the

establishment of

a

mechanism to enforce the right to

collective bargaining
under Section

(a)

7

.

88

By opposing collec tive bargaining

of the NIRA,

capitalists sabotaged the

only aspect of the recovery act that had
any real

possibility of stimulating economic recovery by
increasing
the purchasing power of the workers. As for the
labor

movement,

it would have to wait until the passage of the

Wagner Act for the establishment of the government

protection called for by Hillman.
The demise of the NRA opened the way for the rise of

Keynesianism as the guiding approach to the New Deal
policies

.

This took place in mid-1935 with the launching of the so-

called "Second New Deal."

The notion of two New Deals was

first formulated by Basil Rauch in The History of the New
Deal:

1933-1938

.

Underlying this notion was the assumption

that a fundamental shift in the policies of the Roosevelt

administration occurred in 1935.

According to Rauch, this

change in policy divided the New Deal into two distinct
periods,

and its importance justified the concepts First
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New Deal and Second New Deal.

Rauch summarized the

differences between these two periods in
the following way:
The primary aim of the First New
Deal
while that of the Second was reform. was recovery
Higher priced
for industry and agriculture were
the immediate
objective during the first period; increased
purchasing power and social security for the
population as whole were the immediate objectives
during the second period. The policies of
the first
period were expressions of the philosophy of
economic nationalism and scarcity, while those
of
the second illustrate the philosophy of
international economic cooperation and economic
abundance.
The First New Deal was chiefly
beneficial to big business and large farmers. The
Second New Deal was chiefly beneficial to labor and
small farmers. 89
In sum,

the First New Deal was conservative because its

policies were favorable to business, while the Second New
Deal was liberal, because it was favorable to labor.

Although

I

draw upon Rauch'

s

90

periodizat ion of the New

Deal,

my conceptualization of that process differs from

his.

The distinction between the two New Deal periods, as

argued here,

is that the first was corporatist,

second was Keynesian.

As used here,

thus,

while the

the Second New

Deal denotes the radical shift to Keynesian policies that

occurred between 1935 and 1938.

Specifically, this shift

was defined by two interrelated elements.

First,

the

passage of "a cluster of epochal reform measures"-including the Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the

Banking Act of 1935, the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act and the wealth tax act--which were designed above all
to enhance the regulatory functions of the state and to
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.

stimulate mass consumption

.

91

That the architects Qf

^

Second New Deal visualized
these reforms as key
components
of a recovery program
based on the expansion of
mass
consumption is evidenced by
Frances Perkin's comment in
1933: "As a Nation, we are
recognizing that programs long
thought of as merely labor
welfare, such as shorter hours,
higher wages, and a voice in
the terms and conditions of
work, are really essentially
economic factors for recovery,
and for the technique of
industrial management in a mass
production age." 92
The other element was the rise
of the members of the

Keynesian elite to key positions as
administrators of the
New Deal welfare state. As Steve
Fraser points
out,

"[by]

mid-1937 the state agencies responsible
for human capital
and infrastructural development, for
planning
and for

regulating the flow of public and private credit,
were run
by this newly empowered Keynesian elite."
The agencies
controlled by the Keynesians, according to Fraser, were
the
Department of Labor under Frances Perkins; the Interior
Department under Harold Ickes; the National Labor Relations

Board and the Works Projects Administration under Harry
Hopkins; the National Resources Planning Board controlled
by Beardsly Ruml and Frederick Delano; the Rural

Electrification Agency under Morris Cooke

and John

Carmody; and the Federal Reserve under Marriner Eccles
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From these positions the
Keynesian elite would attempt
to
shape the future of the
American political economy.
In synthesis,

the Second New Deal represented
the
triumph of the "social Keynesian"
program advocated by
Cooke, Person, Van Kleeck,
and others since the early
1930s. 94 This program, unlike
the more conservative variant
of Keynesianism which emerged
in the late 1930s, stressed
not just the use of the state
to promote mass

consumption

through fiscal and monetary policies,
but also the use of
the state to regulate capitalist
enterprises through
"social economic planning. "95 The
triumph
of

Keynesianism", however, would be short-lived.

Alan Brinkley points out,

..

social

By 1945,

as

"the idea of an administrative

state,

which seemed so strong in the late 1930s was
in
decline; and the faith in fiscal policy so
tentatively

embraced in 1938, had moved to the center of liberal
hopes. "96 ironically, then, the moment of triumph of
social

Keynesianism also marked the beginning of its defeat.
Put differently,

during the 1940s and the post-World

War II period the regulatory-oriented social Keynesian

approach was displaced by the more conservative "commercial
Keynesianism"

.

97

In the pr0 cess,

the more radical aspects

of the program espoused by the Taylor Society and others-

aspects such as the notion of social economic planning,
example, were eclipsed, while fiscal and monetary policy

became the fundamental tools of an approach based on the
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idea of indirect management
of the economy.
a key factor
that contributed to this
transformation was the rise during
the late thirties and throughout
the forties
of a

conservative reaction to the New Deal.

Propelled by the

1937 recession and by Roosevelt's
attempt to reform the
Supreme Court and to reorganize
the executive branch, these

conservative forces (which included not
only Republicans,
but also Southern Democrats) would
challenge the legitimacy
of the New Deal. 98
In November 1937,

about this effort in

a

Harlow Person expressed his concern
letter to Morris Cooke.

business," stated Person,

"Big

"has been bringing propaganda of

the first magnitude to bear on Congress to
repeal

progressive laws and force reversal of progressive
administrative policies and acts, by falsely leading people
to believe that they are the causes of the recession."

These forces, Person argued, wanted to restore "the grand
old days of the middle twenties."

Person's response to

these claims was that "[a] secure prosperity is not to be

gained by returning to the highly dangerous set-up which

preceded New Deal legislation, but by adjusting our
attitudes to acceptance of the fact that the ownership
group has still to pay its price for relief from
depression, and that additional progressive, regulatory

legislation is essential."

The task of the moment,
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Person

said, was "to conserve
the progressive results of
the New
Deal legislation. "99

As it turned out, the
conservative forces could not
turn the clock back to the
pre-New Deal era.
But they did
weaken the Roosevelt administration
and to undermined its

capacity to further develop the New
Deal.
exemplified by the fact that in 1943

This was best

the conservative

forces in Congress were able to
kill the National Resources
Planning Board, which was a strong
institutional base of

social Keynesianism.
"[i]n 1937,

100

Moreover,

as Basil Rauch notes,

the administration undertook to complete
the

structure of the Second New Deal with measures
to benefit

particularly the less well-organized groups of farmers
and
workers.
By the end of 1938, this process had stopped,

and

the creative period of the New Deal ended." 101

With the end

of the Second New Deal the hegemony of "social

Keynesianism" also came to an end.

World War
The war,

II

sealed the fate of social Keynesianism.

according to Robert Collins, provided "striking

evidence of the effectiveness cf government expenditures on
a

huge scale."

"Spending for war," as Collins points out,

"finally ended the worst depression in American history." 102

And in doing so, it strengthened the case for indirect
management of the economy.
argues,

provided

Moreover,

as Alan Brinkley

the success of this approach during the war
a

mechanism for economic growth in the postwar
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period that was not based
on state sponsored planning
of
capitalism.
Such an approach, as Brinkley
put it:
d

ay
m nage the econ °™y without
^°
directli rh,?i!
?
challenging the
prerogatives of
nan??.!"?
al sts
Gr ™th did not necessarily
!
require
involvement in the affairs of private
10nS WhiGh (as the wartime
mobilization
i2? h S
St
e
S b ° th C ° mpleX and
Poli'-lly
S?f??cu?r?t 5id '
require a drastic expansion of
the regulatory
rPauhfi
i
functions of the state.
'To produce
re
ed
the indirect manipulation
of
Of thfH
the economy through the use of
fiscal and
monetary 'levers'; and to distribute
the plenty
required the creation of an efficient
welfare
1Q 3
system
-

'

r

^5

.

World War

.

.

II,

in short,

set the stage for the

dominance of "commercial Keynesianism" during
the postwar
era.
Purged of its more radical aspects and
transformed
into a depoliticized "technique" or "tool
box",

Keynesianism was embraced during the post-World War

II

period by every Democratic and Republican administration
administration until the 1980s.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Analysis
The purpose of this dissertation is to
contribute to
an

understanding of the emergence of

a

Keynesian

political-economic strategy in America during the
interwar
period.
It is concerned primarily with one
crucial
aspect

of this process: the ideological role played
by key

political,

and managerial elites in the emergence of such

strategy.

It thus traces the political discourse

articulated by the Taylor Society, the institutional home
of scientific management,

from its inception as an

industrial research organization in the pre-World War

I

period to its development as an important policy-making
network during the New Deal.

It

focuses on key figures in

the Taylor Society including Morris Cooke, Harlow

Person, Henry Dennison,

and Mary Van Kleeck,

as well as

those who were closely associated with the society
as Rexford G.

Tugwell,

S.

,

such

Louis D. Brandeis, George Soule,

Frances Perkins, and Sidney Hillman.
My analysis is based on

a

non-teleological conception

of capitalist development in which social agency plays a

central role and in which the history of capitalism is

understood as an open-ended process.

Thus,

although

I

stress the role played by political and economic elites,
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a

reject the "conspiracy model" of
history in which all
outcomes consciously serve the interest
of capital.
I
assume, that the history of capitalism
in the United States
is the outcome of political,
economic, and ideological
struggles, involving conflicts not just
between workers and
capital, but also between different sectors
of capitalists
and between contending groups of professional
and

managerial elites.
Accordingly,

a

basic premise

underlying this

dissertation is that the Keynesian political-economic
order
was not the "design" of an "enlightened elite,"
that sought
to deliberately "incorporate" the working class into
a new

industrial state to save the American economy.

Instead,

it

was the product of working class struggles "from below" and

"reforms from above."

The major reforms associated with

the Keynesian political-economic order

recognition,

collective bargaining,

(i.

e.,

union

social security, etc.)

were passed and implemented over the opposition of the

majority of capitalists.

Such programs were achieved by

working class struggles which pressured state managers to
institute economic and social reforms that not only

provided benefits to many workers, but also strengthened
the state in relation to the working class,

and increased

the state's capacity to intervene in the economy.

configuration of

a

The

Keynesian political economy was thus

determined not by some capitalist "conspiracy" to "co-opt"
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workers or by some "deep logic of
capitalist accumulation,"
but by the resolution of specific
political struggles

between contending social forces in

a

given historical

moment
This is not to deny the significance
of efforts to
reform the political economy "from above."
Quite the

contrary.

My analysis is also informed by the
recognition

that there were contending political-economic
strategies

within the capitalist class and between different
political
and managerial elites.
I
focus specifically, on
the

differences between two key strategies: corporatism and
Keynesianism.

The corporatist strategy was advanced by a

traditional business and political elite linked to the
railroads, public utilities,

favored

a

and producer goods.

It

system of industrial self-regulation, which would

create cartel-like arrangements to restrict production,

prices and divide the market.

promoted by

a

fix

The Keynesian strategy was

bloc of newer, mass consumption-oriented

industries and by

a

professional and managerial elite that

was concerned above all with expanding the mass market

through the intervention of the state.

The Keynesian

strategy advocated an interventionist state and economic

policies that would enhance social purchasing power and
mass consumption. Accordingly,

it

supported the enactment

of the major social and economic reforms of the New Deal

such as the the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act.
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The Taylor Society was born
during the Interstate

Commerce Commission (ICC) hearings
of 1910, better known as
the "Eastern Rate Case."
This case-which was presented by
Louis D. Brandies with the assistance
of Frederick
W.

Taylor and his

f ollowers--propelled

the scientific

management movement into the national
spotlight and
popularized the concept of "scientific management".

As

Milton Nadworny points out, the Eastern Rate
Case put the
scientific management movement "on the map" and
gave it

name.

It also

Taylor Society,

provided

a

a

site for the formation of the

for it was during the ICC hearings that a

"small band of Taylorites" conceived of the idea of

creating

a

society that would perpetuate the work of

Frederick Taylor and take advantage of the efficiency craze
that had transformed scientific management into

a

national

phenomenon
The Taylor Society was formally organized in 1911 as

a

professional-managerial network primarily composed of
management consultants, engineers, and businessmen.

Its

membership was concentrated in Philadelphia, New York, and
Massachusetts; and its activities included among other
things,

educational work and research concerning scientific

management,

a

consultation and information service for

managers and engineers, discussions of policy issues facing
the business sector,
journal.

and the publication of a bimonthly

By the beginning of World War
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the Taylor

Society had become the institutional
home of the scientific
management movement and was without any
doubt the most

progressive management forum in the United
States.
Before World War I, the Taylor Society

focused its

attention exclusively on the technical problems
of factory
production and the reorganization of the labor
process.

World War

I,

outlook.

During the war the majority of the members of the

however, would transform the society's

Taylor Society went to work for the U.S. government
as

management "experts."

Their task was to contribute to the

effort of planning and developing war production.

This

experience enabled the members of the Taylor Society to
discover the macroeconomy and the state.
them to

It

broaden their social perspective.

also enabled
In particular,

the experience of organizing war production with the

collaboration of unions under government-sponsored
collective bargaining arrangements,

transformed the

Taylor Society's previous position in relation to union

recognition and collective bargaining.

As part of this new

perspective, members of the Taylor Society played an

instrumental role in terms of labor-management relations

within the planning and production agencies they worked in
during the war.

Of special significance in this respect

was the role played by members of the Taylor Society in the

drafting of an industrial code (General Order #13) which
advocated, among other things,
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collective bargaining, the

8-hour day, minimum wages, equal pay
for women, health and
safety provisions for women and children,
and unionmanagement cooperation arrangements.

After the war, the Taylor Society shifted
its
attention to the "problem of industrial relations"
advocating

a

by

conception of industrial democracy based on

"workers' consent" and union-management
cooperation

schemes.

Among the most prominent of these schemes was
the

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) Plan, known also as
the
Beyer Plan.
This plan, which was designed and supervised
by Otto Beyer,

a

member of the Taylor Society and an Army

Captain during World War

I,

called for the unions to

cooperate with management to increase productivity in
exchange for management's recognition of collective
bargaining.

it also

linked wages to productivity gains.

The Taylor Society's new understanding of the "labor

question"--which was embodied in the Beyer Plan-- led to

a

rapprochement with the American Federation of Labor during
the 1920s.

Moreover,

in the twenties the Taylor Society and its

associates played an important role in the development of
Herbert Hoover's campaign to create

management system.

a

macroeconomic

This campaign was based on a

microeconomic approach to macroeconomic stability.
idea behind this approach was that

The

economic stability was

achieved through the action of individual managers at the
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level of the firm.

Under this conception, the state was

limited to providing guidance (along
with other private
agencies) to these managers so that
they could stabilize
their firms.
This strategy relied strongly on the

expertise and authority of management consultants
and
social scientists.
Thus, the key role played

by the Taylor

Society
The Taylor Society figured prominently in the
study

undertaken by the Federated American Engineering Societies
(FAES)

to investigate the causes of "waste" and low

production in industry.
study,

The group that developed this

the "Committee on the Elimination of Waste," was

dominated by members of the Taylor Society and its report
was representative of scientific management.

Society also played

a

significant role in the FAES' second

major research project,
the steel industry.

The Taylor

study of the twelve-hour day in

a

This study,

which was developed at

Hoover's initiative and which recommended reducing the work
day to eight hours in the steel industry,

was dominated by

engineers associated with the Taylor Society.

Finally,

the

Taylor Society also made important contributions to the

"Unemployment Conference,

"

convened by president Harding in

September 1921 at Hoover's suggestion.
In conclusion,

study on waste,

through their participation in the

in the steel industry research project,

in the Unemployment Conference,
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and

the Taylor Society played

a

leading role in Hoover's campaign to
create
management system. For the Taylor Society,

a

macroeconomic

this campaign

represented an opportunity to expand the
application of
scientific management to new areas and a
recognition of
importance of scientific management as
social problems.

tool for resolving

Moreover, participation in Hoover's

campaign represented
its pre-World War

a

I

a

shift in the

Taylor Society from

concern with the details of factory

production to the broad questions of policy-making.
is to say,

the

That

it completed the transition of Taylor Society

from factory to society.

Despite the close collaboration between the Taylor
Society and Hoover, their alliance began to unravel in the
late 1920s.

An important reason for this was that leading

members of the Taylor Society became increasingly critical
of Hoover's program and consequently began to develop

political relationships with individuals who espoused

a

different political-economic strategy such as Robert
Wagner, Frances Perkins, Robert LaFollete, Jr., and Felix

Frankfurter.

This realignment reflected the emergence

within the Taylor Society of
Such a perspective involved

a
a

proto-Keynesian perspective.

growth-oriented strategy

based on high wages and rising consumption norms.

Its aim

was not to stabilize production, but to expand it by

increasing mass consumption and thus social purchasing
power.

This perspective not only went beyond Hoover's
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strategy for macroeconomic stability, it
prefigured some of
the key aspects of the post-World War
II economic
order.

Missing from this perspective, however, was

a

better

understanding of the role of the state and the
unions in
the development of

a

mass consumption political economy.

This understanding emerged during the early
years of the

Great Depression.

During the 1930s Morris Cooke, Harlow

S.

Person,

and

other leading members of the Taylor Society became an

important component of the political and business network
that put forward

a

Keynesian strategy based on the

expansion of mass consumption via the intervention of the
state.

This network was critical of the corporatist

program,

advanced by businessmen like Gerard Swope of

General Electric and Henry
Commerce.

I.

Harriman of the Chamber of

The corporatist program--which would be embodied

in the National Recovery Administ rat ion--was based on a

strategy in which the state would sanction cartel-like

arrangements among capitalist enterprises to reduce

destructive competition, restrict production, and fix
prices.

This system of industrial sel f -regulation entailed

minimal government intervention and
unions and collective bargaining.
on the other hand,

a

reduced role for

The Keynesian program,

advocated an expanded and strong role

for the state and unions in the political economy,
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along

with

macroeconomic policies that promoted
social
purchasing power and expanded mass
consumption.
During the Second New Deal

(1935-1938)

the Keynesian

elites entered the corridors of power
and many of its
members took key administrative positions
in the welfare
state.
The state agencies controlled by this
elite

included those in charge of human capital and

infrastructural development, as well as those
responsible
for planning and for regulating the flow
of public
and

private credit.

From these positions the Keynesian elite

would attempt to shape U.S. political economy.
triumph, however, was short-lived.

after World War

displaced by

a

II,

Their

During the 1940s and

the program espoused by this elite was

more conservative form of Keynesianism,

"commercial Keynesianism."

In the process,

the more

radical aspects of the program advocated by the Taylor

Society and other social Keynesians--such as an

interventionist state with strong regulatory power— were
eclipsed,

and fiscal and monetary policy became the

fundamental tools of

a

program based on the idea of

indirect management of the economy.

Implications
What are the implications of the analysis developed in
this dissertation?

It

demonstrates that the Taylor Society

was a Keynesian formation and not an exponent of corporate
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liberalism as corporatist historians
have argued.
According to these historians, corporate

liberalism-

understood here as
envisioned

a

a

liberal ideology and program that

"middle way" between laissez-faire and

"welfare statism" -was the strategy of

business and

political elites who sought to reform
capitalism.
For
this perspective, the corporate liberal
tendency of the
interwar period is best exemplified by such
figures as
Gerard Swope of the General Electric Company,
Henry

I.

Harriman of the Chamber of Commerce and others
including

businessmen like Henry

S.

Dennison and Edward A. Filene,

engineers such as Morris Cooke, and social scientists like
Mary Van Kleeck and Harlow
view,

S.

Person.

In the corporatist

there are no significant ideological and programmatic

differences between these advocates of capitalist reform.
Thus,

the corporatist school fails to acknowledge the

existence of alternative political-economic strategies
(such as the one espoused by the Taylor Society)

within the

business and political elites who sought to reform
capitalism.

Rather,

it encompasses all reformist currents

under the ideology and program of corporate liberalism.
The analysis developed in this dissertation takes issue

with this interpretation.

It shows how

period the Taylor Society became

a

during the interwar

forum in which an

important group of mass consumption-oriented businessmen,
engineers, management consultants,
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and social scientists,

.

sought to map the outlines of
economy.

a

new Keynesian political

The dissertation argues that the Taylor
Society

was part of a professional-managerial
elite, who by the
early thirties came to advocate a Keynesian
strategy

focused on increasing social purchasing power and
expanding
mass consumption via the intervention of the
state.

illustrates,

finally,

It

how this Keynesian elite came to

occupy key positions as state managers during the Second
New Deal, and how they attempted to shape the American

political economy.
This dissertation demonstrates that the political-

economic strategy espoused by the Taylor Society (and other
social Keynesians) went beyond corporate liberalism in

three major areas.

First,

the role of the state.

The

Taylor Society and its allies favored an interventionist
state with strong regulatory power functions with respect
to capitalist enterprises and the macroeconomy in general.
In contrast corporate liberals such as Harriman and Swope

advocated

a

strategy based on self -regulated industries

under minimal government control and coordinated by trade

associations
Unlike the corporate liberals, the Keynesian elite

understood that left to its own devices the capitalist
class was incapable

demonstrated)

(as the

Great Depression had

of regulating the economy.

It also

recognized that the problem of regulating the macroeconomy
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was beyond the control of any single
industry or any group
of industries acting autonomously.
For the Keynesians,

this problem was linked to areas--including
fiscal,

monetary an regulatory policies--which were under
the
control of the state not of industry.

The state,

Keynesians argued, was the only institution with the power
and the capacity to regulate the macroeconomy

.

in sum,

Taylor Society and its Keynesian associates advocated
more radical,

the

a

regulatory-oriented strategy, while the

corporatists clung to Hoover's vision of an "associative
state,

"

in which government functions as

"coordinator, assistant, and midwife," but not as regulator
of the economy.

Second,

the role of unions and collective bargaining.

The Taylor Society and other Keynesians advocated

a

strong

role for the labor movement in the policy-making process

and recognized the importance of unions and collective

bargaining in maintaining high wages and increasing
workers' purchasing power.

That is to say,

unions as a "deep social need,

"

they visualized

and in accordance with this

view they called on management to assist in the development
of trade unions.

necessary as
labor,

a

For the Keynesian,

elite unions were

form of balance of power between capital and

which ensured workers

a

"fair bargaining position"

with respect to wages and working conditions.
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The corporatists,

on the other hand,

failed to

acknowledge the importance of collective bargaining
and
unions in the development of a mass consumption
political
economy.
Under Swope s Plan, for example, workers
1

were to

be represented by employees'

committees or company unions,

not by independent trade unions. These company
unions

lacked any real power over wages and management policies.
By excluding trade unions in favor of employees'

representation schemes that did not give workers any degree
of real participation in the process of production,

Swope

*

Plan remained clearly within the boundaries of corporate
liberalism.

The Keynesian elite

— including

the Taylor

Society--went beyond corporatism and enunciated

a

social-

democratic perspective on unions and collective bargaining.
Third,

macroeconomic policies.

The macroeconomic

policies espoused by the Keynesian network

— including

the

Wagner Act, the Social Security Act, the Banking Act of
1935,

the Public Utilities Holding Act,

and the wealth tax

act--were designed to enhance the regulatory functions of
the state and to stimulate mass consumption.

For

Keynesians, then, the objective of macroeconomic policies
was not merely to stabilize production, but rather to

increase purchasing power, expand the mass market, and

increase the productive capacity of the nation.
Put differently,

Keynesians did not share the vision

of a static balance between production and consumption
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which underlay the corporatist economic
program.
they believe, as did the corporatist
that
s

task of the day was to maintain
They advocated,

instead,

a

the economic

"mature" economic system.

developmental program centered

on expanding mass consumption

power)

a

,

Nor did

(and thus social purchasing

via the intervention of the state.

Such a

macroeconomic program, the Keynesian elite argued, would
lead to full employment, economic growth,
In synthesis,

and prosperity.

my dissertation establishes that there

were strategic political and ideological differences

between corporate liberals such as Swope and Harriman, and
social Keynesians like Cooke, Van Kleeck, Person, and

others associated with the Taylor Society.

It

argues,

moreover, that these programmatic perspectives were

advanced not just by different political and managerial
elites, but also by different capitalist blocs,

fractions.

or

The corporatist program was promoted by

a

more

traditional capitalist bloc rooted in railroads, public
utilities,

and producer goods.

overproduction,

This bloc was burdened by

older technologies,

indebtness.

The Keynesian bloc,

comprised of

a

foreign competition and

on the other hand,

was

network of manufacturing, retailing and

financial sectors closely linked to mass consumption of

durable and light durable goods and to the expansion of the
mass urban market.

It included,
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among others, mass

merchandisers like Filene's and Macy's, and
mass
consumption-oriented banks such as the Bowery
Savings Bank.
The analysis developed in this dissertation,
thus,
contributes to our understanding of the importance
not just
of class, but of class fractions in the
political conflicts
that led to the emergence of a the post-World
War II mass

consumption political economy.

it

also shows the

importance of the role played by key political and

managerial elites in the creation of the post war political
economy.
The creation of this political economy, however,
was not inscribed in the fate of capitalism.

Nor was it

the unmediated product of the "design" of some "enlightened

elite."

Rather,

it was the outcome of a complex and

prolonged process of political struggle between contending
social forces.
By focusing on the conflicts between different groups
of capitalists and between contending political and

managerial elites,

I

have sought to shed light on one

important aspect of the process that led to the creation of
the postwar political economy.

In doing so,

I

have taken

issue with the interpretation put forward by the corporate

liberal school,

in the hope of providing an alternative

understanding to the historical problems studied here.
My attempt to provide an alternative understanding of

modern American political economy is informed by the

regulation approach.

This approach--which is associated

234

.

with the work of

a

group of French political economists

including Michel Aglietta, Alain Lipietz,
Robert Boyer, and
others— centers on the concepts of "regime of
accumulation"
and "mode of regulation."

it

is characterized by a non-

teleological conception of the history of capitalism
and
rejects the view that capitalism is pre-determined

by some

"deep logic" of capitalist accumulation.

Instead,

it

attempts to provide an approach in which human agency and

contingency play
on political,

a

central role.

ideological,

Accordingly,

it

focuses

and economic struggles as the

concrete and contingent determinants of the history of

capitalism
Put differently,

for the regulation approach the

history of capitalism is not pre-determined.

Rather,

it

is

always mediated through historically contingent

institutional forms and regulatory networks (such as the
wage relation, the state, and others) which are themselves
always the outcome of past and present social conflicts.
The regulation approach was useful in the development
of my analysis in several ways.

First,

unlike the

corporate liberalism school, the regulation approach is

characterized by its emphasis on contingency, conflict, and
change.

This emphasis contributed to

my critique of the

corporatist approach and to the development of my argument,
which was based on

a

non-teleological conception of the

history of capitalism.

Second,
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it provided a set of

.

tneoretical concepts (i.e., regime of accumulation
and mode
of regulation) which guided my
understanding of the

development of twentieth-century American political
economy.

Third,

its attention to stages and phases of

capitalist development provided

a

useful tool for

periodizing the history of modern U.S. capitalism.
Yet,

the regulation approach has a number of important

limitations which became evident in the course of my

dissertation and which need to be overcome if is to become
a

truly fruitful tool for historical research.

these are:

(1)

Key among

the ambiguity of some of its central

concepts and the divergent use of these concepts by members
of the regulation school;

(2)

the weakness of its analysis

of the state as a key institutional form of capitalist

regulation;

(3)

the emergence within the regulation school

of a structural-functionalist tendency which tends to focus
on questions of structural coherence

(stability)

and growth

and disregards social conflicts, human agency, and

contingency; and

(4)

the overly general and somewhat

abstract nature of most of the studies done by the

regulation school.
For the regulation approach to overcome these

limitations it needs to become more precise and

historically specific.
That is to say,

It needs to

become historicized

the regulation approach can become

framework for historians only if it can produce
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a

useful

.

historically specific case studies that shed
light on the
concrete history of capitalism in a given
country or
region.

These detailed and specific historical
studies

(such as the one developed in this dissertation)

could

provide the regulat ionists with the analytical precision
which their overly general and abstract presentations
have
lacked

Limiha^inng
What are the limitations of the analysis developed in
this dissertation?

First,

although

recognize that the

I

Keynesian political economy was the product of

a

conjunction of working class struggles "from below" and
"reforms from above,"

I

do not incorporate a detailed

discussion of these struggles from below into my account of
the interwar political economy.

discuss in

a

Specifically,

I

do not

detailed way the key role played by the new

industrial unions of the CIO in pushing forward the major
reforms of the New Deal, including the Wagner Act and the
Social Security Act.

stated before,

The fact of the matter,

as

is that these reforms were passed

I

have

and

implemented over the opposition of the majority of
capitalists.
below.

They were won by workers struggles from

If these struggles are not discussed in detail in

this dissertation,

it is not because
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I

fail to acknowledge

.

their importance, but because they
are beyond the scope of
this study.
My purpose was to examine the role
played by key

political and managerial elites in the emergence
of a
Keynesian order.
In this sense, I was limited to examining
one aspect of the creation of the Keynesian
political
economy, the efforts to reform from above.

Its focus was

on the conflicts between different groups of
capitalists

and between contending policymakers, not on the
conflicts

between workers and capitalists.
are the struggles from below.

Left out of the picture

Yet,

if we are to develop a

more comprehensive understanding of the creation of the

political economy of mass consumption we need to start

moving in the direction of studies that deal with the
conjunction between struggles from below and reforms from
above
Second,

I

need to do

a

better job of contextualizing

the ideological development of the Taylor Society.
is,

I

That

need to place this development in relation to other

intellectual and social developments of the period.

For

example, how did the rise of international communism and

World War

I

affect the way the Taylorites conceptualized

the relationship between capital and state?

sources of influences in
the Taylor Society?

What are the

the ideological development of

What are the institutional bases

fostering the development of these ideas?
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What is the

relationship of the Taylor Society to the Russell
Sage
Foundation and other foundations? What is the relation

of

the Taylor Society to theorists of abundance
as Simon

Patten?

What did Taylorists owe to Progressivism? What was

the influence of socialists ideas over the the
Taylorites?

What was the influence of engineers such as Thorstein

Veblen?

These are some of the questions that need to be

addressed to better understand the intellectual development
of the Taylor Society.

Third,

I

need to further develop the discussion of the

Taylor Society's shift to the problem of industrial
relations.

Specifically,

I

need to elaborate on the

Taylorites' conception of industrial democracy.
the Taylor Society mean by industrial democracy?
it mean by workers'

syndicalist?

consent?

Also important,

What did

What did

Was the Taylor Society
is to discuss in detail the

involvement of the Taylor Society in the union-management

cooperation schemes developed during the 1920s.
the objectives of these cooperation plans?

results?

What were

What were their

What was the contribution of the Taylor Society

to these plans?

The rapprochement between the Taylor

Society and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) should
also be addressed in detail.

rapprochement?

What factors led to this

What specifically was the relationship

between the Taylor Society and the AFL?

What role did the

Taylor Society play within the labor movement?
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Furthermore,

it

is important to discuss the relationship

between the Taylor Society and the CIO during
the 1930s.
What role did the Taylor Society play in the
emergence of
the CIO?

What role did it play afterwards?

Fourth, the dissertation needs to explore in more

detail the ideological positions within the Taylor
Society.

Did the Taylor Society represent

a

unified ideological

"position," or were there important ideological differences

within the Taylor Society?

differences?

If so,

what were these

Did they reflect differences between sectors

within the society?

Put differently,

were there

ideological differences between businessmen and managementengineers,

or between businessmen and social scientists

within the Taylor Society?

Were businessmen like Henry

Dennison and Henry Kendall more conservative in their
political outlook than engineers such as Morris Cooke and
social scientists such as Mary Van Kleeck and Harlow

Person?

S.

Moreover, did the social-democratic perspective of

Cooke, Van Kleeck,

and Person represent a general

perspective shared by the organization, or did
an exceptional case.

Finally,

it represent

it would be interesting to

trace figures such as Cooke and Van Kleeck into the 1940s
and 1950s to see were they stood in relation to their

previously held positions, and what role they played in the
political struggles of those decades.
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